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PREFACE 
When re~lecting on the sales of Ayn Rand's novels The 
Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged, the ~ormer editor-in-chie~ 
o~ the New American Library (Signet Press), commented: 
Once or twice a year, we reissue these books • • • and 
I'm not talking about a printing o~ 10,000. These books 
are reprinted in runs o~ 50,000 and 100,000 copies. 
What this means is that every year, 100,000 new people 
read The Fountainhead. o •• Other than with Fitzgerald 
and Hemingway ••• this just doesn't happen.l 
Bennett Cer~, long-time head o~ Random House, observed: "It's 
remarkableJ In all my years o~ publishing, I've never seen 
anything like it."2 The Nathaniel Branden Institute (NBI), 
o~~icial disseminating agency3 ~or Objectivist materials, 
attracted about 5000 students and provided materials to 40,000 
others throughout North America.4 
lEd Kuhn as quoted in E. Ephron, "A Strange Kind o~ 
Simplicity," The New York Times Book Review, (Hay 5, 1968), 
p. 8. Unless otherHise indicated, all ellipses used in this 
study are mine. 
2Bennett Cer~ as quoted in Barbara Branden's bio-
graphical essay, "Who Is Ayn Rand?" in Nathaniel Branden, \fuo 
Is Ayn Rand? (New York: Paperback Library, 1968), pp. 189-91. 
3Branden and Rand severed all personal and pro~ession­
al relationships in May o~ 1968, the NBI also ceasing opera-
tions then. Now, Dr. Leonard Peiko~f o~~ers taped lectures 
on the history o~ philosophy (including Objectivism) which 
are available on a rental basis. See: The Ayn Rand Letter, I, 
No. 7 (January 3, 1972}, 4., and II, No. 8 {January 15, 1973), 
6 f'or details. 
4Nathaniel Branden, "A Report to Our Readers--1965," 
The Objectivist Net-rsletter, IV, No. 12 (December, 1965), 57. 
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The rather enthusiastic public acceptance of Objectiv-
ist philosophy suggests\that it could (at least potentially) 
change the current of American intellectual thought. Objec-
tivism ex~~ines and analyzes most aspects of American life 
including business and industry, government, the arts and, to 
be complete, formal education. This study will examine the 
educational implications of Objectivism. 
Objectivism's consideration of formal education assumes 
two forms: (1) the construction of what the ideally educated 
nuL~ ought to be, and (2) a critique of current school practice 
insofar as it obstructs achievement of that ideal. 
Because Rand is both novelist and philosopher, she 
often employs techniques of the former to develop the latter. 
Using the dramatic intricacies of plot and character, she 
postulates her concept of the educated man as one dedicated 
to rational self-interest, self-esteem and cognitive excel-
lence. He is an ideal which ought to be achieved, ultimately 
suggesting that the school ought to promote the virtues be 
holds dear. 
This study will consider as its primary end the fol-
lowing: to examine the Randian concept of the educated man 
including the nature of the value changes which ought to occur 
if he be truly educated. Such an investigation, of course, 
will be primarily a normative one. As a required corollary, 
the Objectivist critique of present-day school practice will 
receive attention since Rand regards current formal education 
as obstructing the actualization of her educated 'ideal.' 
iv 
structurally, i,he Introduction orientates the reader 
to Objectivism, provid'l,ng biographical data significant to 
'.· \ 
R~~d's intellectual development. The model of her educated 
man will also be outlined, and objections to the model's 
structure will receive attention. The second chapter expands 
concepts outlined in the Introduction relating to the intel-
lectual antecedents of Objectivism. Of primary importance is 
Aristotle's philosophy and Rand's own theory of art, to which 
she attaches significant educative value. 
With the third chapter, the reader will study the meta-
physics, epistemology and axiology of Objectivism. All three, 
but especially the ethics, kaleidoscope to form the educated 
man. Of special concern is the ethics, for in order to be 
formally educated as a morally responsible being;; Ra.Ylcl' s edu_-
cated man exists as a practitioner of a specific code of 
values. Since many of these values conflict with accepted 
Christian ethics, attention will be devoted to their opera-
tion within Objectivist ethics. 
Chapter four essentially consists of a critique of 
Objectivist philosophy, especially noting areas which might 
obstruct the actualization of her educated man. Since Objec-
tivist ethics postulates as virtues concepts such as pride 
and selfishness, attention will be given to Rand's use of 
definition. 
The next two chapters are specifically educational in 
nature. Throughout them, the word education should be taken 
to mea~ formal education, i.e., schooling on the elementary 
v 
and/or higher levels. :Chapter :f'i ve critiques American :f'ormal 
j 
education, epeci:f'ica~l~ noting hm-1 Rand believes it obstructs 
\ .. 
the graduation of' her educated man. Issues such as student 
violence on the c~pus and the wel:f'are state mentality of' :f'or-
mal education receive consideration in the light of' what 
principles of' Objectivist ethics they interdict. Chapter six 
defines what Rand thinks the school ought to be doing to :f'ur-
ther Objectivism's normative ends. Throughout these chapters, 
attention is given to educators whom Rand endorses, including 
Aristotle and Montessori. 
The :f'inal chapter assesses Objectivism's contribution 
to :f'ormal education in America and o:f'fers possible means of' 
dealing with obstructions to its being utilized by schoolmen. 
Suggestions :f'or :f'urther research will be provided. 
Those attempting to study any phase of Objectivism 
are con:f'ronted with a variety of' obstacles, all combi~ing to 
make the task a di:f':f'icult one. Perhaps the most signi:f'icant 
hurdle to be overcome is the problem of' source material. 
Rand, perhaps because of' her experience with Branden, 
generally re:f'uses to grant interviews, especially with those 
who disagree with any of' Objectivism's conclusions. Conse-
quently, the researcher must rely exclusively on published 
materials. Fortunately, they contain su:f':f'icient re:f'erences 
to educational matters to make an investigation worthwhile. 
Primary source materials o:f'ten used in this study include the 
novels Atlas Shrugged (1957), and The Fountainhead (1968). 
Direct commentary on educational issues may be :round in the 
vi 
.f"o11owing books: For the New Intellectual (1961), containing 
excerpts f'rom the majOr novels; Canitalism: The Unknown Ideal 
\. 
\ 
(1967), a moral defense of laissez-faire Capitalism; Introduc-
tion to Objectivist Epistemology (1969), explaining the Objec-
tivist theory of concept formation, and The Romantic Manifesto 
(1971), explaining the Objectivist theory of art and its edu-
cational importance. Of special interest is The Virtue of 
Selfishness (1964), dealing with Objectivist ethics, and The 
New Left: The Anti-Industrial Revolution (1971), consisting 
of" extended commentary on American formru. education. 
Additionally, Rand's three journals (all published by 
the Objectivist), The Objectivist Newsletter (1962-1965), The 
Objectivist (1966-1971), and The Ayn Rand Letter (1971-date), 
contain i'requent references to education, and at>e cited 
throughout this study when appropriate. 
A problem exists with Nathaniel Branden's writings. 
His published materials, including frequent articles in The 
Objectivist Newsletter and The Objectivist, may be used with-
out reservation. Following their separation in May of 1968,5 
Rand has categorically refused to endorse any of his published 
material. Consequently, one must proceed with extreme caution 
when citing such books as his The Psychology of Self-Esteem 
(1969). Material published by Branden after 1968 is used only 
when there can be no mistruce as to its consistency with 
5For details of the separation, including Rand's 
reasons for initiating the break, see chapter one, p. 2. 
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Objectivist thought.6 Since his book Vlho Is Ayn Rand? (co-
authored vlith his wife) first appeared in 1962, it may be used 
without reservation. 
In view of the above, enough primary source material 
exists· to warrant the feasibility of an investigation of Ob-
jectivism and American education. Secondary source material 
cited in the text has been selected according to th~ee con-
ditions: (1) when Rand has specifically endorsed the figure 
in her writings-Aristotle and Nontessori, for example, (2) 
when the v~iter is an established scholar whose material pre-
sents a mature and sophisticated evaluation of American schools 
--Job~ Holt, Charles Silberman, and (3) when the material pre-
sents a critical analysis of Objectivism itself. Of impor-
tw~ce here are two books: by 
Albert Ellis, and With Charity Tovrard None by William 0 1Neill. 
Both books begin with the premise that Objectivism is unsound 
philosophically, and then proceed to build a case, with vary-
ing degrees of success as will be established throughout this 
6For example, in The Psychology of Self-Esteem, Branden 
writes: "Although I am no longer associated with !1is s Rand, 
I welcome this opportunity to acknowledge the invaluable con-
tribution which her work as a philosopher has made to my own 
thinking in the field of psychology. I indicate, throughout 
the text, specific concepts and theories of Miss Rand's 
philosophy, Objectivism, which are crucially important to 
my own ideas. The Objectivist epistemology, metaphysics and 
ethics are the philosophical frame of reference in which I 
write as a psychologist." See: Nathaniel Branden, The 
Psychology of Self-Esteem (New York, Bantam Books edition, 
1971), p. ix. 
viii 
study.7 
Even given a s\U'ficient amount of primary source 
\ .. 
' 
material, a researcher still treads on shaky grounds. Rand 
extends little s~pathy to anyone discussing Objectivism un-
less he receives 'official' sanction to do so. Individuals 
who have written without it have faced litigation.8 Rand's 
lawyer, Henry Mark Holzer specifies: 
••• the specific formulations of Ayn Rand's discoveries, 
as well as her fictional creations, constitute her property 
and fall under the protection of the copyright laws • • • 
(which prohibit the) use of extensive quotations from 
someone else's work--even when credit is given--if they 
constitute the major part of the new work •••• Thus, if 
in your own work you make a brief reference to the work 
of Ayn Rand, you must tru{e scrupulous care to separate 
your own views from hers and to ascribe to her only those 
statements which she has actually made. In other words, 
do not paraphrase or summarize what you think amounts to 
Miss Rand's position in any given issue; set forth what 
that position is--just as she has stated it.9 
Throughout this study, references to ideas specifically not 
the author's and pertaining to any aspect of Objecti~ism are 
7see: Albert Ellis, Is Obfectivism a Religion? (New 
York: Lyle Stuart, 1968), pp. 9- 3, and \·lilliam O'Neill, \-lith 
Charity Toward None (New York: Philosophical Library, 197rr;-
pp. 3-4. Of the two, 0 1Neill 1 s is the more scholarly and 
sophisticated. work. 
8see: "Court Upholds Use of Author's Name in Blurb," 
Publishers' ltleekly, CLXXXXV (Ivlarch, 1969), 35, and "But You 
Can Do That, 11 Publishers' Heekly, CLXXXXV (Hay, 1969), 23-24. 
A blurb is a short quotation from a review which appears on 
the jacket of a book. \fuen one appeared on Chaos Below Heaven 
by Eugene Vale containing Rand's name, the latter sued under 
the provisions of a New York Law, charging invasion of privacy. 
Rand won the case, but on !-1arch 18, 1969, the Appellate Divi-
sion of the New York Supreme Court reversed the decision. 
9Henry Mark Holzer, "A Statement of Policy," Part II, 
The Objectivist, VII, No. 7 (July, 1968), 14. My brackets. 
Italics in original. 
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cara~ully ~ootnoted. Although the author has tried to present 
Objectivist philosophy as Rand de~ines it, he has--especially 
in chapter ~our--reserved the right to examine areas o~ it 
with which he disagrees. In so doing, care has been exer-
cised not to inaccurately state Rand's position. 
Finally, a word concerning documentation. Many of the 
books by Rand cited in this study contain articles which 
first appeared in some o~ her journals, chie~ly The Objectivist 
Newsletter and The Objectivist. When such articles are used, 
the footnote refers the reader to the book in which they are 
reprinted. This policy has been adopted chie~ly because the 
books are more readily available to the general public than 
the journals. 
As a student of Objectivisms this writer believes the 
philosophy of Objectivism can sustain substantial contribu-
tions to American educational practice. The specifics of 
that belief follow. 
X 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
While a student at the University o~ Petrograd in 
Russia, Ayn Rand, a history major, studied ancient philo-
sophy under Pro~essor N. 0. Lossky, an authority on Plato. 
During an oral examination, he discerned her dislike for 
Platonic Idealism. He asked, 11 You don't seem to agree with 
Plato, do you? 111 She replied, "No I don 1 t •••• My philo-
sophical views are not part o~ the history o~ philosophy yet. 
But they will be."2 
Much later and in America, she realized her dream and 
today, her published works include the novels Anthem, We the 
Living, The Fountainhead, Atlas Shrugged and the philosophi-
cal publications The Romantic Mani~esto, The Virtue o~ Self-
ishness, For the New Intellectual, Capitalism: The Unknown 
Ideal, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, and The New 
Left: The Anti-Industrial Revolution. To date, they have 
sold over eight million copies. Un~ortunately, as critic Dora 
Jane Hamblin observes, 
It has been ~ar too easy, and too much fun, ~or everyone 
~rom book reviewers to philosophers to economists to poke 
lBarbara Branden, 11 \fuo Is Ayn Rand?," in Nathaniel 
Branden, Hho Is Ayn Rand? (New York: Paperback Library, 
1968), p. 132. 
2Ibid. 
- 1 
2 
.f"un at her excesses,. The general hilarity has obscured 
the issue, which is deadly serious.3 
\ 
\ 
As the following pages\will hopefully make clear, Ayn Rand 
should indeed be taken seriously. 
Although it is not intended here to write a biography 
of Rand, 4 a knm-rledge of her childhood and academic career 
will provide data crucial to an understanding of Objectiv-
ism. Three significant developments helped to form her 
intellectual character: early academic interests, atheism, 
and the adoption of America as home. 
Early Academic Interests 
Ayn Rand was born on February 2, 1905 in St. Peters-
burg, Russia. Her biographer notes that mathematics first 
aroused her interest, because "in its rigorous, demanding 
clarity, she found a constant and exhilarating intellectual 
challenge."5 Probably as a result of witnessing the Russian 
revolution which cost the family their business,6 Rand de-
3nora Hamblin, "The Cult of Angry Ayn Rand," Life, 
LXII (April, 1967), 92. 
4Interested readers should consult Barbara Branden's 
biographical essay, "Who Is Ayn Rand?," in Nathaniel Branden, 
Who Is A~ Rand?, pp. 119-191. Rand broke with the Brandens. 
in Hay, r6B for their alleged philosophical inconsistencies. 
For details see: Ayn Rand, "To Whom It May Concern," The 
Objectivist, VII, No. 5 (May, 1968), 1-8. Her letter therein 
is dated, September 15, 1968. 
5Barbara Branden, "Who Is Ayn Rand?," ~ 121. 
6Rand's parents were Jewish merchants, When the 
revolutionary forces confiscated the business, Rand and her 
family faced starvation for several years. Her novel, We 
The Living describes revolutionary Russia. Of it she wrote, 
~I want to say that We The Living is as near to an autobiog-
3 
veloped a loathing .for,, Connnunism and all .forms o.f collectiv-
ism. "I lmew it was ~vil," she said.7 More significantly 
'· 
perhaps, she began to seek a t~pe o.f man more worthy, more 
heroic than the t4ugs who murdered Czar Nicholas II and muti-
lated him and his .family. Turning .fram mathematics, she 
.found such men in the novels o.f Victor Hugo,8 men heroic in 
stature, and dedicated to truth and justice: 
It was (.for Rand] the discovery o.f a world o.f unprece-
dented scope and grandeur, o.f magnificently ingenious 
plots, o.f inexhaustible imaginativeness, of an exalted 
sense of li.fe, of man seen as a hero. It was a world 
swept .free o.f the commonplace, and the trite--a world 
dedicated to the exciting, the dramatic, the important.9 
Thus Rand developed a taste in fiction .for the heroic man, 
the moral crusader. This type o.f novel, referred to by lit-
erary historians as Romantic .fiction, is characterized by 
"strong interest in action • • • o.ften based on love, adven-
ture, and combat. nlO As will be seen, her concept o.f adven- ~~ 
ture and combat is intellectual and philosophical. Atlas 
raphy as I will ever write. It is not an autobiography in 
the literal, but only in the intellectual sense. The plot is 
invented, the background is not." See: We The Living (New 
York: The New American Library, Signet Press, 19S9), p. ix. 
The novel contains vivid descriptions o.f the starvation and 
brutality o.f Communist Russia. 
?John Kobler, "The Curious Cult o.f Ayn Rand," The 
Saturday Evening Post, CCXXXIV (November, 1961), 12. ---
~ihen the antecedents o.f Objectivism are discussed, 
.attention will be' given to Hugo's sense o.f the heroic as it 
influenced Rand. 
9Branden, "Who Is Ayn Rand?," p. 126. 'brackets. 
Italics in original. 
l~villiam Thrall, Addison Hibbard, and c. Hugh Holeman, 
A Handbook to Literature (New York: Odyssey Press, 1960), 
p. 425. 
4 
shrugged has been described as an epistemological detective 
story, with heroic characters the protagonists. 
In March of 1964, when interviel'red by Playboy magazine, 
Rand spoke of her interest in Victor Hugo and a modern writer, 
Mickey Spillane: 
PLAYBOY: Are there any novelists whom you admire? 
RAND: Yes, Victor Hugo. 
PLAYBOY: \fuat about modern novelists? 
RAND: No, there is no one that I could say I admire among 
the so-called serious writers. I prefer the popular lit-
erature of today, which is today 1 s remnant of Romanticism. 
My favorite is Hickey Spillane. 
PLAYBOY: Why do you like him? 
RAND: Because he is primarily a moralist. In a primi-
tive form, the form of the detective novel, he presents 
the conflict of good and evil, in terms of black and white. 
He does not permit a nasty gray mixture of indistinguish-
able scou..'!"ldrels on both sides. .He presents an uncompro-
mising conflict.ll 
Rand's heroic ideal, her concept of an educated man, is pri-
marily a moralist. Hank Rearden, Ho-v1ard Roark, John Galt-
all of her heroes are crusaders against moral depravity; 
what values they hold will be considered at length. 
Ayn Rand entered the University of Petrograd in 1921, 
majoring in history. While there, she studied ancient philo-
sophy under the Platonist, Professor N. o. Lossky, 12 but came 
to reject his idealistic orientation in favor of the realism 
of Aristotle. Rand recalls: 
In college I had taken history as my major subject, and 
philosophy as my special interest; the first--in order to 
' llAlvin Toffler, (Interviewer), 11 Pla4boy's Interview 
with Ayn Rand," Playboy, XI (March, 1964), 0. 
12Branden, "Who Is Ayn Rand?," pp. 131-32. 
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have a £actual knowledge o£ man's past, £or my £uture 
writings; the second--in order to achieve an objective 
definition o£ my values •••• 
I have held the same philosophy I now hold, £or as 
far back as I can remember •••• 1:·1y philosophy, in 
essence, is the concept of man as a heroic being, with 
productive achievement as his noblest activity, and rea-
son as his only absolute. 
The only philosophical debt I can acknowledge is to 
Aristotle. 1J 
Aristotle remains the only philosopher whom she acknowledges 
as having any influence on her thinking. Rand combines the 
Romanticism of Hugo and Spillane with Aristotelian meta-
physics, epistemology and axiology--the moral philosophy, 
however, more uniquely her own, but the two agreeing that 
happiness constitutes the legitimate end for man--to produce 
her concept of man as a heroic being. 
Atheism 
In addition to her interest in mathematics and admir-
ation for Hugo and Spillane, another important idea contri-
buted to Rand's intellectual development. Between 1918 and 
1921 Rand concluded that God could not exist. She believed 
the concept of God degrading to man, forcing him to live up 
to a moral standard he could never possibly achieve, but at 
the same time incurring punishment for failure to do so. 
Rand's atheistic position is a significant reason why 
Objectivist ethics have been criticized. Western civiliza-
tion remains, at least in name, committed to the Christian 
13Ayn Rand, Atlas Shru~ged (New York: 
can Library, Signet Press, 19 7), p. 1085. The New Amari-
6 
ethic, and consequently rejects anyone who proposes an ethi-
cal system counter to Christian moral philosophy. 
In chapter rour, when problems with Objectivism are 
discussed, space will be devoted to Objectivism and atheism. 
At first glance, rew would be willing to commit their children 
to a philosophical-ethical system which rejects God as immoral. 
America 
In 1925, Rand's entire lire changed when relatives 
orrered the chance or coming to America: 
At nine-thirty one evening, early in 1926, she boarded 
her boat at Le Havre •••• Eight days later, she stood 
on a pier at the Hudson River, tears running dmm her 
race, looking through the lightly falling snow at the 
sky-scrapers or New York City •••• 
She arrived in New York with rirty dollars in her 
nurse-and the outlines or seventeen nlavs and novels in 
her mind. She spent two days looking~atuthe buildings 
and the glittering electric signs or the greatest city in 
the world, the city that was her symbol or everything she 
admired in lire.l~ 
For Rand, New York represented one or the greatest monuments 
to the mind or man. It is signiricant to note, thererore, 
that many or her heroes are businessmen, industrialists and 
architects--men 't-lho make such a city possible. 
After an intense struggle--The Fountainhead, for ex-
ample, was rejected by twelve publishers for being too 'in-
tellectual•--her literary and philosophical fame caught hold. 
She became a United States' citizen and in 1921, married an 
actor Frank 0 'Connor, to vihom she ded:Lca ted Atlas Shrugged. 
14nranden, "t'lho Is Ayn Rand?" p. 137. 
7 
Thoy now reside in New York. 
O'Connor's ini\ial impression of his future wife's 
'·· 
character is revealing: 
one of the most striking things about her • • • was her 
complete openness--the absence of any trace of devious-
ness. The total honesty. You knew that it would be 
inconceivable for her ever to act against he~ own prin-
ciples •••• She never wondered if she was going to 
succeed. The only question was how long it would tru{e.l5 
This description not only reflects Rand's character, but 
could also describe Dagny Taggart, Hank Rearden or any of 
her fictional heroes. Honesty, devotion to one's principles, 
and love of productive work are three virtues she wishes any 
educated person to possess. 
In summary, Ayn Rand's intellectual development re-
sulted from the following positive and negative influences: 
positive--a love of mathematics, logic, Bomantic fiction and 
Aristotle; negative--any form of collectivism including Com-
munism and a disbelief in God's existence. 
For Rand educational theory is a problem to be con-
sidered when constructing a comprehensive world view. Ob-
jectivism deals with most aspects of American life including 
government, economics, business, culture, and, to be complete, 
education. She relates her philosophy to education by direct 
commentary in her three journals, 16 her purely philosophical 
l5Frank O'Connor quoted in Barbara Branden, Ibid., 
pp. 143-44. ' -
16Rand's journals include the following: The Objec-
tivist Newsletter which ran from 1962 to 1965, when it became 
a magazine called The Objectivist. This lasted until Septem-
ber, 1971 and was then replaced oy The Ayn Rand Letter, the 
8 
works, and the novel. Using the dramatic intricacies or 
plot and character, she depicts the educated man as one ded-
icated to rational selr-interest, reason, selr-esteem, and 
cognitive excellence. 
Berore continuing, two objections to the Randian model 
or the educated man must be considered. Critics have argued 
that, (1) such men as envisioned by Rand could never exist 
and (2), her heroes are viciously cruel people who delight 
in hate and destruction. Obviously this study would termin- . 
ate here ir either charge remained unchallenged. Parents 
would hardly commit their children to a value change in the 
race or such objections. 
The case ror unbelievability perhaps is best stated in 
Is Objectivism a Religion? by Dr. Albert Ellis, who observes 
in this connection: 
Ayn Rand's heroes in her novels--such as Howard Roark and 
John Galt--are utterly impossible humans--or rather super-
humans. They have no rlai-ts, and they are literally out or 
this world •••• It is even questionable whether it can 
be correctly claimed that Roark, Galt and the other Rand-
ian heroes and heroines are ideal rigures, who obviously 
do not exist today, but who might come alive tomorrow. 
Could they? I doubt it: They are just not human. More-
over, ir they did exist, it would perhaps be unrortunate; 
ror some or their "ideal" characteristics consist or 
latter still in print. The rirst two publications, edited 
by Rand and Branden until Nay, 1968 when he lert, contain 
articles written by Rand and others interested in Objectiv-
ism. The Ayn Rand Letter is written usually by Rand, with 
an occasional contributor. All three publications contain 
rrequent rererences to education and will be cited through-
out this study when appropriate. Additionally, Rand has 
written a play entitled Hight or Januarr 16th. Excepting 
the journals and Introduction to Objectlvist Epistemology, 
all are available in paperback from Signet Press. 
9 
stubbornness • • • and abysmal intolerance and dogma-
tism.l7 
When arguing that Roark and Galt do not exist today, Ellis 
is correct, but ignores the fact that they could (and ought) 
to exist given the educative value of Objectivist ethics. 
Significantly Ellis fails to cite Rand's "The Goal of My 
tvriting," in his text. Importantly, it clarifies Rand's 
intent in creating characters such as Galt: 
This is the motive and purpose of my writing: the pro-
jection of an ideal man. The portrayal of a moral mal, 
as my ultimate literary goal, as an end in itself--to 
which any didactic, intellectual, or philosophical values 
contained in a novel are only the means •••• My basic 
test f'or a..'1.y story is: "Would I want to meet these char-
acters and observe these events in real life? • • • Is 
the pleasure of contemplating these characters an end in 
itself'? 11 
It's as simple as that. But that simplicity involves 
the total of man's existence. It involves such questions 
as: lfua.t kind o£ men do I v.ra_l!t to see i'Yl real li:Le--a11.d 
why? What kind of events, that is human actions, do I 
want to see taking place--and why? • • • 
It is obvious to what field of human knowledge all 
these questions belong: to the field of ethics. What is 
the good? What are the right actions for man to take? 
What are man's proper values? 
Since my purpose is the presentation of an ideal man, 
I had to define and present the conditions which make him 
possible and which his existence requires. Since man's 
character is the product of his premises, I had to define 
and present the kind of premises and values that create 
the character of an ideal man and motivate his actions; 
which means thaf8I had to define and present a rational code of' ethics. 
When creating characters, she deals with heroic individuals 
(as the protagonists, of course) who act according to a 
17Albert Ellis, Is Objectivism a Religion? (New York: 
Lyle Stuart, Inc., 1968), p. 254. Italics and quotation 
marks in original. 
18Ayn Rand, "The Goal of My vlriting," Part I, The 
Objectivist Newsletter, II, No. 10 (October, 1963), 3~ 
Italics in original. 
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specific code of valuas--Objectivist ethics. They are dedi-
cated to "the glory o'!' man.nl9 She argues that a man is the 
\_~ 
product of what values he chooses to accept. Since her ideal 
man does not yet exist, her novels create him by showing the 
value changes that will have to occur if he is to exist. 
Rand describes art as, "the indispensable medium for 
the communication of a moral ideal,u20 which implies the 
existence of a specific one which characters either endorse 
or reject. Because the moral ideal here portrays man as 
heroic, her protagonists naturally will live according to a 
code of ethics necessary for the achievement of that ideal. 
Thus they may be believed insofar as they practice (in this 
case) Objectivist ethics. Rand's and Branden's own thoughts 
en charact,ariza.ticn are important r.Ler-e, the former noting 
that, 
Characterization is the portrayal of those essential 
traits which form the unique, distinctive personality 
of an individual human being. 
Characterization requires an extreme degree of selec-
tivity. A human being is th& most complex entity on 
earth; a writer's task is to select the essentials out 
of that enormous complexity, then proceed to create an 
individual figure, endowing it with all the appropriate 
details down to the telling small touches needed to give 
it full reality. The figure has to be an abstraction, 
yet look like a concrete; [sic) it has to have the uni-
versality of an abstraction;-arid, simultaneously, the 
unrepeatable uniqueness of a person.21 
19Ayn Rand, "The Goal of My \vriting," Part II, The 
Objectivist Newsletter, II, No. 11 (November, 1963), ~ 
20Ayn Rand, "The Psycho-Epistemology of Art," in The 
Romantic Hanifesto (New York: The New .American Library,-
Signet Press, 1971), p. 21. 
21Rand, "Basic Principles of Literature," Ibid., p. 52. 
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Branden elaborates on 'iwhat is meant by essentials: 
They [her heroes] 'are projections of man as he might and 
ought to be; they fr'e projections of the human potential • 
• • • Ayn Rand does not ask: Do such men exist? She 
asks: Should such men exist? ••• [Her] principle of 
characterlzation is • • • to present a character by means 
of essentials,· that is, to focus on the actions and attri-
butes which reflect the character's basic values and pre-
mises--the values and prenises that motivate him and 
direct his crucial choices •••• To characterize by means 
of essentials is to focus on the universal-to omit the 
accidental, the irrelevant, the trivial, the contingent--
and to present the fundamental motivational principles 
which are potentially applicable to all men.22 
By selecting the essentials, the principles which govern a 
character's actions, Rand creates heroes or villains depend-
ing on whether or not they achieve moral excellence. Thus, 
critics who argue unbelievability ignore the criteria defined 
as essential for character creation. 
John Galt, the principal hero in Atlas Shrugged, dom-
inates the novel. The entire novel challenges the reader 
(and characters in the novel itself) to learn his id~ntity 
and beliefs.23 Its first words, "Who is John Galt?" launch 
a fascinating and brilliantly written epistemological mys-
tery. Later in the novel, Galt himself, in a 35,000 word 
speech, provides the answer to his identity, as well as to 
the nature of the moral code he practices. As such, it 
22Branden, "Hho Is Ayp. Rand?, p. 81. Brackets and 
italics in original. 
23A careful reading of Atlas Shrucged reveals that 
its several protagonists are unable to dlscern the nature 
of Galt 1 s mission and thus, at first, act to thwart it. The 
infallibility charge, therefore, cannot be sustained. It 
results from a misreading of the novel. ~~at is signifi-
cant, however, is that the protagonists continue to respect 
and seek the truth. 
12 
provides a valuable insight into Rand's concept of the edu-
cated man: 
:Hy morality, the morality or reason, is contained in a 
single axiom: existence exists--and in a single choice: 
to live. The rest proceeds from these. To live, man 
must hold tl~ee things as the supreme and ruling values 
of. his life: Reason-Purpose-Self-esteem. • • • These 
three values imply and require all of man's virtues, snd 
all his virtues pertain to the relation of existence and 
consciousness: rationality, independence, integrity, 
honesty, justice, productiveness, pride •••• Did you 
want to know who is John Galt? I am the first man of 
ability who refused to regard it as guilt. I am the £irst 
man who would not do penance for his virtues or let them 
be used as the tools of my destruction. I ma the first 
man who would not suffer martyrdom at the hands of those 
who 1.-rished me to perish for the privilege of keeping them 
alive. I ru;l the first man who told· them that I did not 
need them, and until they learned to deal "I-Ii th me as 
traders, giving value for value, they would have to exist 
without me, as I would exist without them; then I would 
let them learn whose is the need and whose the ability--
and if human survival is the standard, whose terms would 
set the way to survive •••• I swear--by my life and my 
love of' it-that I wilJ never live for the sake of another 
man, nor ask another man to live for mine.24 · 
In brief, that selection from Galt's speech describes the 
virtues, terms and conditions to which a rational man must 
adhere if he is to approach the Randian concept of the educat-
ed man. 
Critics such as Ellis have argued that such men as 
John Galt could never exist; they are superhuman creatures 
who never err, never commit one act of L~orality (according 
to their own code), and re£use to recognize that man will 
often choose the evil, even when trying to accomplish good. 25 
But, the fact which Ellis refuses to recognize is that a man 
24Rand, Atlas Shrugged, pp. 944, 957, 993. 
25Ellis, Is Objectivism a Religion?, pp. 179-96. 
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who aspires to live a~. a John Galt might indeed err, as some 
characters in Atlas S('lrugged do. In.fallibility is not a 
\ 
necessary condition here, but cognitive awareness is, meaning 
that "Since man must act, his survival requires that he 
apprehend26 reality, so that he may regulate his behavior 
d . 1 n27 accor ~ng Y• In other words, we may never be John Galts, 
but if we choose to think, to set proper values, to con-
sciously remain aware of reality, and to recognize and cor-
rect any errors in our thinking, then we are living properly. 
So infallibility is not required; the willingness to think is. 
Lastly, the charges of cruelty and hate require refu-
tation. If these charges are true, then the Objectivist 
view of an educated man ought not to exist. VJriting in 
Commonweal. Patricia Donegan states the case: 
Hiss Rand's book [Atlas Shrugged] is hardly acceptable as 
a novel and her premise proceeds from hate. She deplores 
the idea of Original Sin and considers "pity" immoral. 
Nowhere does she use the word "compassion." She envisions 
reward completely on the basis of merit, and this merit 
is judged only by intelligence and ability. Charity and 
humility have no place in the author's scheme of things. 
The destruction of the weak to the advantage of the strong 
is applauded. It is dispiriting to think of an outpouring 
26Jiost realists choose to use the words correspond to, 
rather than apprehend. For example, Van Cleve Ilforr~s wr~ tes 
that the key to Real~st epistemology is, " ••• seeing to it 
that our statements about the world we live in do in fact cor-
respond tp the way things really are." See: Philosopht and 
the American School (Boston: Houghton r·1ifflin Co., 196 ) , 
pp. 145-46. N.B.: Horris, though an Existentialist by con-
viction, has wr~tten about other philosophies. 
27Nathaniel Branden, The Psvcholog~ of Self-Esteem 
(New York: Bantam Books Inc., 1971), p. 7. Italics in 
original. 
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of hate on this scale on any audience. 28 
Objectivism indeed rejects the concept of Original Sin as 
immoral, but hardly out of hate. Hebster 1 s Third New Inter-
national Dictionary defines Original Sin as follows: "hered-
itary. sin or defect often held in Christian theology to be 
transmitted from one generation to the next and inherited by 
each person as a consequence of the original sinful choice 
made by the first man of the human race." John Galt speaks 
of the term in his speech: 
A sin without volition is a slap at morality and an in-
solent contradiction in terms: that which is outside the 
possibility of choice is outside the province of moral-
ity. If a man is evil by birth, he has no will, he can 
be neither good nor evil; a robot is amoral. To hold, 
as man's sin, a fact not open to his choice is a mockery 
of morality. To hold man's nature as his sin is a mock-
ery of nature. To punish him for a crime he committed 
before he 1-ra.s born is fl. mockery nf' jns tice ~ To hold him 
guilty in a matter Hhere no innocence exists is a mockery 
of reason. To destroy morality, nature, justice and 
reason by means of a single concept is a feat of evil 
hardly to be matched.29 
Galt (and Rand) refuse to accept30 any code which would di-
vorce moral culpability from free choice, for how can one 
sin if he cannot choose? If men are guilty by nature, then 
no morality is possible to them. Thus, the rejection of 
28Patricia Donegan, "A Point of View: Atlas Shrugged," 
Commom-Ieal, LXVII (November, 1957), 156. Ny brackets. 
29Rand, Atlas Shru~, p. 951. 
3°The following, from the Richmond Times-Dispatch and 
reprinted in The Objectivist, suggests that even chlldren 
cannot accept Original Sin: ":r-rrs. A. T. Dinw·iddie asked her 
Sunday school class what •you must do before you obtain for-
giveness of sin.r There was a pause. Finally one 6-year old 
timidly held up his hand and said: t Sin. 1 11 See: The Objec-
tivist, VI, No. 3 (March, 1967), 14. 
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Original Sin probably i_stems from a love of man and his poten-
~ 
tial for the heroic. \ 
\ .. 
Donegan next argues that Atlas Shrugged regards pity, 
compassion, and charity as immoral. A careful reading, how-
ever would reveal that what Objectivism rejects is altruism, 
defined by Webster as "uncalculated consideration of, regard 
for, or devotion to others' interests •••• 11 Uncalculated 
consideration Rand totally eschews. More than once, she has 
cautioned readers not to confuse altruism with benevolence 
or ordinary human kindness: 
Many people believe that altruism means kindness, benev-
olence or respect for the rights of others. But it means 
the exact opposite: it teaches self-sacrifice, as well 
as the sacrifice of others, to any unspecified
3
ipublic 
need"; it regards man as a sacrificial animal. 
That is what Objectivism rejects--that man must (uncalculated 
consideration) sacrifice his own self-interest as a moral 
obligation: "Do not hide behind such superficialities as 
whether you should or should not give a dime to a beggar," 
Rand writes. "That is not the issue. The issue is whether 
you do or do not have the right to exist without giving him 
that dime.u32· Altruism derives from the premise of need--
that one's need constitutes a moral claim on any producer, 
31Ayn Rand, "Theory and Practice," in Capitalism: The 
Unknown Ideal (New York: The New American Library, Slgnet 
Press, 1967), p. 135. 
32Ayn Rand, Faith and Force: The Destroyers of the 
:Hodern Horld, reprint of a lecture delivered at Yale Uni-
versity {February 17, 1960), Brooklyn College (April 4, 
1960), and Columbia University (May 5, 1960). (New York: 
The Objectivist Inc., 1960), 5. Italics in original. 
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who then becomes bound to satisfy it. The moral issue in-
volved is this: 
•• that a man has no claim on others (i.e. that it is 
~ot their moral duty to help • • • and that he (one in 
need] cannot demand their help as his right) does not 
preclude or prohibit good will among men and does not 
make it L~oral to offe) or to accept voluntary, non-
sacrificial assistance. 3 
one therefore remains free to provide whatever aid he wishes 
to give to those less fortunate, provided he is not forced 
to do so.34 In With Charity Toward None, William O'Neill 
challenges the Objectivist definition of altruism noting, 
"It is, in essence, the type of self-gratification which is 
achieved by identifying oneself with, and subsequently par-
ticipating in, the well-being of others on a psychological 
level."35 But, O'Neill ignores an essential concept-
volition. Of course one may derive gratification from help-
ing another, thus boosting his self-esteem, but the pleasure 
soon dissipates if assistance becomes sustained obligation. 
In fact, the very reason a benevolent (not altruistic) indi-
vidual may find helping another pleasurable is because he 
respects human dignity enough to want to voluntarily get in-
volved. 
Nathaniel Branden provides the philosophical distinc-
33Ayn Rand, "The Question of Scholarships," The Objec-
tivist, V, No. 6 (June, 1966), 11-12. My brackets. Paren-
theses in original. 
34It is for this reason that Objectivists reject the 
welfare state. One is .forced to help those in "need" in-
definitely. Thus the virtue of productivity becomes a vice, 
.for the more a man produces, the more is available to loot. 
35o 'Neill, With Charity Tmvard None, pp. 201-02. 
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tion between altruism~nd benevolence: 
The literal philos~phical meaning of altruism is: placing 
others above self. \As an ethical principle, altruism 
nolds that man:mllst make the welfare of others his primary 
concern •••• A morality that tells man that he is to 
regard himself.as a sacrificial animal, is not an expres-
sion of benevolence or good will •••• Benevolence, good 
will and respect for the rights of others proceed from an 
opposite code of morality; from the principle that man the 
individual is not an object of sacrifice, but an entity 
0~ supreme value; that man exists for hi~6own sake and is not a means to the ends of others •••• 
Altruism, then, turns man into a sacrificial animal waiting 
helplessly for the first claimant in need to feed upon him 
by right. Benevolence, however, has as its ~oundation a: 
pro~ound regard for the right of man. Hen help one another 
out of respect ~or the value of a human life (their own and 
the person being helped), and not because they are ~creed to 
do so. In an emergency situation, a man may properly risk 
his life, ~or example, to save children in a fire--this is 
benevolence. But, to have the victims of the fire then 
claim that their rescuer must support them inde~initely 
since they have no home is altruism. 
Thus, Rand's heroes are not unfeeling brutes who take 
pleasure in destroying the weak as Donegan would have us be-
lieve, but people of sel~-esteem who respect the value of a 
human life enough to not turn that value into a vice. When-
ever there is a sacrifice, there is usually a victim. 
Finally, Donegan suggests that Rand bases reward only 
36Nathaniel Branden, "Benevolence versus Altruism," 
The Objectivist Newsletter, I, No. 7 (July, 1962), 27. 
Italics in original. 
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on the principle of m~rit or achievement. This observation 
distorts the principl'e of achievement as the foundation for 
\, 
\ 
human rights. Especially here, there is no excuse for misin-
terpretation because Rand herself has addressed the issue in 
clear, precise language when replying to a reader who asked 
.about the connection betHeen reward and achievement. She 
notes: "One loves a man's character, not his achievement; 
one loves that in his character which made him capable of 
h . . n37 ac.1ev1ng. Thus, reward is contingent upon the type of 
character that makes productive achievement possible. 
John Galt, Hank Rearden and Rand's other fictional 
heroes, then, are men and women dedicated to rational self-
interest, self-esteem and cognitive excellence, virtues 
:me.kine; productive e.chjeve:ment poss:i.blf'!e They are; in Rand's 
words, the "new intellectuals," who are 
••• willing to think. All those who know that man's 
life must be guided by reason, those who value their own 
life and are not willing to su~render it to the cult of 
despair in the modern jungle of cynical impotence •••• 
He will be an integrated man, that is: a thinker who is 
a man of action. He will know that ideas divorced from 
consequent action are fraudulent, and that action divorced 
from ideas. is suicidal. He will knovr that the conceptual 
level of psycho-epistemology30--the volitional level of 
reason and thought--is the basic necessity of man's sur-
vival and his greatest moral virtue. He will know that 
37Ayn Rand, "An Answer to Readers," The Objectivi·st, 
VI, No. 3 (March, 1967), 13. Italics in original. 
38psycho-epistemology is defined as: the study of 
man's cognitive processes from the aspect of the interaction 
between the conscious mind and the automatic functions of the 
subconscious." See: Ayn Rand, 11 The Psycho-Epistemology of 
Art," in The Romantic :Hanifesto, p •. l8. 
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men need philosophy for the purpose of living on earth.39 
Her educated man is a philosopher, meaning one dedicated to 
reason, purpose, and self-esteem with their corresponding 
virtues of independence, rationality, integrity, honesty, 
justice, productiveness, and pride--all of which have special 
meanings for Objectivists. In stressing these virtues as 
necessary for her educated man to practice, Rand demands a 
change in human values, which ought to occur if his goal of 
living on earth is to be realized. 
SUMMARY 
Philosopher-novelist Ayn Rand's interests include 
Aristotle, Hugo's concept of the heroic, history, and mathe-
matics~ In repudiating all forms of collectivism and the 
moral evil of altruism, she has posited her concept of the 
educated man, a "new intellectual" dedicated to reason, pur-
pose and self-esteem. 
Characters such as Hank Rearden, Howard Roark and 
especially John Galt are profoundly moral men, men who Rand 
thinks ought to exist. Far from being inhuman or cruel, 
these men dedicate themselves to the glory of man as a heroic 
being. 
This paper will deal with Rand's concept of the ideal 
man, her educated man, and his potential for existence. The 
39Ayn Rand, "Introduction," For the New Intellectual 
(New York: The New American Library, Signet Press, 1961), 
pp. 50-5lo Italics in original. · 
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second chapter will discuss the intellectual antecedents o~ 
Objectivism, and the third will develop in more detail the 
metaphysics, epistemology and axiology o~ Objectivism. 
\ 
' \ 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE ANTECEDENTS OF OBJECTIVISM 
The first chapter suggests that Objectivism developed 
!'rom ideas and concepts Ra..'1d formulated while a student. 
Chapter two examines the question of influence1 in more de-
tail by studying the effect of: Aristotle, Hugo, Spillane, 
and the Social Darwinists, Herbert Spencer and vJilliam 
sumner, upon Rand's Objectivism. 
Aristotle's influence may be considered as threefold: 
metaphysical and logical, educational, and aesthetic. The 
word Objectivism means that reality exists independeniJly 
{i.e., is objective) of man's mind. In expressing his belief 
1The question of influence presents many problems, and 
is often extremely difficult to validate. First of all, in-
fluence should be taken to mean influence in a positive sense. 
The ~efinition presumed throughout is Gottschalk's: 11 a per-
sistent shaping effect upon the thought and behavior of hunan 
beings, singly or collectively." Similarity of ideas does 
not in itself constitute influence. Many factors such as 
tradition, similarity between two cultures, etc. could ac-
count for two writers expressing like ideas.--rrProof must 
be provided that the later writer was in fact exposed to the 
ideas of the earlier one. 11 See: Louis Gottschalk, Under-
standing Historl (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1969), 
pp. 245-54. Th1s chapter suggests that the above influences 
shaped Rand's thinking contingent on the following questions 
being successfully answered: Did Rand read the material con-
cerned? Did she accept all or only part of what she read? 
If accepted, do the ideas appear in her own v-rri tings and if 
so, to what extent do they shape her thought? If these 
questions can be satisfactorily answered, then the probability 
of influence exists. 
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in an objective reality, Aristotle takes issue with Plato's 
dichotomy of shadows and forms, and suggests instead that 
what the senses perceive constitutes true reality: 
Now the view that neither the sensible qualities nor the 
sensations would exist is doubtless true (for they are 
affections of the perceiver), but that the substrata 
which cause the sensation should not exist even apart 
from the sensation is impossible. For sensation is sure-
ly not the sensation of itself, but there is something 
beyond the sensation; for that which moves is prior in 
nature to that which is moved •••• 2 
of the senses Aristotle writes,-" ••• we do not regard any 
of the senses as Wisdom; yet surely these give the most 
authoritative knowledge of particulars. 11 3 Thus he concludes 
that particular objects exist in reality, comprehended by 
the mind through the senses. As will be discussed shortly, 
Rand accepts the same conclusions. 
Aristotle believes that reality could be known through 
four causes: material, formal, efficient, and final,4 since 
all men, when contemplating the nature of reality, seek 
" ••• to deal with the first causes and the principles of 
things."5 Such for Aristotle constitutes wisdom. Rand 
speaks of this when dealing with a man's ability to form 
concepts: 
2Aristotle, Metaphlsics, lOlOb 32-37. Trans. 
w. D. Ross. Parentheses 1n original. 
3rbid., 98lb 10-11. 
4By way of example: If a man makes a coin, the materi-
al cause is the gold out of which it is made, the formal cause 
.,.-1S the shape the coin takes, the efficient cause is the man, 
and the final cause is the purpose for which the coin is·made. 
5Aristotle, Metaphysics, 98lb 29. 
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concepts of materials are formed by observing the dif-
ferences in the constituent materials of entities. 
(Haterials exist only in the form of specific entities, 
such as a nugget of gol~ •••• ) The concept of "gold," 
for instance is formed by isolating gold objects from 
all others, and then abstracting and retaining the 
material, the gold, and omitting the measurements of the 
objects ••• in which gold may exist. Thus, the materi-
al, is the same in all the concrete instances sub~umed 
under the concept, and differs only in quantity.b 
The gold, then, exists independently of the mind and is per-
ceived by the senses as Aristotle, likewise, would have it. 
The principle of concept formation has as its base an inde-
pendent reality. The mind ignores specific (material) ex-
amples of gold, and abstracts the form. ~vi thout the concept 
of causality concept formation would be impossible in Randian 
epistemology. 
Aristotle's conception of reality involves the follow-
ing specifics: substance, form and matter, act and potency. 
In Book VII of the Netaphysics, he discusses the concept of 
substance defining it as a real entity, 'tvhich actually ex-
ists: "that which 'is' primarily is the 'what• •••• n7 
We may observe how the Objectivist theory of concept forma-
tion develops from this: a substance (gold) exists.as an 
entity including its dimensions (accidents) which may be 
separated from it only by a process of cognitive abstraction, 
but may not exist apart from it. Of course, all of the above 
is contingent on the existence of an objective reality. Both 
6Ayn Rand, Introduction to ob·ectivist E 
(New York: The ObJect~v~st Inc., 1 
original. Parentheses in original. 
7Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1028a 14. 
iste:n?loQ" 
ItaJ.~cs ill 
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philosophers, then, deny the concept of innate knowledge. 
Aristotle divides substance into two categories: 
form and matter. The form of something, permanent and last-
. is that which makes it what it is. Form means type: J.ng, 
••• the artist makes, or the father begets, a 'such' 
out of a 'this'; and when it has been begotten, it is a 
rthis such' •••• And when we have the whole, such and 
such a form in this flesh and in these bones, this is 
callias or Socrates; and-they are different in virtue of 
their matteS (for that is different), but the same in 
form ••• 
Related to form is the principle of actuality or the exist-
ence of an object. Substance (form) is actuality; it is 
vThat an object actually is in reality. 
Hatter is that which assUllles a given form and that 
which makes any change possible, i.e., the raw material (the 
goldj out of which is produced the coin. Related to matter 
is the principle of potentiality. That is, an object has 
the 'potential' to become 'actualized' by assuming a definite 
form; therefore change occurs when potency becomes actual-
ized. Notes A. H. Armstrong: 
••• whenever a potentiality is coming to be actual there 
is always an actual being existing in full actuality from 
the beginning of the process which can be recognized as 
its cause.9 
Thus, potency is acted upon by an existing actuality, the 
efficient cause, thereby bringing about change. 
Aristotle's contribution to philosophy rests in his 
directing " • • • attention to the world we actually experi-
8Ibid.,.l033b 22-24, 1034a 5-B. 
9A. H. Armstrong, An Introduction to Ancient Philoso-
~ (Boston: Beacon Press, 1959), p. 81. 
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ence, turning away f'rom the tendency to concoct other worlds 
presumably more real than the one we wake up to every day.nlO 
Rand's contribution to philosophy is of' like importance. 
In accepting Aristotle's metaphysical position, Rand 
outlines several principles including the f'ollowing: 
My philosophy, Objectivism, holds that: 
1. Reality exists as ~~ objective absolute--f'acts 
are f'acts independent of' man's f'eelings, wishes, hopes or 
i'ears. 
2. Reason {the f'aculty which identifies and inte-
grates tte material provided by man's senses) is man's 
only means of' perceiving reality, his only source of 
know~edge11his only guide to action, his basic means of' surv~val. 
In dif'f'erent words, Aristotle says the same thing: that 
reality is objective, not spiritual, and that entities exist 
which the mind, via the senses, may come to understand. 
Technically, hmvever, Aristotle states that the mind con-
sists of' an active and potential power. The potential {or 
receptive) mind is only capable of' synthesizing sense data 
(referred to, therefore, as the common sense), but the final 
act of synthesis (~) must be peri'ormed by the active mind. 
This higher or active power is uniquely man•s. 
The Randian concept of metaphysics is related to her 
second point as i'ollows: 
Existence exists--and the act of grasping that statement 
implies tHo corollary axioms: that something exists 
which one perceives and that onH exists possessing con-
sciousness. • • • ivhatevel' the degree of' your knoviledge 
----------·------
1°van Cleve I'1?:r7i~, ~.h).l~h;y and ~:he Amar_tcru1 School (Boston: Houghton Mliflln Lo., 1)61 , p. ~6. 
llAyn Hand, "Introducing Objectivism," Tl:?_£_~~ivis:!?, 
Hm·rsletto1•. I, No. 8 (August, 1962), 35" ParentllorJos ln 
..... _, ···<~·-·- "'"t .. ·---~-- ,• 
or:LgJ.nal. 
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these two-existence and consciousness-are axioms you 
cannot es·cape, these two are the irreducible primaries 
u.e. ~ metaphysical) implied in any action _you under-
take •••• Whether you know the shape o~ a pebble or 
the s~ructure or a solar system~ the axioms remain the 
same: that it exists [independent or t~2mind] and that you know it tvia the senses and reason]. 
In other words~ to survive on earth, one must knoH that an 
objective reality exists ("something exists which one per-
ceives"-Rand; "but that the substrata which cause the sen-
sation sh01;tld not exist even apart rrom the sensation is 
impossible 11 -Aristotle), with survival contingent on the 
degree to Hhich the mind corresponds to what is real. To 
evade reality is to derine the wish or wh±m as the real, 
thereby leading to epistemological and metaphysical chaos. 
Although Objectivist metaphysics will be discussed later in 
more detail, sufrice it to say that f'or no"fl, Ra..."'l.d believes 
(as does Aristotle) that an objective reality exists, and 
that man must use his reason ir he is to live as a man. 
Objectivism derives intellectual ballast not only 
f'rom Aristotle 1 s metaphysics, but also rron his OJ?ganon, the 
logical treatises. Specirically, the princ:iple of' identity 
(A :o= A) and its metaphysical implications are of' vital sig-
niricance to Rru1d: 
The LaiJ of' Identity (A is A) is a rational man•s para-
mount consideration in the process of determining his 
interests. He kn01vs that the contradictc•ry is the im-
possibJ.e ~ • • ho does not permit himself' to hold con-
tr·adicto:r-:y values, to pursue contradic to:r>y goals. • • • 
~~he som•co o:f man 1 s rights is • • • the .law oi' identity. 
12Ayn Rru1d, "This Is John Galt Speak5_ng, n in For tho 
l'!_cnJ Intel1ectual (NeH York: The Ne1v American I,ibrary, s~c;not 
Pross-;-J.lJoll, pp. l2L~-·25. Hy brackets. Italics in original. 
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.A is A and man is man. Rights are conditions of exist13 ence required by man's nature for his proper survival. 
Because Objectivist ethics--the value system to which her 
educated man ought to aspire--is contingent on the principle 
of identity, it becomes necessary to determine Aristotle's 
use of the principle, and whether Rand.correctly interprets 
its use. 
Aristotle notes, " ••• it (substance] has no con~ 
trary. What could be the contrary of any primary substance, 
such as the individual man or animal? It has none.ul4 In 
other words, A =A--the substance man is the substance man. 
Related to this principle is what Aristotle terms, "the most 
certain principle of all," the principle of. contradiction, 
or the principle of identity in negative form. The prin-
ciple of contradiction states, 11 ••• that the same attri-
bute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the 
same subject and in the same resnect.u15 
Rand has much to say about these principles. \,Jhen 
addressing those who choose to evade reality by wishing 
something to be the real, John Galt comments: 
Whatever you chocse to consider, be it an object, an 
attribute, or an action, the law of ide:1ti ty rereains the 
same. A leaf cannot be a stone at the same time, it can-
not be all red and all green at the sar::.e time, it cannot 
13Ayn Rand, "The 'Conflicts • of Ncr:' s Interests," in 
The Virtue of Selfishness (New York: The New American 
L:fbiary;-·signetfiress;·l964), p. 51. ItaJics in original. 
14Aristotle, Catef!vJ:•ies, 3b 24-:?6. Trans. E. M. 
Edghill. My brackets. 
15~td., l005b 18-20. 
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freeze and burn at the same time. A is A •••• The re-
striction they (those who seek to deny the law and thus 
evade reality] seek to escape is the law of identity. 
The f:r:>edom they seelc is freedom from the fact that an A 
will remain an A, no matter what their tears and tan-
trums •••• An honest man does not desire until he has 
identified the object of his desire. He says: 1It is, 
therefore I want it.• They [the evaders] say: 1 I want 
it, therefore it is.tl6 
It becomes apparent that the Objectivist view of reality 
rests on the axiom: A is A--man is man and existence exists, 
regardless of the wish. In the context of Objectivism, then 
the law is a moral law and those who evade reality by sub-
stituting wishes (I want it, therefore it is) for what is, 
and act upon those suppositions as if they were real, deny 
reason as man's absolute and proceed to force others to con-
form to the.ir private reality. For exaraple, l-rhen students 
threaten to riot unless their demands are met, Rsnd argues 
that they vTish the right to force the university to conform 
to their mm private version of reality. But, just as a 
leaf cannot at the same time be a stone, so their personal 
versions of reality cannot at the same time constitute Hhat 
is really real. The rebelling students thus violate the 
Principles of Identity and Contradiction. She vrri tes: 
In ordor to live, man must act; in order to act, he must 
make choices; in order to make choices, he must define a 
code of values, he must knoH what he is [rational] and 
Hhere he is (objective rea1ity1-i.e., he must know his 
o-vm natu1~e (including his means of knowledge) and the na-
ture of the t:miverse in which he acts •••• He needs 
-----------
16H8.nd, 11 This Is John Galt Speakim~." in For the NeH 
... ::>, --II?-.~_£_;L1e~_!:ua!, pp. 125, 150, 155. My brackets. 
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,Ehilosophy. 17 
For now, the where is important. For Rand, man lives in an 
Aristotelian universe, which implies a definite epistemologi-
cal construct--namely that man's mind is competent to under-
stand and deal with the 1-.eali ty implied in the metaphysics. 
In so doing, a man makes choices which suggest a specific 
code of values. The educational implications are signif'i-
cant and will be discussed in future chapters. 
One of Objectivism's critics, Albert Ellis, denies 
the validity of making the law of identity a moral concept, 
and suggests an improper application of the term: 
It is notable that where the objectivists are constantly 
quoting Aristotle's Law of Identity in an effort to prove 
that anyone lvho in any way lives ""Ti th compromises and 
· contradictions is horribly immoral • • • , Aristotle him-
self did not use the Law in this manner. On the contrary, 
in regard to human affairs, he constantly espoused what 
has come to be lr..nown as the Aristotelian mean-that is, 
conduct that is moderate and avoids extremes or excesses. 
• • • The Lav-1 of Identity Has devised by Aristotle as a 
logical measure to demonstrate when two propositions are 
contradictory. It does not necessa1•ily imply, hmvever, 
that it is wrong or terrible for contradictions to ex-
ist.lb 
Again, Ellis is only partly correct for although Aristotle 
does indeed suggest the golden mean (Nicomachean Ethics, 
Book II, Chapter VI) as a guide for conduct, in the Meta-
PhJsics he speaks of the consequences of holding contradic-
tions. First, stating the principle of contradiction (the 
17 Ayn Rand, 11 Philosophy and Sense o1'"' Life, 11 in The 
Romant:i.c J'Tanifesto (lJm·l York: The Nei·J Am.e1·ican Library;-
SJ.gnot Press 1 1971), p. 30. Hy brackets. Italics in 
o.riginal. 
lc3r..lb t 1",1 J • c..< I"' Ob ·· t. . R 1 • • ? ( k ~~ er ,L', •••• J.. .... , _:.'; ~cc lVJ..Sr.~~_::_~_:._J..gJ..on. New Yor : 
Lyle Stum't, 1968), pp. i9"2-':13. It~:LLJ.cs J...a orrglnal. 
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negative of the principle of identity), 
• • • the same attribute cannot at the same time belong 
and not belong to the same subject and in the same re-
spect ••• it is impossible frr any one to believe the 
same thing to be and not to be ••• ,19 
he next proceeds to identify the type of man who would deny 
it, and what consequences l-rould result: 
But if all are alike both wrong and right one who is in 
this condition will not be able either to speak or to say 
anything intelligible ••• and if he makes no judgment 
but 'thinks' and 'does not think,' indifferently, what 
difference -vdll there be between him and a vegetable?20 
It would appear, according to Aristotle himself, that the 
principles of contradiction and identity have profound moral 
consequences, for to evade them is to evade judgment, which 
is to evade thinking, which is to cease to be a man. In ac-
cepting the metaphysical position of Aristotle and his law 
of identity, Ha...'1.d has defined the premises to which her edu-
cated man ought to adhere. He is one who accepts the exist-
ence of objective reality which cannot be contradicted or 
evaded. 
Aristotle's concept of the educated man should be ex-
amined to determine whether Hand accepts it. Because he did 
not write a speciric educational document, it becomes neces-
sary to deter•rnine his educational beliefs by consulting the 
Nicomachean Ethics and Politics. The discu.ssion will be 
limited to the nature of happiness (the good) and education's 
role :in helping man to achieve it. 
----·--------
19 Aristotle, tJiotarhxsics, l005b 18-20, 23-24. 
2oibid., 1oo8b 8-13. 
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In the Politics, Aristotle notes: 
No one will doubt that the legislator should direct his 
attent:on above all to the education of youth; for the 
neglect of education does harm to the constitution •••• 
That education should be regulated by law and should be 
an affair of state is not to be denied.21 
Rand does not completely endorse Aristotle's thinking, and 
here is an example of disagreement. Although she emphati-
cally rejects state control of education,22 opting instead 
for a privately operated and administered school system, she 
does believe along with Aristotle that politics as method of 
inquiry must not be divorced from ethics, and that both have 
a practical aim. Writes D. J. Allan: 
• • • namely the promotion and maintenance of human 
happiness • • • likeviise the purpose oi' lecturer and stu-
dent is not merely to learn the truth, but to improve men 
and make them happier.23 
21Aristot1e, Politics, 1337a 11-14, 33-4. Trans. 
B • Jot-Tett. 
22This point, vihich runs counter to the American edu-
cational practice of common schooling for all, will be con-
sidered when Objectivism and American educational practice 
is discussed. The case for a private educational system is 
stated by Nathaniel Branden. See: "Intellectual .Ammunition 
Department, 11 'l'he Objectivist Newsletter, II, No. 6 (June, 
1963), 22. 
23rt is important to understand what Aristotle means 
by happiness. The Greek word is eudairnonirt, meaning good 
demon. \-Jhat Aristotle does is to change tGo concept from an 
external one (demon) to an internal one, thereby making man 
hilnsE)lf' responsible for his own happiness; not some external 
force. The educational implications are s5 .. enificant: 
11 
• .. • when heavy responsibility for the course of' human 
affairs is shifted to its human origin, e{lacation takes upon 
itself enormous activities." See: Robel~i!; s. Brumbaugh and 
Nathaniel H. Lawrence, Philosophers on Education: Six Es!lay~~ 
on ~}]8 Foundf:i.tion of 1.1estern 'l1hou.r>;ht (Bost..:m: Houghton, 
Nii'1'11.n Co .. 1 196.5), pp., 5I~-55. Hand accep'i:;s this position, 
noting that man must create his own happiness through tho.o.x-
ercise of reason, engaged in productive work. For seloct1on 
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To this end Objectivism completely subscribes as the rol-
lowing, from Anthem, makes clear. A character speaks: 
I know not ir this earth on which I stand is the core of 
the universe or ir it is but a speck of dust lost in 
eternity •••• For I know what happiness is possible to 
me on earth. And my happiness needs no higher aim to 
vindicate it. My happiness is not the means to any end. 
It is the end. It is its own goal. It is its own pur-
pose.24 
It remains to be determined whether Rand and Aristotle mean 
the same thing when speaking of happiness for both merely 
valuing happiness as man's end would not be enough grounds 
for suggesting influence. Aristotle attempts to discover 
the relationship man has to happiness by determining the 
function of man. He writes: 
What, then, can this function be? It is not life; for 
life is apparently something that man shares with plants; 
and we are looking for something peculiar to him. We must 
exclude therefore the life of nutr•i tion and growth. There 
is next what may be called the life of sensation. But 
this, too, apparently is shared by man with horses, cattle 
and all other animals. There remains vJha t I may call the 
active li.fe o.f the rational part o.f man's being •••• 
The .function o.f man then is activity of soul in accordance 
with reason, or not apart from reason.25 
Aristotle thus believes that man's function, unique to him 
as man, is rational activity. The active mind actualizes 
what potential man ha.s f'or living as man, Rnd f'urther serves 
to control emotions. 
quoted above, see: D. J. AlJ.an, The Philo[wphy of Aristotle 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1970), J::p. 123-2~---
2LJ..Ayn Hand, Anthem (NeH York: The HeH American Library, 
Signet Press, 1946)-;--pp--;--123-25. 
25Aristotle, Nicomnchean Ethics, 1097b 33-35, 1098a 
1-3, 6-7. Trans. James 0elidou:------
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Proper activity for Aristotle must be learned through 
the educative process. Of particular concern here is the 
question: "What kind of education will produce the disposi-
tions desired by a given individual? ••• n26 Aristotle 
concludes that the best kind of education should have as its 
goal the aim of all men--happiness, the best and noblest 
activity in the world, namely the performance of intrinsi-
cally excellent activities. But what activities of the soul 
are intrinsically excellent? Aristotle speaks of arete, 
commonly translated as virtue, but meaning more accurately, 
excellence depending on knmvledge. There are two virtues 
of the intellect: (1) theoretical wisdom (sophia) and (2) 
practical wisdom (phronesis).27 These could be acquired, 
he believes, through education, chiefly ·the lecture method, 
but not without some activity on the learnerts.part. Sophia 
is concerned with permanent and objective moral truths which 
men must come to knov-r by study. Sophia, however, must oper-
ate in conju...'1c tion with phronesis, an application of' the 
f'ormer to a particular situation. 
Although Rand does not use precisely these same words, 
she does consider cognitive developmen·t to be man's best and 
noblest activity: 
Rat:i.onality is man 1 s basic virtue, the source of' all his 
----·------·---
26uLL1:tam Prankona, Three Historical Philosophies of' 
Educa t:ion ( Glen-v~iew, Illino1s: Scott, !:<"O:re"Sman and Company, 
196 5 ;-; P:' 19 -
27Brtl.rnbaugh and LaHrenco, 
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other virtues. Man's basic vice, the source or all his 
evils, is the act of' unf'ocusing his mind, the suspension 
of' his consciousness, which is not blindness, but the 
ref'usal to see, not ignorance, but the ref'usal to know. 
Irrationality is the rejection of' man's means of' sur-
vival. • • • The virtue of' Productiveness is the recogni-
tion of' the f'act that productlve work lS thg process by 
which man's mind sustains his life. • • • 2 
Thus, intellectually excellent activity consists of' using 
one's reason by engaging in productive work. Rand believes 
that man needs both theoretical wisdom (philosophy) in order 
to live as a man, and practical wisdom (proper conduct) in 
order to live as a moral being. Both philosophers consider 
reason a virtue, and--as later chapters will suggest--Rand 
is extremely critical of' American education f'or its f'ailure 
to provide moral leadership f'or young people. 
Aristotle also considers morally excellent activity, 
calling it virtues of' character such as prudence and justice. 
These are contingent upon, and cannot operate without 
phronesis. The virtues hailed by Rand as proper to any edu-
cated man include: rationality, independence, integrity, 
honesty, justice, productiveness, and pride. These will be 
considered Hhen Objectivist ethics are exam.ined. 
A clear relationship betl-;een intellectually and moral-
ly excellent activity is established by botr1 Aristotle and 
Rand, the former noting: 
---------·---
28Ayn Hand, "The Objectivist Ethics, f' in The Virt~ 
of Selfishness, pp. 25-26. Italics in original. Other 
phi1o:Jopti8rs-fncluding Hegel and Kant v;ould also identify 
cognitive development as man's noblest activity. Rand, hoH-
ever, rejects thoir interpretations as destructive. Inter-
ested readcr·s should consult the :introductory essay in ~ 
The Now Intellectual, PPo 10-57. _____ .........._ ___ ,_.,. __ _ 
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••• that since moral virtue is a state of character 
concerned with choice, and choice is deliberate desire, 
therefore both the reasoning must be true and the desire 
right, if the choice is to be ~ood, and the latter must 
pursue just what the former asserts •••• This is why 
choice cannot exist either without reason and intellect 
or without a moral state •••• 29 
Man, in acting to achieve happiness as his final end, must 
use his reason in the choice-making process. Since right 
choice implies some moral standard, the latter becomes a 
necessary condition in the life of a moral man. Both Rand 
and Aristotle require a rational evaluation of activity, with 
Rand also noting that the decision to be rational involves a 
value judgment, namely the worth of the mind. Writing in 
this connection, Nathaniel Branden observes: 
Objectivism locates man's free will in a single action 
of his consciousness, in a single basic choice: to focus 
his mind or to suspend it; to think or not to think • • • 
man has the nm-1er to regulate the actio:q of his ~ ~­
SCTo'USrie"S"'S; Han has the p01.-1er to exercise his rational 
faculty--or to suspend it.30 
One who chooses to evade thinking, to ignore his reason, 
ceases to engage in intellectually excellent activity and 
lives as a vegetable, to use Aristotle's metaphor. For Rand 
and Al,istotle survival is far from automatic; a man must 
think to survive, and that requires consciously sustained 
choice. 
Criteria determining morally excellent activity, 
thinks Aristotle, arise only in a social context, :for 
29Aristotle, Nico::nachoan Ethics, 1139a 22-26, 32-33· 
30Na th2.niel Branden, 11 Intellectual An1!YllL.'1.i tion Depart-
ment, li ~:'he Ob,-iectivist Newsletter, III, No. 1 (January, 1961+) 1 
3. Italics :i.ri.·- orTginal. 
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n ••• by doing the acts that we do in our transactions with 
other men we become just or unjust.n31 It is .from social 
actions that moral states arise.32 The principle developed 
by Aristotle to govern this activity is known as the golden 
mean. 
-
For Aristotle, one must never33 be disposed to act in 
either deficiency or excess, and it is the runction of the 
educative process to cultivate behavior in accordance with 
the golden mean. D. H. Allan explains how: 
A good character is a whole set of ••• dispositions; in 
order to produce it, you must make your pupil take up the 
right attitude under your directiop, until he can do so 
spontaneously and from knowledge.34 
For example, we may observe that there exists a mean between 
the excesses of confidence and cowardice, namely bravery. A 
man may be conrident and lacking in fear, thererore rash, or 
rearful and lacking in confidence, therefore a coward. Im-
port~~tly, however, the learner must act to be moral. In 
31Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book II, Chapter I, 
p. 953. 
32Here is another instance where Rand and Aristotle 
disagree, tho formel' not sharing tho latter's enthusiasm for 
man as servant of the state. Branding such an anti-demo-
cratic attitude as collectivistic, she postulates instead 
the belief that mor•ally excellent activity, while operative 
in a social context, derives .from reason-the only ethical 
absolute Ob,iectivism recognizes •. 
33Al~is totl8 qualifies this noting: 11 • • • not every 
action nor every pas.sion admits o.f a mean; for some have 
names that already imply badness, e.g~, ••• adultery, 
theft, murdel' .••• It is not possible then, ever to be 
right Hi tb. regard to them; one must aluays be Hrong. 11 See: 
Nicomaclw_an Ethic~, Book II, Chapter IV. 
3L~fl.llan, 'l'l~~P~Y o.f Aristotl~, p. 128. 
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other words, 
• • • moral virtue consists in observance or the Mean by 
instar~es or conduct actually approved or condemned ac-
cording to prevailing standards.35 
For Aristotle--and here again Rand disagrees--standards of 
behavior which the child learns as he intellectually matures 
are set by the state as a means or preservL~g its own insti-
tutions.36 For the sake or clarification, we may briefly 
outline the Objectivist concept or a just state: 
The proper functions or a government fall into three 
broad categories, all or them involving the issues or 
physical force and protection of man's rights: the 
police, to protect men from criminals--the armed-s8r-
Vlces, to protect men from foreign invaders--the law 
courts, to settle disputes among men according to ob-
JeCtlve laws.37 
All other governn1ental activities, other than those speci-
fied above, are therefore irmnoral if the government chooses 
to engage in them, since so doing involves the·violation of 
someone•s rights. 
It should be noted that Aristotle's use of the "golden 
mean" as man's proper guide to moral conduct conflicts with 
Randian ethics. Aristotle co~nents: 
Again, ho".·rever much all things may be so 'and not so' 
still there is a more or less in the nature or things; 
for He should not say that two and three are equally 
even, nor is he rrho thinlm four things are five equally 
35rt.?_id .. , p. 13o. 
36Thomas Davidson, Aristotle and Anc:i.ent Educational 
Ideals (:Hew York: Burt Pranki1n, l9b9), p. 179. See aiso :. 
Aristotle, Politics, Boolc VIII. 
37 Ayn Hand, 11 'l1 he Nature of Government, n in Capitalism: 
~'he Unknm:n Idoal (NoH York: The Ne·H American Library, Sig-
net Press;19b'ff; p. 3~J~. Italics in original. 
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wrong with him who thinks they are a thousand. If' then 
they are not equally wrong, obviously one is less ln>ong 
and therefore more right. If' that which has more of' any 
quality is nearer the norm, there must be some truth to 
which the more truer is near • • • and we shall have got 
rid of the unqualified doctrine which woulg prevent us 
from determining anything in our thought.3 
Here, Aristotle argues that in human conduct, a man's actions 
may be "less wrong and therefore more right." In other 
words, in any given dispute, the parties concerned may each 
argue their actions to be morally justifiable. For example, 
one 1-1ho steals rather than work certainly is more wrong than 
a man who steals a loaf of' bread to f'eed his starving child. 
But, concluding that A is A, good is good and bad is 
bad, Ayn Rand disagrees with her philosophical hero. In an 
article entitled "The Cult of r-1oral Grayness," she voices 
her conviction: 
One of the most eloquent symptoms of the moral bankruptcy 
of today's culture is a certain fashionable attitude to-
"t-lard moral issues best summarized as: "There are no 
blacks and whites, there are only grays." ••• Before 
one can identify anything as "gray," one has to knov;r what 
is black and what is white. In the field of morality, 
this means that one must first identify what is good and 
what is evil. And when a man has ascertained that one 
alternative is good a...'Yld the other evil, he has no justi-
fication for choosing a mixture ••• f'or choosing any 
part of that which one knows to be evil.39 
Several factors are bothersome. Aristotle's doctrine of the 
mean, which he favors over the law of identity as a moral 
guide, appears more applicable to a broader range of ethical 
pr·oblems than the latter, which would be sul'ficient if all 
38Aristotle, }'~si?_~, 1008b 32·~37, l009a 1-5. 
39Ayn Hand, 11 '1'he Cult of' l-foral Grayness, 11 The Obj_~-
1~_ws1Bt~~' III, No. 6 ( J·une, 196J.t.J ~ 21. 
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of man's moral dilemmas were clear cut. But, common sense 
and experience indicate that many decisions a man must make 
involve a certain amount of goodness on both sides. From 
Rand's own economic thinking comes an example. She f'avors 
laissez-faire capitalism over the welfare state, since the 
former respects individual rights, while the latter implies 
stealing from those who produce. All well and good, until 
the questic•n of orphans arises. Obviously they are too young 
to work; yet under laissez-faire Capitalism no public money 
may be spent to aid them, for A is A and socialism in any 
form is immoral. 
Rand herself seems to sense this dilemma when arguing 
that voluntary charity violates no Objectivist ethical guide-
line. Yet, is not voluntary charity a mean betv-reen the ex-
treme of laissez-faire Capitalism and the welfare state? To 
carry the example further, we might imagine the existence of 
orphans not Han ted by anyone. vlha t becomes of them? It would 
appear that some sort of public aid would have to be forth-
coming. Relying on the golden mean, then, one may be an ad-
vocate of capital ism and totally anti--..;elfa.re state and 
therefore a laissoz-.fairo Capitalist, or an advocate of the 
welfare state and therefore totally anti-capitalist, a 
socialist. But, the mean between the two is voluntary aid, 
Hi th government aid one stop closer to the vTolfare state. 
He must remomber, however, that Aristotle argues 
against some actions {murder~.) as never admitting to a 
mean. In such cases, the principle of identity remains in 
full operation, warning men that they cannot fake reality by 
substituting their own wishes ~or the real. At no time may 
they act as i~ their dreams were reality. In many cases, 
there~ore, the principle o~ identity per~orms an invaluable 
function ~or man, warning him that contradictions ought not 
to exist, but there are occasions when the golden mean is 
clearly more rational, as Rand implies when advocating volun-
tary charity. 
It should be noted that Aristotle considers morally 
excellent activities to be excellent because o~ their in-
trinsic qualities. ~·Je learn to act virtuously by seeking 
the good through contemplation and morally virtuous activity. 
This has important implications ~or the educative process as 
Aristotle notes in Book II o~ the Ethics: 
Actions then are called just and temperate when they are 
such as the just or the temperate man would do; but it is 
not the man who does these that is just and temperate, 
but the man who also does them as just a~d temperate men 
do them. It is well said, then, that by doing just acts 
that the just man is produced, and by doing temperate 
acts the temperate man; without doing ~hese no one would 
have even a prospect o~ becoming good.~O 
John Burnet observes that the concept o~ per~ormance lies at 
the heart o~ Aristotle's whole phil~sophy o~ education.41 
One acquires virtue by practicing the types o~ activity 
Hhich produce virtue. In other words, a good man is one who 
acts morally, which is Hhat Rand means when she says that a 
40Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, lOO_s'b 5-12. 
}_IJ·Joh.1"1 Rurr!Gt, ( ed.), Aristotle on Education ( C&"':l.-
br•idge: Cam.bridge University Pross, 19""6'7}, p. 46~ 
philosopher is an individual who acts. 
The Poetics of Aristotle must also be examined to de-
termine if influence exists. In The Romantic Manifesto, .a 
book devoted to her theory of art and literature, Rand de-
fines art as, " • • • a selective re-creation of reality 
according to ~artist's metaphysical value judgments."42 
This relationship between art and metaphysics is interesting 
and signifi.cant .43 Rand quotes the f'ollowing which appears 
in the Poetics, 
• • • the distinction between historian and poet is not 
in the one writing prose and the other verse; ••• it 
consists really in this, that the one describes the thing 
thaif4has been, and the other a kind of thing that might 
be. 
She then continues, noting that 
The place of ethics in any given work of art depends on 
42Rand, "The Psycho-Epistemology of Art:" in The 
Romantic Hanifesto, p. 19. Italics in original. 
43For additional evidence, see Ayn Rand: "The Goal 
of !1y Writing," The Objectivist Newsletter, II, No. 10 
(October, 1963), 38-40. She notes therein: "There is a 
passage in The Fountainhead that deals with this issue: the 
passage in '\vhich HoHard Roark explains to Steven Hallory why 
he chose to do a statue for the Stoddard Temple. In writing 
that passage, I was consciously and.deliberately stating the 
essential goal of my m·m work: 11 ••• I think you're tho 
best sculptor we've got. I think it, because your figures 
are not what men are, but Hhat men could be-and should be. 
Because you've gone beyond the probable and made us see what 
is poBsible, • • • your figures are more devoid of contempt 
for huraani ty than any 1vork I 1ve ever seen ¢ •• your figures 
are the heroic in man •••• Your figures are not what men 
are, but what they could be-and should be.n This line will 
make it clear whose great philosophical principle I had ac-
cepted •••• 11 She means Aristotle, and goes on to cite the 
above passage from the Poetics. 
44Aristotlo, Poetics, ll.J-5lb 1-5. Tl.~ans. I. Bywater. 
the metaphysical views of the artist. If, consciously or 
subconsciously, an artist holds the premise that man pos-
sesses the power of volition, it will lead his work to a 
value orientation. • •• An art work may project the 
values man is to seek and hold up to4h~ the concretized vision of the life he is to achieve. ~ 
The relation of ethics to art as defined by Aristotle becomes 
the principle used by Ayn Rand in her novels. Believing that 
art's function is to select the essentials necessary for a 
given value change (Objectivist ethics) she proceeds to cre-
ate an ide~·.l man. Both philosophers, in harmony for the most 
part, see art's purpose as presenting an ideal man. This is 
the reason why she refers to herself as a Romantic Realist. 
\men G. E. R. Lloyd in his study of Aristotle com-
ments: 11 • • • it is an important part of Aristotle's doc-
trine that the poet and the artist represent things not 
merely as they are, but as they might be and as they should 
be,rr46 one could substitute Rand for Aristotle without vio-
lating its spirit. 
What then may be said of Aristotle and Ayn Rand? 
Were the latter 1 s v1ri tings and beliefs influenced by the 
former? It is this writer's belief that Aristotle's influ-
once is persistent and shaping. lve ·have sho-vm that Rand 
1-vas exposed to Aristotle's thought; that she accepts him as 
the only philonopher i·Jho influenced the development of Ob-
jectivism. Beliefs accepted include: an objective reality, 
45Hand, "The Psycho-Epistemology of Art," p. 23. 
h6a. E. R. Lloyd, Aristotle: The Grm..rth and Structure 
of His Thour;ht ( Crunbridge: Cambridge lJ'YiJ.vor·s-rty Pr•es s, 
T9GS""), pp. Z/Tf-?5. 
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the principles of identity and eontradiction, rationality as 
man's essential characteristic, man's end on earth should be 
happiness, and the concept of morally oriented art. There-
tore, despite the fact that Rand rejects Aristotle's belief 
that the state should control the educative process, reason-
able evidence does exist that Rand 1 s knowledge of Aristotle 
influenced the development of Objectivism. 
The second area of investigation is the Romantic move-
ment in literature. Although evidence seems to support in-
fluence, the matter requires further consideration. 
As a distinct and recognizable movement, the or~gins 
of Romanticism remain difficult to trace. However, literary 
historians usually mark the 1790's as the beginnings of the 
Romantic movement in English,47 for in 1798, Coleridge and 
Wordsworth published their Lyrical Ballads, the preface to 
which set down characteristics of the new verse.48 
Because a denotative definition of Romanticism seldom 
satisfies anyone, the term may be best described by suggesting 
several characteristics, the chief of which is individual-
ism.49 
47For evidence which justifies the 1790's as the be-
ginnings of Romanticism in English literature, consult David 
Perkins, ( ed.), English Romantic t•Jri ters (Nmv- York: Harcourt 
Brace and World,-r9b7), pp. 1~ 
48The preface appeared in the 1800 edition. 
49These include: individualism, worship of nature, 
exoticism, nationalism, and disillusiomnent... \-Then all or 
most are present, the literature is usuall~r said to be Roman-
tic. See Rod l'l. Horton and Vincent Hopper, Backgrounds of 
European Literatm:>e (New York: Appleton-Ce:ntury-Cro.fts, 
'I'9W), pp. )bl-61}.-
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The Romantics regarded the wel.fare o.f the ;individual, not 
of the state or group, as the primary object .for consider-
ation and sought a society which would allow the most 
complete .freedom o.f action, both political and social.5° 
Individualism best appeals to Rand, who argues that Romanti-
cism derives its essence .from the concept o.f volitional con-
sciousness, which allows man to choose his own values. In 
order to keep them, he must ~ properly.51 
But, a serious problem arises .for anyone .familiar 
with Romantic literature. Objectivism has been discussed in 
terms of its fidelity to Aristotelian Realism. Most literary 
historians, however, see Romanticism as essentially an emo-
tional reaction against the rigid rationalism of Classicism. 
Discontent found expression in anti-rational, anti-industrial 
moods characterized by one critic as a lack of concern, 
••• uith portr•aying a rational or external world; it 
is very much concerned with portraying the world from the 
vantage point of the personality of the writer ••• it 
is largely this pOiver to set forth one's individual emo-
tions, personal ideas ••• which distinguishes this tem-
per from the classical and from the realistic.52 
Moody, emotional and imaginative53 reactions hardly seem con-
sistont with Objectivism's strictly realistic temper, espe-
50rbid., Po 361. 
51Ayn Rand, "VJhat Is Romanticism?," in The Romantic 
Manifesto, pp. 64-65. 
52Addison Hibbard and Horst Frenz, (eds. ), Writers o.f 
.!_he \·!estern Ho:r.>ld (Boston: Houghton Hifflin Co., "196-rT;--
Po J9>. 
53The classic study of the Romantic mind and the facul-
ty of imaeination, complete ~lith supernatural and emotional 
trappings, is: John L. Lmv-es, The Road to Xanadu(Cambridgo, 
Mass.: Riverside Press, 1927). 'l'he &ubject of the book is 
Coleridge 1 s imaginD.tion as it influenced his composition. 
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cially when they o.ften conflict, even when describing the 
same event.54 
Still another characteristic of Romanticism which ap-
pears to conflict with Objectivist principles is the desire 
of the poet or novelist to escape the harshness of present 
reality, longing instead for a more utopian existence, either 
with Nature or in the past. Thus, Coleridge could write of 
pleasure domes and scared rivers.55 As if in validation, 
many of the major English Romantic poets le.ft England, seek-
ing adventure in foreign lands. Lord Byron~ for example, 
died in Greece, fighting for that country's independence. 
For a philosophy which prides itself on the principle that 
one must face reality and never evade it, Objectivism seems 
strangely inconsistent with the Romanticism of Byron, ~'lords-
worth and Coleridge. 
F. L. Lucas even attempts to define Romanticism in an 
Aristotelian context, and concludes much the same, at least 
54For example, in September 1802, Wordsvwrth wrote of 
London: "Earth has not anything to show more fair: I Dull 
would he be of soul who could pass by I A sight so touching 
in its majesty: ••• 11 In the sa...llle month and of the same 
subject: "r·1iltonl thou shouldst be living at this hour: I 
England hath need of thee; she is a .fen I Of stagnant waters; 
altar, S't-Tord, and pen, I Fireside, the hel'c-ic wealth of all 
and bower, I Of inward happiness •••• 11 
It matters little to Wordsworth that the reactions to 
London in the same month conflict; rather 't-Jhat is signif'ioant 
is that the poet .feels different emotions each time he looks 
at the city, and expresses himself accordingly. Another sign 
of conflict appears in the .first poem. Usually, the Romantic 
poets scorned city life, seeking escape to the wilds of' na-
ture. Thus, Word::n-mrth 1 s praise seems out of' place. 
55The poem is "Kubla Khan." 
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by implication: "Romantic literature," he writes, "is a 
dream-picture of life; providing sustenance and fulfillment 
for impulses cramped by society or reality.u56 Now if 
Aristotle indeed would have defined Romanticism that way, it 
appears that when Rand classifies herself as a Romantic, she 
cannot at the same time logically support Aristotelian phi-
losophy. Emotionalism as a basis for individuality, subjec-
tivism, and evasion of reality do not even appear to be Ob-
jectivistic, much less Aristotelian. 
Rand, however, appears to be aware of the traditional 
characteristics of Romanticism, and counters the contradic-
tion in tvro ways. First, she defines herself as a Romantic 
Realist, and secondly completely disagrees with the literary 
historians• description of Romantic art. 
What is a Romantic Realist? At first glance, the 
te1~s appear contradictory, but all one need do to resolve 
the apparent illogic is read her novels and writings on the 
nature of art. As suggested above, she believes Romantic 
literature recognizes the principle that man possesses the 
faculty o:f volition, this " ••• a function of man•s ration-
al faculty."57 Because the Romantics failed to identify the 
relationship between volition and reason, they linked it to 
emotionalism, thus (according to Rand's analysis) perpetrat-
ing their own decline and fall headlong into Naturalism, 
56p. L. Lucas, The Decline and Fall of the Romantic 
];_9-eal {New York: Macmillan Co$, 1937}, pp"7' 35-36. 
57Rand, 11 \-lhat Is Romanticism?" p. 71 .. 
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which she regards as presenting a degrading view o~ man as a 
creature without volition. Romanticism there~ore should not 
be thought o~ exclusively in terms of emotional responses and 
the supernatural, but rather as a literary movement designed 
to reveal the heroic potential of man. 
Although most literary historians such as Baugh and 
Lowes would probably disagree with this interpretation, a 
few of them do not rule it out entirely. Lucas, for instance 
points out that it is dangerous and often misleading to think 
of Romanticism in terms of rank opposition to Classicism.58 
And John Lowes, in his master~ul study of Coleridge's "The 
Rime of the Ancient Mariner," a poem complete with ghosts, 
ghost ships, and supernatural horrors, notes that behind the 
horror a foundation of logic appears: the mariner sins, as 
punishment the Albatross is hung about his neck, the ship's 
crew suffers as a result of the killing of the bird, and the 
mariner is finally redeemed, but i'orced to tell his story as 
punishment. Lo1..res observes: 
But the train of' cause and consequence is more than a 
consolidating factor of' the poem. It happens to be life, 
as evePy huma."'l being lmoHs it. You do a i'oolish and evil 
deed, and its results come home to you. And they are apt 
to f'all on other3 too., You repent, and the load is lif't-
ed from your soul., But you have not thereby escaped your 
deed. You attain f'orgiveness, but cause and ef'fect work 
on unmoved, and lifo to the end may be th~9continued reap-ing of the repented deed's results •••• ~ 
l1any convicts in prison Hill validate that statement. Even 
58Lucas, The Decline and Fall of the Romantic Ideal, 
pp. h?-8. 
59Lowes, ~ad;..~X:ana~, pp$ 270-73. 
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after his release with the so-called "debt to society" paid, 
the ex-convict cannot very often .find a good job.60 
Thus, although Rand does not employ all the conven-
tions or characteristics of supernaturalimn, her novels may 
be classified as Romantic in that they depict heroic indi-
vidualisn and .freedom, but in a rational context. This con-
text must be understood if we are to appreciate her admira-
tion .for Victor Hugo. Of his characters, she writes: 
Do not look for familiar landmarks--you won't find them; 
you are not entering the backyard of "the folks next 
door, 11 but a universe you did not know existed. • •• 
You are about to meet a race of giants, who might have 
and ought to have been your neighbors. 
Do not say these giants are "unrealn because you have 
never seen them before •••• It was not his [Hugo 1 sJ 
purpose to show you what you had seen a thousand times 
before. Do not say that the actions of these giants are 
"impossible 11 because they are heroic, noble, intelligent, 
beautiful-remember that the cowardly, the depraved, th~ 
mindless, the ugly are not all that is possible to man.bl 
For these reasons the argument that Romantic fiction courts 
the unrealistic is dismissed as not being the issue. 1.Jhat 
is, however, is that such men ought to exist. Literature 
60coleridge himself, in Ch~ter XIV o.f the Biographia 
Literaria, comments in this connection: 11 ••• it was 
agr'eed, that my endeavours should be directed to persons and 
characters supernatur·al or at least ·romantic; yet so as to 
transfer from our inward nature a human interest and a sem-
blance of' truth su.fficient to procure for these shadows of' 
imagination that v:illing suspension of disbelief for the 
moment •••• Hith this vioH, I wrote "The Ancient Hariner." 
See: S. T, Coleridge, BioGrnphia Litoraria, Chapter XIV in 
David Per·kins, (ed.), English Homr .. ntlc ""'vir:LTers, p. 452. The 
Homan tics, then, often Use the supornatur~a1, the emotional 
or• the bizarre to convoy sol:J.O truth about the nature of man. 
It is too nn::teh an oversimplification to conclude that Rcman-
ticimn means emotionalism which means irrationality. 
61Ayn Hand, "Introduction 
Jioman tic }fanif'esto, pp. 119-20. 
"n:;ote thO:C.~trocJuction to Hugo r s 
i;o Ninety-Three," in The 
As the titJ.e suggests-;--:Rand 
novel. 
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need not consist in merely presenting man as he is, but in-
deed can present him as he ought to be, and such a presenta-
tion implies no metaphysical violation. 
Barbara Branden reports that the character Rand most 
admires in her favorite Hugo movel, Les Miserables, is 
Enjolras, " ••• the young leader of the insurrectionists, 
n62 who dies fighting on the barricades. • • • Hugo tells 
us his thoughts as he and an outnumbered band continue to 
fight: 
They are positive •••• For, and this is beautiful, it 
is always for the ideal, and for the ideal alone, that 
those who devote themselves do devote themselves. An in-
surrection is an enthusiasm. Enthusiamn may become anger; 
hence, an uptaking of arms •••• And men sacrifice them-
selves for these visions, which for the sacrificed, are 
nearly always illusions, but illusions with which, after 
all, the whole of human certainty is mingled. • • • Hho 
knous? They will perhaps succeed. They are the m..i.nority; 
they have against them an entire army; but they are de-
fending the right, the natural law, the sovereignty of 
each over h~mself, which allows of no possible abdica-
tion. • • • 3 
"The sovereignty of each over himself.n This essential cap-
tures the significance of Hugo for Ayn Rand. Although 
Enjolras meets death, it becomes a magnificant thing, a sy.m-
bol of the heroic. Her Jom1 Galt or Dagny Taggart could do 
no less, for they too recognize the primacy of the individ-
ual: his mind, his creative powers, and his potential for 
greatness. 
62Barbara Branden, 11\fuo Is Ayn Rand?," in Who Is AYll, 
Ra.nd? (New York: Paperback Library, 1968), p. 126. -
63victor Hugo, Les Niserables, trans. by r1. Jules 
Gray, Part V, Volume v-;-Book I (Philadelphia: George Barrie 
and Son, 189 3 ) , pp.. lhl~.-45. 
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Rand believes that in contemporary literature all 
traces of Romanticism have vanished, her admiration extend-
ing only to Mickey Sillane, creator of the detective Hike 
Hammer. Speaking of detective fiction as practiced by Spil-
lane, she comments: 
Detective fiction presents, in simple primitive essen-
tials, the conflict of good and evil; that is the root of 
its appeal. l-Uckey Spillane is a moral absolutist. His 
characterizations are excellent and drawn in black-and-
whites; there are no slippery half-tones, no cowardly 
evasions, no cynicism--and no forgiveness; there are no 
doubts about the evil of evil. • • • His hero, Mike Ham-
mer, is a moral avenger, passionately dedicated to justice, 
to.the
4
defense of the wronged, and to the destruction of 
ev~l.6 
In reading his One Lonely Night65 one may readily observe 
Hammer in his role of moral crusader. Briefly, the novel 
concerns the detective's attempt to retrieve top secret docu-
ments stolen by a Communist spy network operating clandes-
tinely j_n America. In so doing, Hammer encounters an assort-
ment of Russian agents, all cast as totally vile, about whom 
he makes his intentions quite clear: 
Gladow spoke. The aides spoke. Then the general spoke. 
[all Red agents]. He pulled his tux jacket down when he 
rose and glared at the audience. I tffarnmerJ had to sit 
there and listen to it. It was propaganda right off the 
latest Moscow cable and it turned me inside out. I -vmnt-
ed to feel the butt of an M-1 against my shoulder pointing 
at those ••• up there on the rostrQ~ and feel the pleas-
ant impact as it spit slugs .••• 
Sure, you can sit dm·m at night and read about the 
hog·Hash they hand out. Haybe you t re fairly intelligent 
64Ayn Rand, 11 Revimv- of The Girl Hunters, 11 The Obiec-
tivj.st Nm-rsletter, I, No. 10 (October, 196Z),pp. 42, [i:. 
65nand consider•s this novel one of his best, especi-
ally in light of Spillane's uncompromising stand against 
Conmnmism. 
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and can laugh at it. Believe me, it isn•t :funny. They 
use the very thing we build up, our own government ~gd 
our own laws, to undermine the very things we want. 
Later, Mike actualizes his :feelings by machine-gunning sever-
al Reds and watching them die in agony. Hammer believes he 
has a moral obligation to kill them: 
There's no shame or sin in killing a killer. David did 
it when he lmocked of'f' Goliath. Saul did it when he slew 
his tens o:f6thous-ands. Thera's no shame to killing an evil thing. 7 
Hammer, in killing the Communists, recognizes that evil is 
evil and can be given no mercy, and thus wins the a~~iration 
of' Rand. It should be recalled here what was observed con-
earning the relationship between the law or identity and the 
"golden mean." Hanrm.ar considers Communism to be completely 
ru1d totally a moral abomination, treating " ••• man as a 
sacrif'icial animal to be immolated :for the bene:fit of' the 
group, the tribe, the society, the state.n68 Here, the law 
of' identity remains in f'ull operation--evil being evil. 
Rand's heroes show as little toleration :for the evil 
in this world as Hammer, although expressing their dissatis-
f'action, f'or the most part,69 in intellectual terms, which 
lead to action, but not with machine guns. The detective 
66Hickey Spillane, One Lonely Night (Ne1.-1 York: The 
New Juncr·ican Library, Signet Press, 1951), p. 79. My 
brackets. 
67~., p. 110. 
6Bnand, 11 Consex•va.tism: An Obituary, '1 in Capital ism: 
'I1ho Unknown Ideal, p .. 195. 
69The qualif'ication is included i'or reasons uhich will 
be made clear in chapter i'our. 
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novel, of course, is less intellectually sophisticated than, 
for example, Atlas Shrugged, but the moral zeal in both is 
unmistakable. An example of this zeal fran The Fountainhead 
finds Howard Roark (the protagonist) accosting those who 
would have the welfare state: 
Man cannot survive except through his mL~d. He comes on 
earth unarmed. His brain is his only weapon. • • • But 
the mind is an attribute of the individual. There is no 
such thing as a collective brain. There is no such thing 
as a collective thought. An agreement reached by a group 
of men is only a compromise or an average drawn upon many 
individual thoughts. It is a secondary consequence. The 
primary act--the process of reason--must be performed by 
each man alone •••• No man can live for another. He 
cannot share his spirit just as be cannot share his body • 
• • • The man who attempts to live for others is a depend-
ent. He is a parasite in motive and makes parasites of 
those he serves. · The relationship produces nothing but 
mutual corruption.70 
Randts heroes wage a philosophical war agaLnst corruption 
and-in this case-socialism and altruism. But, the dedi-
cation to an ideal is just as pronounced as Mike Hammer's 
hatred for the Communists. 
In their respective novels, there exists some evil 
which must be overcome: Communism, altruism, sacrifice, 
etc., and against these evils their heroes never waver until 
victory is achieved. For Rand, this is the essence of Ro-
mantic literature. Her heroes are men who ought to exist, 
wb.o ought to fight to rid the world of moral evil and in so 
doing> advance their own conception of the good.71 
70Ayn Rand, The Fountainhead (New York: The New 
American Library, Slgnet Pl•ess;-·r%"8), pp. 680-81. 
7lunmoly., Objectivist philosophy. 
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In sum, we may observe that when Rand defines Roman-
ticism, she means (at least) the following: (1) Man as in-
dividual, a being of volitional consciousness, is the basis 
for Romantic art, (2) Freedom and individualism are predi-
cated not on emotionalism, but on reason, and (3) Heroes are 
larger than life and ought to exist. 
Are there sufficient grounds, therefore, to claim in-
fluence? For the affirmative we may argue that Rand has 
read the Romantics (for her Hugo and Spillane) and has writ-
ten a book, The Romantic Manifesto, which outlines her theory 
of literature along Romantic lines. She views man in a he-
roic capacity, but bases his heroiffm on rational individual-
ism; not emotionalism or subjective reaction. Finally, we 
have sho-vm that although Roman tic literature often favors 
emotionalism and the supernatural, Romantic writers such as 
Coleridge often have a rational message to convey using the 
Romantic motif as a vehicle. Romantic poetry, then, may not 
be as alien to reason, logic and order as a first reading 
might suggest. 
But, serious difficulties do exist which challenge 
influence, especially if the above named characteristics of 
Romru1ticism are considered essential. Rand's definition of 
Romanticism and her analysis of Romantic ii1dividualism would 
probably not be accepted by most literary critics. Those 
such as Horton, Lowes and the Romantics the!nselves consider 
emotior~s to be a major characteristic, a vjew which Rand 
considr::rably modifies 1-rhen presenting her definition. Al-
I 
II 
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though Lowes argues that logic may be at the foundation of 
coleridge's poetry, he attaches supreme significance to the 
poet's use of the supernatural and the emotional reactions 
used in the creative process. In her novels, however, Rand 
tends to reverse the emphasis. Too, her heroes are not 
skeptics, but the Romantics often are. "Pleasure domes" 
often evaporate when confronted with the harshness of reality. 
Toda.v, Spillane is characterized as a popular writer; 
not a Romantic, but Rand still prefers the Romantic classifi-
cation. Now as literary critic, she is of course entitled 
to so classify Spillane, provided substantiating evidence can 
be found. 
Lastly, her position that Romantic writers miscalcu-
lated by not identifying the relationship between volition 
and reason, turning as if through ignorance to emotionalism, 
is not generally accepted. Indeed, the "turningn often was 
a matter of conscious and deliberate choice. 
Thus, we may conclude--except for Hugo where definite 
influence exists-that Rand was influenced by the Romantic 
school-~provided, and this is essential, we recognize that 
her conception o£ Romanticism is often at odds with estab-
lished critics. 
We may observe in this context that Rand's use of 
definitions creates headaches for any researcher. In £act, 
Ellis is quite critical of what he calls hor 11 ••• highly 
tautological thinking, rr72 'vhich he beliovos invalidates much 
72Ellis, Is Objectivism A Religi~?, p. 217. 
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of Objectivism. For example, merely because Rand calls her-
self a Romantic according to her own definition of Romanti-
cism, does not necessarily mean she is one. Obviously the 
question of definitional use requires careful attention and 
will therefore be considered in chapter four. 
Finally, Rand's relationship to the Social Darwinists 
must be considered. At first glance, men such as Herbert 
spencer and William Sumner seem to have much in common with 
Rand. All three accept laissez-faire Capitalism, oppose the 
welfare state, and defend the concept of negative government. 
But, as commonality itself does not prove influence, we must 
examine the case for possible influence in more detail. 
Herbert Spencer, an Englishman, achieved his greatest 
popular.i ty in the decades following the Civil Har. His 
ideas found considerable acceptance across the,Atlantic, for 
it was during this period that America began to transform 
herself into an industrial democracy. Great factories in 
the north had produced the weapons of war needed to defeat 
the agrarian south. In such a setting, Spencer's philosophy 
fit quite well: 11 Spencer's was a system conceived in and 
dedicated to an age of steel and steam engines, competition, 
exploitation, and struggle."73 
According to Spencer, evolutionary progress charac-
terizes the development of societies, with primitive ones 
soon (as a result of internal conflict) acquiring military 
73nichard Hof'stadter, Social Darwinism in American 
_Thoup;ht (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955),'"1)-:-Js;-. 
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sophistication. This military society, still unstable how-
ever, eventually evolves into an advanced industrial state, 
founded on laissez-faire Capitalism. Although virtual per-
fection exists at this stage, Spencer reasons that altruism 
will mark the culmination: then society will be as nearly 
perfect as humanly possible. The evolutionary principle be-
bind his theory states that, 
Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant 
dlsslpatlon-o~motion; durins-whicb the matter passes 
from a (relativelz) indefinite, lncoharent homogeneltx 
to a Trelatively) definite, coherent heterogeneity •••• 74 
Implicit in this important principle are the following con-
cepts with which Rand 'tvould agree: (1) individual rights-
homogeneity to heterogeneity, (2) private ownership of 
property--socialism implies homogeneity, (3) negative role 
of government--laissez-faire outlook. 
For Spencer, such a society cannot be achieved eas-
ily, for it requires the competitive restructuring of the 
environment. When defining the nature of competition, 
Spencer notes that a member of society cannot exclusively 
devote himself to a special activity 11 ••• unless those 
for whose benefit he carries on his special activity in ex-
cess, give him in return the benefits of their special ac-
74Herbert Spencer, First Principles (New York: D. 
Appleton and Co., 1910), p:-)b(. The-deffr1ition includes 
the v.ropd 'relatively' twice. Spencer added this qualifica-
tion to malce it clear• that " • • • Evolution must be regard-
ed as falling between two ideal limits, neither of which is 
roached." He believed that 11 relativity 11 characterizes all 
our lm01.-1lede;e. See "Appendix A" to First P1•inciples, 
pp., 513-16. 
. it• s ?5 tJ.V J.e • 
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Competition, the heart or laissez-raire Capi-
talism, must be ruthless, to the extreme that the unrit be 
eliminated, ror: 
• • • the rorces at work will exterminate such sections 
or mankind as stand in the way, with the same sternness76 that they exterminate ••• herds or useless ruminants. 
Although he did not oppose voluntary aid ror the poor, 
Spencer thinks that i~ government, through the welrare state, 
tries to help those in need, then nature's laws will be 
thwarted, thereby creating catastrophe. Further, the ex-
istence of the unrit can only serve to lower the moral and 
intellectual tone or society since they limit productive 
achievement and thwart competition. 
America's most significant Social Darwinist was 
Willirun Sumner, whose contribution to social thought re-
sults from a synthesis of three concepts: (l),the Protes-
tant ethic, (2) laissez-faire Capitalism, and (3) natural 
selection. 
Strongest in New England, the Puritan ethic proves 
quite compatible with capitalism in that they both stress 
hard -vwrk and dedication to material prosperity which, for 
the P1u•i tan, was a sign of inward holiness. This relation-
ship, Rand completely ignores. 
Laissez-faire Capitalism, believes Sumner, is the 
75nerbert Sponce:r•, 'l'he Study of Sociologz ( NevT York: 
D. Appleton and Co., 1910), p. 303. · 
76nerbert Spencer•, Social Statistics (New York: D. 
Appleton and Coe, 1910), p~e;.- -----
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most sophisticated economic system because it alone rests on 
the principle or survival or the fittest. He writes that 
competition invariably results in " ••• courage, good 
training, intelligence, perseverance,n77 qualities operative 
only in a society based on the contract relationship: 
A society based on contract is a society or free and in-
dependent men, who form ties without favor or obligation, 
and cooperate without cringing or intrigue. A society 
based on contract, therefore, gives the utmost room and 
chance for individual development, gud f'or all the self-
reliance and dignity of a free man.7ti 
Rand would totally endorse that statement, believing that 
the contract relationship is one in which men are treated as 
rree agents; not slaves or the welfare state, which thwarts 
those or ability. Believing in social determinism, Sumner 
concludes that the evolutionary process is a slow one; there-
fore man cannot force change which can only occur according 
to nature's plan over a period of centuries. Such a posi-
tion tends to lessen the po-v1er of the mind to institute 
change. 
In an important essay entitled "The Forgotten Man," 
Sumner discusses the true intent of socialistic reformers: 
As soon as A observes something vrhich seems to him to be 
wrong, from -vrhich X is suffering, A talks it over with B, 
and A and B then propose to get a law passed to remedy 
the evil and help X. Their law always p1•oposes to deter-
77Hillia...l1 Sumner, "The Challenge of I•1acts, 11 in The 
.Qh_~_;u:~i£_Of Fa9ts and Other Essays (Nevl Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 19fl~), p. 67. 
78tvilliam Sumner, Hhat Social ClassoE: Owe to Each 
Otho:P (New Haven: Yale Universlty Press~ 1')~ 
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mine what C shall do ror X. 79 • • • 
The true intent or course, is to practice altruism, which as 
we have seen, involves the suf'rering or the innocent, here 
man c. To quote Rand, A and B " • • • assume a halo or vir-
tue by giving away goods • • • by making others (C) pay ror 
the luxury of [their] pity. n80 
Finally, we must consider Sumner as an ethical rela-
tivist. In Folkwavs, his major sociological work, he out-
lines the belier that when men rirst act in consort to sur-
vive, they rind that certain activities or ideas work more 
successrully than others: 
The struggle to maintain existence was carried on, not 
individually, but in groups. Each prof'ited by the other's 
experience; hence there was concurrence towards that which 
proved to be the most expedient. All at last adopted the 
same way for the same purpose. Hence, the ways turned 
into customs and became mass phenomena.tll 
With the passage of time, these customs or f'olkways acquire 
moral validity, the violation of which by any member or the 
group incurs punishment. Thus folkways become mores--that 
is, morally binding on the group. 
Sumner argues that because societies difrer from 
country to country, so also do the folkways and mores pro-
duced by them. Thus, 11 ••• the real process in great 
bodies of men is not one of deduction from any great prin-
79r,vi11irun Sumner, 11 The Forgot ten Han, 11 in The For-
,gpttel]; ~Im~a."l.(~-_Q_ther Essay~ (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 19b91, p" 4."66. 
80Rand, Atl~ .. SlJ:r'ugged, p. 540. 
8lwilJ.iam. Snmr1er, _folbrays (lie"L·J" York: Hentor Books, 
1940), p. 18. 
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ciple or philosophy or ethics, ••• but one of minute 
... 
efforts to live well under existing conditions. n82 • • • 
Because tne mores vary according to the survival needs of 
the given society, then human conduct cannot be contingent 
on objective moral principles. 
As suggested, there is much in Sumner and Spencer 
which seems compatible with Objectivism including: {l) 
laissez-faire Capitalism, {2) the negative role of govern-
ment, (3) individual ownership of property, (4) the contract 
system, (5) opposition to socialism and {6) sympathy for the 
"forgotten man." Indeed, the sympathy is great enough to 
prompt one critic to observe: 
All in all, she (Rand] is probably the most thoroughgoing 
advocate of laissez-faire capitalism ever to set pen to 
paper •••• If you could multiply Herbert Spencer by 
\villiam Graham Sumner, you would get Ayn Rand. 83 
If an accountant could check the multiplication, however, he 
would find an error. Although they and Rand are similar in 
the areas mentioned above, their reasons for support are 
quite different. vlri tes Rand: 
Herbert Spencer, another champion of capitalism, chose 
to decide that the theory of evolution and of adaptation 
to environment was the key to man's morality--and declared 
that the moral justification of capitalism was the sur-
vival of the species, of the human race; that 'Hhoever was 
of no value to the race had to perish; that man's morality 
consisted of adaptinn; oneself to one's social envirorrn1ont, 
and seekinn; One IS O"tvn happineSS in the Welfare Of SOCiety; 
and that the automatic process o:f evolution would eventu-
82Ibi<_l., p. ~~-9. 
83r.f. Stanton Evans, "The Gospel According to Ayn 
Hand," National RevieH, XIX (October, 1967), 1059. My 
brackets. - -
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ally obliteratg4the distinction between selfishness and unselrishness. · 
Of course, Objectivism rejects the belief that altruism 
could eventually replace capitalism in the evolutionary 
development of the race. Hmvever, the major distinction 
made between Rand's justification or capitalism and Spencer's 
is that Rand's is moral, while Spencer's, biological. The 
title or her book, Capitalism: The Unknorm Ideal, means 
that laisse·z-raire Capitalism is a moral ideal yet to be 
achieved. In "~fua t Is Capitalism?," she defends her thesis: 
Capitalism is a social system based on the recognition 
of individuil rights, including property rights, in vThich 
all property is prJ.vately 01-mea •••• The moral }Ustili-
cation of capitalism does not lie in the altruist claim 
that it 1•epresents the best way to achieve nthe common 
good." It is true that capitalism does ••• but this is 
merely a secondary consequence. The moral justification 
of capitalism lies in the fact that it is the only system 
consonant with man's rational nature, that it protects 
~an'~ su8~ival qua man, and that its ruling principle is 
JUStJ.ce . .? 
Rand sees capitalism as consistent with man's moral right to 
function as a rational individual, a moral being and not 
merely a biological unit in the race. In this connection, 
Objectivism would also reject Spencer's belief that the 
tmfit should be eliminated, arguing.that individual men 
have no moral obligation to support them but certainly no 
rieht to exterminate them. 
The concepts stu"vival of the fittest and social deter-
8~and, "Introduction," For The Ne11 Intellectual, 
p. 37. Italics in original. 
85Rand, 11 \Vbat Is Capitalism?," in Ganitalism: The 
Unkno-vrn Ideal, pp. 19-20. Italics in origii1.al. 
-,r 
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minism need qualirication rrom an Objectivist point or view. 
survival of the rittest could be interpreted to mean might 
makes right with the implication or death to the weak. Objec-
tivism, however, sees the rittest as those who choose to be 
rational by engaging in productive work to achieve happiness. 
Further, since the concept implies the aggressive use or 
force, Objectivism would reject the term and any of its 
implications. 
Rand and Sumner are compatible in wishing to resur-
rect the forgotten man, but certainly disagree regarding his 
nature. Specifically, she rejects the concept or social 
determinism, which Sumner uses to imply that man's mind is 
incapable of altering nature's evolutionary laws.86 Rand, 
as v.re have often noted, sees man as a :rational creature very 
capable of molding the environment to suit his needs. Of 
course, the method ror so doing implies, for Objectivism, 
individual rational achievement and not any form or social-
ism. 
Lastly, Objectivism rejects Sumnerts belief that 
morality is relative. Although recognizing that customs or 
folkways might vary from nation to nation, Rand would also 
assert that man's nature does not vary. His potential for 
ra.tiom·.,_l achievement is contingent on1y on volitional choice, 
regardless of national origin. 
On the basis of this evidence, we may conclude that, 
861Villiam S1mmer, 11 The Absurd Effort to Hake the 1Vorld 
Over, 11 in l-Jar and Other Essays (NeH Haven: Yale Univel'Si ty 
P1•ess, 1970}, pp. 209-lOe --
I, 
I 
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despite the similarities between Sumner, Spencer, and Rand,. 
that Rand was not influenced by the rormers 1 writings. Sim-
ilarity or ideas does not constitute inrluence. 
SDM1-1ARY 
In this chapter, we have attempted to validate the 
suggestion that Rand was influenced by Aristotle, the Roman-
tics, and the Social Darwinists. 
Investigation substantiates that Objectivism is inrlu-
anced to a large degree by Aristotle's philosophy. This 
influence, persistent and shaping, places Aristotelian 
philosophy and Objectivism in firm intellectual contact. 
It is further suggested that they fail to agree on some 
points, including man and his relationship to the state, 
the doctrine of the golden mean as·it relates to the prin-
ciple of identity, and the nature of government. Rand's 
acceptance of his theory of art is also demonstrated. 
Although Rand has read certain Romantic writers and 
has a book on the theory of Romantic composition, we can 
only determine tentative influence as her definition of 
Romantic art is often at odds with established critics. 
Her ailiniration for Hugo has been documented, but her classi-
fication of Spillane as a Romantic is at best an idiosyn-
cratic classification. Rand and the Romantics at least 
agroe, however, on the point that art should reflect the 
he:r•oic in man. A problem regarding Rand's use of defini-
tion ar:i.ses here, which Hill be exandned in chapter four. 
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Lastly, it was established that Objectivism was not 
influenced by the Social Darwinists. In fact, Rand rejects 
these thinkers for their failure to defend capitalism in 
moral terms. Although she and the Social Darwinists speak 
in terms of loyalty to capitalism, opposition to the wel-
fare state, and the negative role of government, similarity 
in intellectual content does not prove influence. 
It is hoped that this background will provide a 
clearer understanding of Objectivism by placing it in intel-
lectual perspective. The next chapter will consider the 
philosophy of Objectivism, and it is that to which we now 
turn. 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE HETAPHYSICS, EPISTEMOLOGY AND AXIOLOGY 
OF OBJECTIVISM 
This chapter will discuss the philosophy of Objectiv-
ism thereby providing the background necessary to effectively 
understand Rand's educational position. Attention will be 
devoted to the metaphysics, epistemology, and especially the 
axiology of Ob j ec ti vi sm. The a.."'lCiology merits special con-
sideration because Rand's educated man must subscribe to an 
ethical code which at times counters Christian morality. 
Included in this chapter will be a discussion of the 
concept, sense of life. It requires special consideration 
prior to an analysis of the metaphysics, for the metaphysics 
cannot be fully understood without discerning how Rand inte-
grates sense of life into her philosophical system. 
Sense of life is defined as: 
A sense of life is a pre-conceptual equivalent of meta-
physics, an emotional, subsconsciously integrated ap-
praisal of man's relationship to existence. It sets the 
nature o.f a man's emotional :r•osponses and the essence of 
his character.l 
Sonse of' life then precedes a philosophy of' life, and con-
------
stitutes an emotional, pre-conceptual estimate of one's view· 
lAyn Hand, !!Philosophy £tnd Sense of Life, 11 in The 
Ro~nantic Hanifesto (Hci'T York: 'l1he NeH American Lib1•a:r•y, 
Sigi1et Pr·oss, 1971), p. 25. 
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himsel~ and the world. 
Rand notes that an individual, prior to understanding 
what metaphysics means, " • • • makes choices, ~orms value-
judgments, experiences emotions and acquires a certain 
implicit view o~ li~e."2 The result o~ such activities is 
that one's, 
. • • subconscious mechanism sums up his psychological 
activities, integrating his conclusions, reactions, or. 
evasions into an emotional sum that establi.shes an habit-
ual pattern and becomes his automatic response to the 
world aroQ~d him. What begins as a series or single, 
discreet conclusions • • • becomes a generalized ~eeling 
about existence, an L--nplici t metaphysics vli th the compel-
ling motivational pmver o:r a constant, basic emotion-an 
emotion which is part o:r all his other emotions and. 
underlies all his experiences. This is a sense o~ li:re.3 
The nature o:r the emotions evoked is contingent on the indi-
vidual's view o~ pimsel~.4 In other words, what conclusions 
one reaches depends on lltthat which is important to~' r or: 
•that kind o~ universe which is right :ror ~' in which I 
would f'eel at home. ,u5 
Essentially, then, "the key concept, in the ~ormation 
of' a sense of' lit"e, is the term 'important, 1 nb because 
important, 
••• pertains to that aspect o:r metaphysics which 
serves as a bridge between metaphysics and ethics: to 
a .fundamental view o~ man t s nature. That vieH involves 
the ans"Hors to such questions as Hhether the m1iverso is 
kno1-mble or not, uhether man has the pmv~)r or choice or 
not, whether he can achieve his goals in life or not. 
The ansv-Ters to such questions are 11 metaphysical value-
2Ib. ' 
__2:.£·, p. 26. 3Ibid. Italics in original. 
4Ibid., p .. 27. Italics in original. 
---
5Ibid., p. 28. Italics in original. 6Ibid. 
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judgments, 11 since they fo:rDl the base of ethics. 7 
The concept sense of life is vital to any consideration of 
Rand's educational position. The school must assume the 
responsibility of providing a secure environment, thereby 
helping the child develop emotionally sound reactions which 
are crucial to making proper value judgments. In other 
words, the learner should feel that he is in a secure and 
predictable universe. 
Sense of life perhaps may be best described in terms 
of art. The artistic process is controlled by the artist's 
sense of~: 
• • • what an art work expresses, fundamentally, under 
all of its lesser aspects is: "This is life as I see 
it." The essential meaning of a--viewer's or reader's 
response, under all of its lesser elements is: "This 
is (or is not) life as I see it. 11 8 --
In other words, the artist presents his view o~ man and o.f 
existence as developed from his sense of life, now fully 
matured into a philosophy of life.9 
In order to live as a man one must, according to Rand, 
be able to smoothly make the transition from being guided by 
a ~~ of life to being guided by a philosophy of life. 
She writes: 
By the time he reaches adolescence, man's knowledge is 
suf'f'icient to deal with broad funda.."llentals; this is the 
period Hhen he becomes aware of the need to translate 
7Ibid. 
BRand, "Art and Sense of' Lif'e," in The Romantic 
Hanif'esto, p. 35. Italics in original. 
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his incoherent sense or lire into conscious terms. This 
is the period when he gropes ror such things as the mean-
ing of lire, ror principles, ideas, values and, desper-
ately, ror selr-assertion. An~--since nothing is done 
••• the result is the frantic, hysterical irrationality 
or most adolescents, particularly today. Theirs is the 
agony of the unborn--of minds going through a process or 
atrophy at a time set by nature for their growth.lO 
Rand thus believes that our present society ignores the means 
required to actualize the transition. She argues that edu-
cation should help the child become an adult by assisting in 
the transition from sense of life to philosophy of lire. 
One or the reasons Rand speaks so harshly or contemporary 
American education is because or its railure to carry out 
that important task. As the transition ought to occur in 
elementary school, it should come as no surprise to learn 
that Objectivism focuses attention on the elementary educa-
tive process, especially endorsing Montessori. 
vle may noH turn our attention to a treatment of Objec-
tivism. In 1vlho Is Ayn Rand?, Nathaniel Branden outlines, in 
brief, the philosophy's essentials: 
In metaphysics, it is the principle that reality is 
objective and absolute, that it exists independent of 
anyone 1 s consciousness, perceptions, beliefs, .,..d.shes, 
hopes or fears-that 1vhich is, is what it is-that 
"existence is identity 11 -that A is A. In epistemology, 
it :i.s tho p1•inciple that man's mind is competent to 
achieve objectively valid kno-vlledge of that Hhich exists. 
In ethics, it is the principle that values proper to man 
are objectively demonstJ.'able.ll 
The philosophy of Objectivism assie;ns man a unique place· .in 
----------------------
lOD ' d tl pl.- • 1 h d s f L. ,... II 2° na..,1 ., ~ 1ll osop y an en so o 11. e, p. /. 
llNathaniel Branden, Hho Is Ayn Rand'? (New York: 
Paperback Library: 1968), p. 49. 
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the universe because of' his capacity f'or rational.thought. 
Animals, of' course, are incapable of' the capacity f'or non-
instinctual perception which only man enjoys. But man's 
consciousness is not automatic. He of'ten acts as his own 
worst enemy because he 11 ••• is the only living entity 
born without any guarantee of' remaining conscious at a11.12 
Objectivism rests on the basic premise that the most f'unda-
mental choice which man makes is "the choice of' lif'e or 
death.nl3 Thus, man can either think or suspend thought. 
Rand's metaphysical system is based on the so-called 
~ of' Thought as advanced by Aristotle. Specif'ically, the 
principle of' identity, the law of' contradiction, and the law 
of' causality require comraent. 
The principle of' identity stipulates that an entity 
is itself' and remains itself'. It cannot theref'ore change in 
a given context. In other words, A is A, man is man and 
chair is chair. Related to this principle is the law of' 
contradiction (the negative of' the principle of' identity). 
Aristotle regards this laH as n • • • the most certain prin-
ciple of' all •• ~ that regarding which it is impossible to 
be mistaken. 1114 He defines it as f'ollows: " ••• the same 
att:.t:>ibute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to 
12Ayn.Rand, "The Objectivist Ethics,n in The Virtue 
of Self'ishness (New York: The NeH' American Library, S~gnet 
Pr·ess~-1964J,p. 19. 
13rbi£o, p. 21. 
14Aris totle, l·1o tap~ysics, 1005b 11-12. 
! I 
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the same subject and in the same respect. 1115 Thus, one can-
not logically believe the same thing to be and not to be, ror 
A is not _1ot-A. 
The principle or identity and law or contradiction 
rorm the m-etaphysical base or Rand 1 s philosophy. Her pro-
tagonist John Galt, when addressing the American people, 
condemns them ror their railure to grasp the meaning or the 
principle or identity and law or contradiction: 
A lear ca~~ot be a stone at the same time, it cannot be 
all red and all green at the same time. • • • 
Are you seeking to knoH v-1hat is wrong with the world? 
All the disasters that have wrecked your world came from 
your leaders' attempt to evade the ract that A is A •• 
A contradiction cannot ltist. An axiom is itselr, and so 
is the universe •••• 
Galt's speech is intended to be a philosophical summary or 
Atlas Shrugged's dramatic activity. Thus, the "disasters" 
result rrom the railure or individual characters to respect 
the Aristotelian laws mentioned by Galt. 
An example will illustrate Galt's meaning. The United 
States as portrayed in Atlas Shrugged races economic (and 
moral) collapse. Too long abused, scorned and exploited by 
the advocates of welfare socialism 1-1ho control the govern-
ment, a group of competent industrialists ~~rike, w·ithdraw 
rrom society, leaving ·t;he country to the mercy of those who 
claim the right to dominate their minds. 17 Dagny Taggart-
l5Ibid., l005b 18-20. 
l6A:vn Rand, Atlas Shrur;r;ed (New York: The New Ameri-
can Libral'Y, Signet Pl'oss, 19'5"!), pp. 9l.!.O-it.3. 
17The strike do vice is a metapho1•. Atlas Shrugged 
illustrates Hhat races America in the futurei1' the country 
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an industrialist and Rand's central ~emale protagonist--at 
the time or the rollowing conversation, ~ails to grasp the 
moral necessity ror the strike. Attempting to persuade 
industrialist Ken Danagger not to abandon his business, she 
asks, 
"You have decided to retire? To give up your business?" 
"Yes." 
"Does it mean nothing to you now?" 
"It means more to me no1.-1 than it ever did be~ore." 
"But you're going to abandon it?" 
"Yes. • • • " 
"Do you realize what your retirement will do to • • • all 
the rest or us, whoever is lert?" 
"Yes I realize it more rully than you do at present.nl8 
From Dagnyrs perspective, Danagger appears to be violating 
the law o~ contradiction: A is not not-A, love is not not-
love. In other words, how could Danagger, who loves his 
business 1rdsh to aband.on it-an act.ion certainly implying 
non-love?l9 But, as Galt explains throughout his speech, 
contradictions cannot exist. Dagny's error is her ~ailure 
to understand Danagger's reasons ror retiring. In the con-
text or the entire novel, his actions are quite logical, as 
continues to drirt toward socialism. For a summary or the 
ethical principles involved in the decision to strike, the 
reader should consult Atlas Shrugged, pp. 616-27. Therein 
is explained the moral evil implicit in the welf'are state 
advocate 1 s basic conviction: .from each according to his 
ability, to each according to his need. 
18Ibid., p. 419. 
19It is important to note that no one rorces Danagger, 
or any of' the industrialists to retire. Danagger's decision 
is absolutely non-coerced. It is a .freely made, voluntary 
decision. 
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herselr, will discover.20 na.gny, 
The law or causality argues that no rinite being can 
exist without a surricient cause or reason. Aristotle spe"lks 
or rour causes: material, rormal, erricient, and rinal. 21 
Here, the erricient cause is important. Speaking or it, 
Aristotle notes: 
••• it is not likely that either rire or earth or any 
such element should be the reason why things manirest 
goodness and beauty ••• nor again could it be right to 
intrust so great a matter to spontaneity and chance. 
When one man22 said, then, that l'eason was present • • • 
as the cause and order or all arrangement, he seemed 
like a sober man. • • .23 
Thus, man's reason constitutes the erricient cause. John 
Galt co~~ents in a similar manner: 
~ve are the cause or all the values that you covet, we 
perrorm the process or thinking, which is the process 
derining identity and discovering causal connectaons. 
taught you to know, to speak, to produce •••• 2 
who 
o:f 
\ole 
In Atlas Shrugged, the :following de:finitions o:r man, as 
o:ffered by leading antagonists, represent violations o:r the 
law of causality: 
111·1an? 't-lha t is 
with delusions 
plasm, f'ull of 
emo·t;ions • • • 
man? He's just a collection or chemicals 
of' grandeur." "A miserable bit or proto-
ugly little concepts and mean little 
II 
Dr. P1•i tchett 
20For details which explain the nature or Dagny's 
discovery by resolving the co;tradiction, see Galt's speech 
in Atlus Shrue&ed, pp. 963-80. 
21Aristotlc, r1etaph:ysics, 98lb-984b. 
22The man is Anaxagoras, an Ionian philosopher who 
settled in Athens in 450 DeC. 
23Aristotle, Netaphysics, 98l.t-b ll-17. 
2L~nancl, Atlas Shrugged, p. 963. Italics in original. 
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"The purpose of' philosophy is not to seek lmowledge but 
to prove that lmowledge is impossible to man." · ..
Dr. Pritchett 
"Man is not open to truth or reason. They cannot be 
reached by rational argument. The mind is powerless 
against them." 
Dr. Stadler 
" ••• what's a human being?" "A weak, ugly, sinf'ul 
creature born that way ••• so humility is the one 
virtue he ought to practice •••• Pride is the worst 
of' all sins." 
Mr. Taggart 
"People don't want to think." 
Dr. Ferris25 
These are the leaders whom Galt castigates f'or their f'ailure 
to respect the law of' causality. By ref'using to recognize 
that reason is the ef'f'icient cause responsible f'or man's 
creative achievements, they bring about the eventual decline 
and fall of America. Atlas Shrugged vividly portrays that 
decline, and offers man an ethical alternative~-Objectivist 
ethics. 
Rand's interpretation of' the Laws of' Thought f'orms 
the metaphysical basis of Objectivism. As such, the laws 
have significant ethical as well as metaphysical implica-
tions. Because of' their application to ethics, the philos-
ophy has been criticized. Albert Ellis and \iilliam 0' Neill 
both object to Rand's use of' the Lm1s of' Thought. O'Neill 
charges that she ignores the f'act that "logic relates to the 
. 
formal context of discourse, and not to the specif'ic values 
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attached to the particular terms involved.rr26 Ellis' objec-
tion is similar: 
Aristotelian logic is merely a system of consistent 
labeling; it is not descriptive or nor does it say any-
thing about external reality. • • • russ Rand unrortun-
ately keeps jumping rrom label to reality, and unthink-
ingly conruses the two.27 
Rand replies by questioning the need ror a logic that bears 
no relationship to reality and that cannot be used by man to 
further his survival. Defining value as "that which one 
acts to gain and/or keep,n28 and logic as "the art or non-
contradictory identification,n29 she proceeds to relate them 
in a decisional context: 
Nobody "decides." Nature does not decide_;_it merely is; 
man does not decide, in issues or knowlea.ge, he merely 
observes that which is. Uhen it comes to applying his 
knowledge, man decides what he chooses to do, according 
to what he has learned, remembering that the basic prin-
ciple or rational action in all aspects of human exist-
ence, is: "Nature to be cornm---aiided, must be obeyed. 1130 
This means that man does not create reality and can 
26\-Jilliam 0 'Neill, ~Vi th Charity Toward None (New York: 
Philosophical Library, 1971), p. 132. 
27Albert Ellis, Is Objectivism a Religion? (New York: 
Lyle Stuart, Inc., 1968), pp. 229-30. 
28Rand, nrrhe Objectivist Ethics, 11 p. 15. 
29Ayn Rand, "':Phis Is John Galt Speaking," in For The 
Nevr Intellectual (Nev-r York: :I'he New American Libl'ary, Sig-
net r:r:ess-;-19617, p. 126. 
30This ph~aRo is Francis Bacon's. See his: Novma 
.Qr~:t.:~: 11 .4phorisms Concerning the Interpretation o.f Nature 
and the Kingdom c.f F!a.."1., 11 iii: 11 Hun1an lmowlodge and human 
poHer meet in one; for where the cause is not kno1m the 
effect cannot be produced. Nature to be coi;;ro.andod must be 
obeyed; and Hhich in contemplation i.s as the cause, is in 
operation as the rule. 11 E .. Burtt, ed., The Enr.;Jish Philos-
op~ers From Bacon to r1ill ( NeH York: Hodern Lrbrary, 1939), 
p. 28. 
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achieve his values only by making his decisions conson-
ant with the f'acts of' reality. Who "decides"? ••• 
AnY man who cares to acquire the appropriate knowledge 
and to judge, at and f'or his ~~ risk and sake. What is 
his criterion or judgment? Reason. What is his ultimate 
f'rame of' ref'erence? Reality. If' he errs or evades, who 
penalizes him? Reality.31 
In using his reason to make value judgments, man must have 
some operational means at his disposal. For Rand, such 
means are the Laws of' Thought. Operationally contingent 
upon an objective reality, they f'unction as man 1 s guidelines. 
By implication, any f'orm of' subjectivism--the attempt 
to f'orce upon reality whims or desires which do not corre-
spond to what is-inevitably leads to chaos and violates the 
law of' contradiction. Noting that oners wish or emotional 
whim contradicts reality. Rand argues that the ultimate end 
of' subjectivism is illogic: "It [subjectivism] is the doc-
trine which holds that man • • • can, somehow, .live, act and 
achieve his goals apart f'rom and/or in contradiction to the 
f'acts of' reality, i.e., apart f'rom and/or in contradiction 
to his own nature and the nature of' the universe. 11 32 The 
f'a.cts of' reality are what a man must examine (using the Laws 
of' Thought as his means) in order tq determine the proper 
action (s) in any given situation. To assert that such and 
such is so when it really is not, and then to act as if' it 
lvere so is to assert and deny the same thing at the same 
time in the same con text. Man examines (or ought to) the 
31Ayn Rand, "Intellectual Ammunition Department, 11 The 
Objectivist Newsletter, IV, No. 2 (February, 1965), 7. 
Itailcs in orlginal. 
32Ibid. My brackets. 
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facts of reality, using his reason if he desires to live as 
a man. 
We may conclude that the following reflects Objectiv-
ism's metaphysical position: Reality is that which exists 
independent of man's mind, the mind being capable of compre-
hending it. Two important corollaries follow: (1) the key 
to man's understanding reality is his reason, and (.2) man 
survives by conscious goal directed actions and choices using 
the Laws of Thought to determine what is. 
Because Objectivism is a highly coherent philosophy, 
a definite relationship exists between its metaphysical and 
epistemological orientation. It is to the epistemology that 
we now turn. Realist philosopher K. F. Reinhardt, although 
not speaking of Objectivism, identifies a relationship 
between metaphysics and epistemology with which Rand would 
agree. He wr·ites: 
The intellect, confronted with a multitude of sensible 
objects, distinguishes between substances and accidents, 
causes and effects, means and ends. Applying the imman-
ent first principles . • • [i.e. La1-1s o.f Thought] the 
intellect proceeds, by means of abstraction, analysis, 
synthesis, and analogy to the formation of concepts, 
judgments and conclusions .••• 33 
For Rand, the first principles or Laws of Thought are used 
in precisely the way Reinhardt suggests. One o.f the .func-
tions of the intellect which makes it distinctly human is 
its capacity to fornmla te concepts. Her book, Introduction 
33K. F. Reinhardt, A Healistic Philosophy (I'1lhmukee: 
'J.,be Bruco Publishing co., l'1Iil1.), pp. 95-96 .. By first princi-
ples, Reinhardt means the principles of identity, contradic-
tion and causality. Hy brackets. 
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to Objectivist Epistemology, deals exclusively with the 
nature or concepts, how they are rormed, and to what use 
they are put by man. 
The epistemology or Objectivism states that the mind 
is capable or achieving objectively validated knowledge or 
reality. By rormal derinition epistemology " ••• is a 
science devoted to the discovery or the proper methods or 
acquiring and validating knowledge."34 Turning to its spe-
cirics, Rand believes that man's consciousness matures in 
three states: the sensory, the perceptual, and the con-
ceptual.35 or the three, the level proper to man is the 
conceptual and as such, has a special relationship to "some-
thing that exists" (i.e. existent), "the building-block or 
man r s lmowledge. "36 As vd th consciousness, the concept 
"existent" develops in three states: entity (" ••• a 
child's awareness or objects,") identity ("awareness or spe-
ciric, particular things which he can recognize and distin-
guish rrom the rest or his perceptual rield 
• • • ") and 
unit ( II • 
• • 
grasping relationships among these entities 
by grasping the similarities and dif'f'erences or their iden-
tities.11)37 11M~ distinctive method of cognition is the 
abili t;y: to ree;_ard entities ~ units. n38 A concept, Rand 
defines as " ••• a mental integration of -~~ EE_ ~ units 
possess:~-_l:!:E. _!:he_ ~ distinguishing_ charactc:_~~istic (_~), with 
34Ayn Rand, Jntroquction to ObjectJv}:E~ Epistemolog:y: 
York: 'l1ho Objoctlv:tst Inc., 1959), p., Jc. 
35]bi9:., p. 11. 36Ibid. 37rbidq_. p .. 12. 38rbid. 
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their Earticular measurements omitted. n39 To be conscious 
.;:.::;----
requires choice, and now the significance of that may be 
observed. If' one fails to be conscious, his entit•e episte-
mological f'ramework collapses because he can only remain 
conscious by being conceptually aware. In so doing, he 
{first as a child) senses and then perceives that nexistents" 
exist in reality. The perception of' entities (the first 
level), which at first appear in be-tvildering confusion, 
gradually becomes more sophisticated, leading to awareness 
of specifics or particulars (i.e. identities), and finally 
culminating in the ability to grasp relationships between 
entities. This ability, to regard entities as units, is the 
basis of concept formation. Essentially, through a process 
of' classif'ication, ma."Yl begins to organize and integra. te 
nni ts into wider and wider concepts, and is thus able to 
learn. 
Conceptual development involves a process of' abstrac-
tion and utilization of' language. For exam9le in his home 
environment, a child gradually comes to recognize that dif-
ferent entities have unlike and/or similar characteristics 
such as sitting, cooking, supporting etc. (identities). As 
time passes, he forms a concept general enoi.t.gh to include 
all or most of these and gives them a name: f'urniture. 
Importantly, though, is that 11 the process of :r orming a 
concept is not complete until its consti tuc•1t units have 
39Ibid., p. 17. Italics in o1•iginaJ.. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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been integrated into a single mental unit by means of a spe-
cific word .• n40 Thus, in Objectivist epistemology a necessary 
condition for the existence of a concept is that it be named~ 
Two significant corollaries of concept formation, im-
plicit in the above, may now be discussed. Beginning with 
conceptual development, the process of cognition " • • • 
moves toward more extensive knowledge, toward wider inte-
gration and more precise dif.ferentiations.n41 For example 
when an entity with four legs and a top is identified as a 
table, and then regarded, along with other entities as inte-
grated into a single unit, we may observe that vast amounts 
of material have been condensed to one or two essential 
characteristics which " ••• stands or falls with the truth 
or falsehood of' these observations."42 
Secondly, concepts are 11 open-ended,n43 meaning that 
they allow man to advance, correct, modify and improve exist-
ing knowledge and to retain and properly integrate vast 
amounts of material. This is essentially their cognitive 
role. If concepts were closed (i.e., that no new lm01vledge 
could be added when discovered), then human knowledge would 
remain static. 
We mentioned in chapter twoL~ that Rand's metaphysi-
cal posit:Lon reflects Aristotle's. Hoi·.rever, an important 
diff'erence exists, related to epistemology-Objectivism 
4°rbid., p. 
h3J·b. d p. 
:._:_.2:_ • ' 
23. 
61. 
41 rbid. 42rtid., 
44Page 25. 
p. 46. 
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regards the concept essence as epistemological; not meta-
physical. As Rand explains: 
Objectivism holds that the essence of a concept is that 
fundamental characteristic (s) of its units on which the 
greatest number of other characteristics depend, and 
which distinguishes these units from all other existents 
within the field of man's knowledge. Thus the essence 
of a concept is dete~1ined contextua~ly and may be altered 
with the growth of man's knowledge.4 
Rand appears to use essence in two ways: epistemologically 
and metaphysically. Epistemologica:'.ly, man comes to know the 
meaning of a concept by defining its essential characteristic 
which separates it from all others. Knowledge, therefore, 
is operative and may be valid only in a particular moment or 
history and is thus contextual. If more knowledge of reality 
is discovered (~.: the world is round; not flat), then 
the new knowledge modifies or replaces the old. Reality, 
however, does not change. The world was always rom~d, even 
when men believed it to be flat. Thus, if the essential 
characteristic of' the concept "world" were flatness, that 
characteristic changed when added knowledge revealed to man 
the VTorld was round. Essence is also used metaphysically, 
meaning that the essence of an entity is what makes it what 
it is. 
When Objectivism states that the concept essence also 
has an epistemological function, what follows is that an 
essential characteristic could change (i.e., become non-
essential or accidental). For Rand, therefore, the use of 
45Ibi~., pp. 49-50. Italics in original. 
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essence epistemologically could create metaphysical chaos. 
If in the future, for example, man's essential defining 
characteristic were found not to be reason--and if concepts 
are open-ended, we must allow for the possibility--much of 
Objectivism could be jeopardized, since it rests on the 
foundation of man as a rational creature.46 
Lastly, we must consider Objectivist ethics, for our 
purpose thE most important part, since Rand's educational 
position reflects a code of values man ought to accept if he 
be really educated. Writes one critic: n ••• what Miss 
Rand is really playing is axiology ••• isn't she really 
trying to give us a justification for a new standard of 
values? 11 47 The answer, of course, is yes. In defining a 
new ethics based on reason, she contemplates several value 
changes man ought to make if he is to act as a man. 
Rand defines ethics as, n ••• a science devoted to 
46Before leaving Objectivist epistemology, the reader 
should be aware of a special class of concepts termed by Rand 
"axiomatic.u Their purpose is 11 ••• the identification of 
a primary fact of reality, which is implicit in all facts and 
in all kno1vledge." They are: existence, identi t_;y_, and con-
sciousness. She notes: 11 ••• although ·they designate--a-
fundamental metaphysical f'act, axiomatic concepts are the 
products of an eplstemo1ogical need-the need of a volitional 
conceptual consciousness which is capable of' error and doubt. 
• • • Axiomatic concepts ar'e epistemologicaJ. guidelines. 
They sum up the c s sence of' all human cognition: something 
exists of which I am conscious; I must discover its iden-
ti ty.rr CoGnition would not be possible without them-;-i'or in 
order to think} we must be conscious of X existing, and wil-
ling to discover' vJhat it is. 11 Rand, Introduction to Objec-
tivist Epistemolop.;y, pp. 52-56. -
4-7E. Cain, They t d Rather Be Right (:r[EHT York: :f\1a.c-
millan Co., 1963), p. ~-S. 
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the discovery of the proper methods of living one's life.n48 
Immediately a question must be disposed of concerning the 
relationship between ethics and metaphysics. Critics have 
attempted to destroy the validity of Objectivist ethics by 
invoking a distinction between metaphysics and ethics. Donald 
EJnmons, in an article entitled "Ref'uting the Egoist," charges 
that egoism can only be refuted in moral, not intellectual 
terms. He writes: 11 ••• pure reason is impotent to under-
mine (or establish) any normative e1~hical code. • • • The 
heart has its reasons that pure reason does not know • 
• • 
Such a position certainly undermines the ethics of 
Objectivism, since Rand regards metaphysics and ethics as 
definitely related: 
n49 
Does an arbitrary human convention, a mere custom, decree 
that man must guide his actions by a set of principles-
or is there a f'act of reality that demands it? Is ethics 
the pro~bnce of whims ••• or is it the province of 
reason?.? 
We may recall that Objectivism rejects Social Darwinism for 
basing ethics on custom and social convention.51 Nathaniel 
48Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemologr, p. 36. 
49nonald Einrnons, 11Ref'uting the Egoist," Personalist, L 
(Summer, 1969), 309-19. -
.5°Rand, 11 The Objectivist Ethics, 11 14. Italics in 
original. 
51For additional evidence regarding the relationship 
between ethics and metaphysics, see: Keith Hard, "Moral 
Seriousness," Philosophy,XLV (April, 1970), 125-26. Ward 
suggests that bei'ore one can determine Hhat he ought to do, 
he must f'irst discover the nature of reali ty1 11 • • • which 
is to say that morality and metaphysics cannot be divorced 
by any clear set of' distinctions ..•• Nox•al seriousness 
does involve, in a sonse, commitment to Hhat the facts are, 
'Y.rha t human li f'e is. • • • 11 
II 
I" I 
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Branden expresses the meta-ethical concept somewhat more 
directly: 
It is ~he nature o~ living entities--the ~act that they 
must sustain their li~e by sel~-generated action--that 
makes the existence o~ values possible and necessary. 
For each living species, the course o~ action required 
is spe~~~ic; what an entity is determines what it ought 
to do • .? 
It is not intended here to present a de~ense o~ whether or 
not an is can imply an ought beyond what Objectivist ethics 
state: namely, the ethics regards the relationship between 
is and ought as crucial. I~ man's essential characteristic 
is rationality, then Rand maintains he ought to behave ac-
cording to a rational code o~ ethics. It is le~t now to 
determine what Objectivism says a man ought to do given his 
nature as a rational being. 
Objectivist ethics begins not with what values man 
ought to accept, but more ~undamentally: "Does man need 
values at all-and why? u53 \-Ie have already discussed value 
in terms of its relationship to logic, noting that Rand 
defines value as " • • • that which one acts to gain and/or 
keep. 11 54 Crucial to the concept o~ value is choice. Values 
.52 :f\Ta thaniel Branden, 11Ra tional Egoism: A Reply to 
Professor Emmons, 11 Personalist, LI (Spring, 1970), 2.01. 
Italics in original. It should be recalled that Rand's 
break 't·Ji th Branden occurred in Hay of 1968. As this article 
was published in 1970, Rand does not strictly endorse its 
contents.. HoHever, he opens the article by notinr;, 11 I am an 
advocate oi' the Objectivist ethics. . • • 11 and further 
aclmouledges his intellectual debt to Rand as the founder o~ 
Objectivisln. For these reasons, the article is used. 
53Rand, "The Objectivist Ethics," p. 13. 
54rhid., p. 15. See above page 7ll-• 
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~u~ values are meaningless if the entity valuing cannot 
choose; if one finds himself in such a situation, then moral-
ity ceases. Something has value when it sustains life (gives 
pleasure) and the conditions necessary for the maintenance 
of life, and ceases to have value if it negates life (gives 
death): " ••• the ultimate value which, to be kept, must 
be gained through its every moment, is the organism's 
life.u55 
-
It should be recalled that man has no automatic code 
for survival. His consciousness is volitional, i.e., he as 
an individual must choose for himself those values which will 
best sustain life. Therefore, the fundamental choice which 
a man must make is to think or not to think. Implications 
of this are metaphysical as vlell as ethical. Notes Rand: 
"Metaphysically, the choice 'to be conscious' is then the 
choice of life or death.u56 If, in other words, man is 
rational, then he ought to engage a value system which sus-
tains rationality. This is the context in which she sees a 
55It is important to note precisely what Rand means 
by life. Critics have argued that she speaks of life only 
in a physical sense. Rand 1 s reply should be sufficient ref-
utation: "It [man's survival on earth] does not mean a 
momentary or a merely phJ:sical survival. It does not mean 
the momentary physical survival of a mindless bi'U te. • • • 
It does not mean the momentary physical survival of a cl,mll-
ing aggregate of muscles who is vlilling to accept any tel"'!lS, 
obey any thug and surr'ender any values. • • • 11Han' s sur-
vival qua man 11 means the terms, methods, conditions and 
goals required for the survival of a ra tiona.l being through 
the whole of his lii'espan-in all those aspects of existence 
Hhich are open to his choice." See: Rand, "Tho Objectivist 
Ethics, 11 pp. 17 -2L~. Italics in original. 
56rbid., p. 21. 
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relationship between is and ought statements. In ract, 
another way in which Objectivist ethics may be derined is 
"Ethics is an objective, metaphys.Lcal necessity or man's 
survival. • • • n57 Given the nature or Objectivist meta-
physics, an important relationship emerges between it, lire, 
values and survival. Man qua man cannot survive without a 
code or ethics, one consisting or values proper to his lire 
as a rational being. 
The question to be presented now is: "What values 
ought man to choose in order to best insure his survival, 
given the kind or being he is?" Rand answers: 
· • • • the three values which, together, are the means to 
and the realization or one's ultimate value, one's own 
lire-are: Reason, Purpose, Selr-Esteem, lvith their 
th:ee ~grresponding virtues: Rationality, Productiveness, 
Pr~de.--' 
Objectivist ethics is above all a rational system. Def'ining 
reason as " ••• the raculty that identiries and integrates 
the material provided by man's senses,n59 she notes that 
man's happiness and selr-esteem is proportionate to his 
fidelity to rational thought.6° Irrationality, in ract, 
explains, .for Rand, the problem o.f evil. Rejecting the 
Christian concept o.f Original Sin, Objectivism regards evil 
as tho refusal to think, to be rational: 
••• some men do not choose to think, but survive by 
imitating and repeating, like trained animals, the routine 
57Ibid., p. 23. 59 Ibid., p. 20. 
60For another vieN of the role of reason in human 
affairs, see: Errol Harris, 11 The Povler of Reason, 11 Review o.f 
~aphysics, XXII (June, 1969), 630. ----
86 
of sounds and emotions they learned from others, never 
making an effort to understand their own work. • • • 
such looters are parasites incapable of survival, who 
exist by destroying thos~ who ~~ capable, 6 those who are pursuing a course of act~on proper to man. 1 
Rand is very critical of American schoolmen for allowing the 
foregoing type of learning to exist in schools, because it is 
the antithesis of rational productivity.62 Formal education 
fails to stress rational development of the young. By gradu-
ating students who behave irrationally and emotionally, 
schools help to weaken the moral fabric of society. 
Reason, purpose and self-esteem are the three values 
proper to a rational man, for they, 
••• imply and require all of man's virtues and all his 
virtues pertain to the relation of existence and con-
sciousness: rationality, independencg~ integrity, hon-
esty, justice, productiveness, pride. ~ 
These characterize the ideal man Rand creates in her novels; 
her educated man Hould live up to and practice'these in his 
daily life. 
Before discussing each virtue specifically, we shall 
classify Objectivism's ethics. Enough has been said to sug-
gest some type of egoism. Of the generally recognized types: 
universal ethical, individual ethical, personal ethical, 
6lRand, 11 The Objectivist Ethics, 11 p. 23. Italics in 
originalc 
62Nathaniel Branden explains the nature of evil some-
what moro succinctly: 11 Evasion, the refusal to think, the 
willful rejection of reason, the w-illful suspension of con-
sciousness, the Hillful defiance o:f reality is man's basic 
vice ...... tho source of all his evils. n See: 11 Hational Egoism: 
A Reply to P17 0.fes s or .Enmons, 11 p. 200. 
63Rand, 11 This Is John Galt Speaking, tt p. 128. 
megalomania, group, and analytic egoism, none seems to best 
characterize Objectivism. 64 Her position has been called 
constrained egoism, that is: "egoism subject to the con-
straint of not violating certain conditions (which are other 
persons' rights).n65 While constrained egoism describes an 
important characteristic of Objectivist ethics, it remains 
incomplete. Probably the best classification i-rould be 
cognitive egoism, or to use Nathaniel Branden's phrase, 
rational egoism. Objectivist ethic5 presents a rational 
morality; one based on the specific nature of man,66 which, 
as we have seen, is his rationality. 
Objectivist ethics holds reason, purpose and self-
esteem as the three supreme values for a rational man. Com-
ments John Galt: 
To live, man must hold three things as the supreme and 
ruling values of his life: Reason--Purpose--Self-esteem. 
Reason, as his only tool of knowledge--Purpose, as his 
64For a discussion explaining why Objectivism is not 
consistent with the recognized types of ethical egoism, see: 
Nathaniel Branden, "Rational Egoism: A Reply to Professor 
Emm.ons, 11 and Donald Emmons, "Refuting the Egoist, 11 pp. 313-
17. See also: Paul 11. Taylor, (ed.), Problems of Horal 
Philosophy (Belmont, Calif.: Dickenson PubllShlng co:-;-
Inc., 1967), pp. 88-89. The latter explains some of the 
types of ethical egoism. 
65Robert lifozick, 11 0n the Randian Argument, 11 Personalist, 
LII (Spring, 1971), 295. 
66nand co1nn1ents: nMan cannot survive as anything but 
man. He can abandon his means of survival, his mind ••• 
but he cannot succeed • • • in achieving a.'lything but the 
subhuman. . . . I·1an has to be man by choice --and it is the 
task of ethics to teach him how to live like man. The Ob-
jectivist ethics holds man's life as the standard of value-
and h~~ ~ lil~£ as the ethical ~rpose_ of every individual 
ma11.. -rr See: Irrf'be Ob jec ti vist Ethics, 11 pp. 24-25. 
1
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choice or the happiness which that tool must proceed to 
achieve-Sel£-esteem, as his inviolate certainty that his 
mind is competent to think and his person is ~orthy or 
happiness, which means: is worthy or living.67 
These values imply seven virtues which a man needs to live as 
a rational being: rationality, independence, integrity, 
honesty, justice, productiveness, and pride. Each or these 
seven virtues will now be examined: 
Rationality " ••• is man's basic virtue, the source 
or all his other virtues .••• It means a commitment to 
reason, not in sporadic £its or on selected issues or in 
special emergencies, but as a permanent way or lire. n68 
Rand states: 
It means one's total commitment to a state or rull, con-
scious awareness in all choices, in all or one's waking 
hours. It means a co~itment to the rullest perception 
or reality within one's power and to the constant, activg9 expansion or one's perception, i.e., or one's knowledge. 
I£ one commits himselr to a rational lire according to the 
£oregoing he must, o£ necessity, reject any £orm o£ mysti-
cism or raith, described as an 11 ••• alleged short-cut to 
knowledge • • • which is only a short-circuit destroying the 
mind."7° The issue or £aith versus reason will be considered 
in the next chapter when problems in Objectivism are con-
sidered. 
67Rand, "This Is John Galt Speaking.t 11 p. 128. Also 
see pp. 81-82, above. 
68Rand, "The Objectivist Ethics," pp. 25-26. 
69Ibid., p. 25. 
7°Hand, "This Is John Galt Speaking, 11 p. 128. 
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Independence " ••• is the recognition of: the !:act 
that yours is the responsibility of: judgment and nothing can 
help you escape. it-that no substitute can do your thinking 
rr71 
• • • 
Objectivism regards anyone as evil who allows 
another to assume his responsibility !:or thinking. Independ-
ence requires the courage to express one's views (rationally 
derived) regardless of: tvhether they violate a norm held by 
the group. Rand's critique of: Progressive education suggests 
it violates this virtue. 
Integrity 11 
• • • is the recognition of: the !:act that 
you cannot f:ake your consciousness ••• that man ••• may 
not sacrif:ice his convictions to the wishes of: others. 
rr72 
. . . Integrity is closely related to independence and 
honesty. One must never abandon his convictions~ regardless 
of: the pressure. 
Honesty 11 . . • is the recognition of: the !:act that 
the unreal is unreal and can have no value, that neither 
love nor f:ame nor cash is a value if: obtained by f:raud 
tr73 
• • • Honesty is man's most solf:ish virtue in that an 
honest man refuses to " ••• sacrif:ice the reality of his 
mm existence to the deluded consciousness of: others. 11 74 
Fraud means two things: (1) metaphysical subjectivism 
which destroys the real by imposing on it one's lfhims or 
desires as if: they were real, and (2) social metaphysics, 
71Ibid. 72Ibid., PP~ 128-29. 
73rbid., Pe 129. 74rbid. 
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a belief which makes truth what a given group or society 
deem it to be at the moment. Objectivism regards Progres-
sive educators as social metaphysicians, destroying young 
minds by imposing group norms on individual learners. 
Justice 11 ••• is the recognition of: the fact that 
you cannot fake the character of men as you cannot fake the 
character of nature, that you must judge all men as con-
scientiously as you judge inanimate objects, with the same 
respect for truth, with the same incorruptible vision, by 
as pure and as rational a process of identification--that 
every man must be judged for what he is and treated accord-
ingly. • • • u75 The Objectivist concept of' justice counter•s 
accepted Christian beliefs. Whereas the Bible warns, 11 Judge 
not, lest you be judged," Objectivism argues, 11 Judge, and 
be prepared to be judged.u76 One must stand r~ady to accept 
the consequences of his own actions. Importantly though, 
one must never take the responsibility lightly; judging must 
not be confused with the random accusing of people with whom 
we may disagree. One must "Never fail to pronounce moral 
judgment, n77 for one 'lrlho sees evil and fails to proclaim it 
as evil is himself guilty. 
Productiveness is 
••• your acceptance of morality, your 1•ecognition of 
75 b.d I l .• 
76Ayn Rand, "Intellectual Ammunition Department," 
.T..b_~ Ob,jectivi~t._l~c_!ter, 11 I, No. 4 (April, 1962), 15. 
77rbid. 
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the fact that you choose to live--that productive work 
is the process by which man's consciousness controls his 
existence, a constant process of acquiring knowledge and 
shaping matter to fit one's purpose, of translating an 
idea into physical form, of remaking the earth in the 
image of one's values--that all wo~k is creative work 
if done by a thinking mind .--.-. 7~ 
The highest activity to which a man can aspire is to use his 
reason by engaging in productive work. Rand notes, "Produc-
tive work is the road o:f man's unlimited achievement and 
calls upon the highest attributes o:f his character: his 
creative ability, his ambitiousness, his self-assertiveness • 
• • • n79 \{e may consider this as a re-interpretation of 
Aristotle. Intellectually excellent activity consists, then, 
in actualizing not only what potentially exists in the uni-
verse, but also in actualizing the mind's potential through 
productive work. 
Pride is 
••• the recognition of the fact you are your own 
highest value, and, like all of man's values, it has 
to be earned--that of any achievement open to you, the 
one that makes all others possible is the creation of 
your own character--that your character, your actions, 
desires, your emotions are the products o.f the premises 
held by your mind--that as a man must produce the physi-
cal values he needs to sustain his life, so he must 
acquire the values of character that make his life worth 
sustaining • e . that to live requires a sense of self-
value. • • • 0 
Terming pride a virtue clashes with Christian morality. 
Webster's Third Nevr International Dictionary defines pride 
78Rand, 11 This Is Joh.t"l. Galt Speaking," p. 130. 
79nand, "The Objectivist Ethics, 11 p. 26. 
80nand, n'.L'his Is John Galt Speaking," pp. 130-31. 
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as, "inordinate sel.f-esteem: an unreasonable conceit o.f 
. •t rr superl.Orl. Y• This de.finition, used in the Christian sense, 
is not what Objectivism means; rather pride is equated with 
"moral ambitiousness." In other words, 
••• one must earn the right to hold oneself as one's 
own highest value by achieving one t. s own moral perfection 
-which one achieves by never accepting any code of irra-
tional values impossible to practice and by never f'ail-
ing to practice the virtues one knoHs to be rational-by 
never accepting an unearned guilt and never earning any, 
or, if' one has earned it, never leaving it uncorrected 
-by never resigning oneself' passively to any f'la\vS in 
one's character---by never placing any concern ••• above 
the reality of one's own self-esteem. And, above all, it 
means one's rejection of' any doctrine that preaches self'-
Dillaolation as a moral virtue or duty.Bl 
In this sense, pride becomes an important virtue, one a 
rational man must have .for living on earth. However, its 
legitimacy is contingent on one's engaging in productive 
work, and thus should not be confused with arrogance as this 
constitutes the wise (in def'iance of reality) to be given 
credit f'or the unearned. 
Objectivism brands American education f'or its f'ailure 
to teach these virtues. In essence they are needed if' one 
is to live up to Rand's concept of' the educated man. 
Given a man who practices Objectivist ethics, what 
then ought to be the result? There can be but one-happiness: 
•.. the achievement of' his ~ ~pin:.::ss is mah' s hie.!];-
est moral purpose •••• Happiness is that state of con-
·scio;t:tsii.OS s-"lihlch pr>occeds f'rom the achievement of' one t s 
values. If a man values productive Hork, his happiness 
is the measure of' his success in the service of' his 
life •••• Happiness is possible only to a rational man, 
81Rand, 11 'J.lhe Objectivist Ethics, 11 P~· 27. Italics in 
original. 
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the man who desires nothing but rational goals, seeks 
nothing but rational yalues and ~inds his joy in nothing 
but rational actions.H2 
This is the heart o~ Objectivist ethics--the (rationally 
derived) happiness o~ man achieved by ~idelity to (rational) 
values. 
We must now consider the role o~ emotions in a ration-
al man r s li~e. They have alrea·dy been discussed when examin-
ing the concept sense o~ li~e, but now their philosophical 
role needs ·treatment. 
In addition to being the agent man needs to engage 
in productive work, reason perrorms another valuable runc-
tion, that or evaluating entities which afrect the selr. 
Nathaniel Branden derines emotion as, u ••• the psycho-
somatic form in which ~ experience~ the benericial ~ 
harT.Irul relationshiE or~ aspect or reality,to himselr.n83 
The sequence is from perception to evaluation to emotional 
response to some action.84 So orten, emotional responses 
occur with such rapidity that the subject rails to realize 
that an evaluation takes place, but because it does, reason 
is involved. Emotions are the result or a value judgment 
made by a man and are " • • • not tools of cogni tio_!! • • • 
what one feels in regard to any fact or issue is irrelevant 
to the question or whether one's judgment is true or ralse. 
82Ibid., pp. 27-29. Italics in original. 
83Nathaniel Branden, "Emotions and Values," Tho 
Qbjectivis~, V, No. 5 (Hay, 1966), 5. Italics in original. 
84Ibid. 
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It is not by means of one's emotions that one perceives 
reality."85 Emotions and reason, then, are not incompatible 
except functionally. One cannot ~erform the task of another. 
Evaluations occur prior to emotional reactions, and it is 
reason that controls evaluations. Emotions occur because 
man has a rational nature; not in spite of it.86 For a 
healthy, rational ~nan, an emotion is the conscious product 
of his values as formed by reason; emotions reflect rational 
value judgments. 87 
One issue needs consideration before closing this 
chapter. When someone advocates selfishness as a virtue, 
replies often take the form of questions such as: "You mean 
you wouldn't help the victims of a :flood?" or "Wouldn't you 
86R. s. Peters in The Logic of Education also argues 
that a de:fini te relationship exists bet-vreen emotions and cog-
nition. He notes that emotions themselves have a cognitive 
core, 1:-1hich he calls an appraisal. In other words, a man who 
experiences the emotion of anger cognitively "appraises" the 
situation which gives rise to the emotion. For example, a 
man cognitively appraising that a convicted murderer escaped 
jail may experience anger. Consequently, "the separation of 
intellectual from affective development is as untenable as 
the study of emotional development without stress on the role 
ot: cognition. 11 See: R. s. Peters and P. H. Hurst, The Logic 
of Education (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970), 
PP • Ii-9-50. 
87KnOL-Tledge of the proper role ot: em.otions refutes the 
charge that Objectivism is a i'orm ot: hedon:i2m. Objectivi::nn 
denies tho premise that whateveP emot~ons, ~,jishes or -v;hims one 
ha8 at the moment constitute tho fSOod. Notes Rand: 11 ••• 
'Happiness' can properly bo the purpose of ethics, but not the 
sta .. 'l.dfu•d. • • • \'ihen a des:i.re • :· • ~s taken as an ethical 
pr1.mti"10~· and the gratif'ication o.f any and n.ll desires is taken 
as an othics.l goal ••• men have no choice but to hate, .fem .. 
and i'ight one another, because their desires and their inter-
ests t..r:i.ll nocossarily clnsh.u See: HThe Objectivist Ethics, 11 
PP. 29-30. Italics in original. 
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helP a little child hurt in a car accident?" For Objectivism, 
however, selrishness does not imply any moral consideration 
or "does not tell us whether concern with one's own interests 
is good or evil ••• it means only concern with one's own 
interests.n88 Rand argues that while her derinition or selr-
ishness is not the Christian one, it does conrorm to what the 
dictionary states. or the rour examined however, including 
Webster's unabridged three-volume dictionary (Webster's 
International), only one (The Random House Dictionarr) derines 
selrishness the way Rand does. 89 Although Rand•s belier that 
her derinition or selrishness conrorms to the dictionat~y is 
thus vTeakened, this does not absolutely rule out the concept 
of selfishness without violating the rights or others. Rand 
88Rand, "Introduction" to The Virtue or Selfishness, 
p. vii. 
89These dictionaries derine selfishness as follows: 
(In all cases, the rirst or primary meaning is cited). 
Webster's New World Dictionary (School and Office Edition): 
Overly concerned Wlth one's own interest and advantage so 
that the welfare of others is neglected." 
Webster • s New Horld Dictiona!:.r (College Edition): 11Having 
such regard .for one's own 1nterests and adva..."ltage that the 
happiness and welfare of others becomes of less concern th&~ 
is considered right or just." 
The Random House Die tionarz (College Edition) : "Devoted to 
·or ca.r1ng only f'or one serf; concerned only with one's own 
inte:r•ests. 11 
~~bster' s 'I?hir·d New International Dictionary (Unabl~idged): 
Concerned excess1voly or exclus1vely Wlth oneself; seeking 
Ol' concentrating on one r s own advantage, pleasure, OI' well-
being Hi thout x•egard ror others. 11 
Webster's College Edition especially does violence to Rand's 
def'ini tion oi'seli'islmess. 
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clarifies the meaning of selfishness: 
If it is true that what I mean by "selfishness" is not 
what is meant conventionally, then this is one of the 
worst indictments of altruism: it iiie"ans that altruism 
permits no concept of a self-respecting, self-supporting 
man-a man who supports his life by his own effort .••• 
The Objectivist ethics holds that the actor must always 
be the beneficiary or his actions and that man must act 
for his mm rational sel.f-interest •••• It is not a 
license "to do as he pleases" and it is not applicable 
to the altruists' image o.f a "sel.fishu brute nor to any 
man motivated by irr•ational emotions, feelings, urges, 
wishes or whims.90 
we have alr7ady examined under what terms and conditions a 
man may act in his own (rational) self-interest and what 
values and virtues make this possible. Selfishness, in an 
Objectivist context, then does not mean the violation of the 
rights o.f others. Further, the concept in no way forbids 
one .from providing help in emergency situations: 
It is only in emergency situations that one should vol-
unteer to help strangers, if it is in one's power. For 
instance, a man who values ht~an life and is caught in 
a shipvrreck, should help to save his fellow passengers 
(though not at the expense of his own life). But this 
does not mean that a.fter they all reach shore, he should 
devote his e.f.forts to saving his fellow passengers from 
poverty, ignorance .••• 91 
More is expected when those needing help are .friends or loved 
ones: II i.f one's .friend is starving, it is not a sac-. . . 
rifice, but an act of integrity to give hlia money for .food 
• • • because his '\vel.fare is important in the scale of one's 
personal values.u92 
9°Rand., 11 Introduc tion, 11 to The Vil~tue of Sel.fishness, 
pp. ix-x. Italics in original. 
9l.Ayn Rand, "The Ethics o.f Emergencies," in The 
~ue o.f Selfif;lmoss, p. 48. Parentheses in original. 
------------
92rbid., p. ~.6. 
·---;f· 
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The only qualification attached stipulates that non-
sacrificial means should be used. Acting against one's oWn. 
rational self-interest, for example helping an accident vic-
tim at the expense of one 1 s own child, would be rejected as 
irrational. Further, Rand believes it immoral to help save 
the life of a horribly immoral person--a dying Hitler, for in-
stance--since such a being ought to be allowed to die for his 
crimes. 
Thus, one who gives money to help a flood victim or 
saves a child hurt in a car accident is not, according to 
the Objectivist ethics, sacrificing anything and may there-
fore help. A rational man does not live for the purpose of 
only serving others. He helps in emergencies if they occur, 
but this is hardly the same situation as being morally obliged 
to provide help whenever asked, and to the detriment of him-
self ru1d his family. 
The only exception to the above would be the men who 
serve as police officers and firemen. To them falls the 
task of saving life at the risk of their own, but these are 
risks they agree to accept as necessary conditions of their 
duties. 
SU1'1MARY 
The purpose of this chapter has been to provide the 
reader vrith an understanding of Objectivist metaphysics, 
epistemology and axiology and some related issues as a neces-
sar•y pPelude to a proper appreciation of Rand's educational 
I 
I ' 
I 
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·position. 
As an introduction to Objectivism, the concept sense 
of life WclS exa~ined. This pre-conceptual equivalent or 
--
metaphysics helps shape man's relationship to reality, and 
later develops into a philosophy of life. Education's task 
is to help the learner make the transition from a sense of 
life to a philosophy of life. 
- Metaphysically, Rand's orientation is Aristotelian. 
Based on the Laws or Thought, it posits the belier that 
reality exists independent or the mind. One cannot properly 
dismiss these Lai.YS as having no relationship to what a<?tually 
!!' for they constitute the tools needed by man to probe 
reality. Of course, Objectivist metaphysics rejects most 
forms of subjectivism, especially the attempt to shape real-
ity to one 1 s personal whims or wishes. 
Epistemologically, Objectivism considers the nature 
of concepts and how they help man to understand reality. 
Without concepts which alloH one to classify and integrate 
vast amounts of knowledge, intellectual growth could never 
occur. But, Rand differs from Aristotle in one important 
respect. Hhile the latter regards 11 essence 11 as metaphysi-
cal, the former regards it as epistemological in nature, 
implyine; that concepts are open-ended thereby allol-Ting ror 
the addition of' new·J.y discovered lmowledge. 
Ethically, Objectivism postulates the 'ideal man, 1 
in effoct the Ra.ndian concept of the educated man. Objec-
ti\rist axiology postulates objective moral truths, validated 
99 
by reference to reality. The criteria used ror determining 
what values a man ought to accept is manrs life as a rational 
being. Objectivist ethics argue that reason, purpose and 
self-esteem together with the virtues or rationality, inde-
pendence, integrity, honesty, justice, productiveness, and 
pride constitute the values one ought to accept if he wishes 
to live a rational lire. Objectivist ethics can best be 
classiried as cognitive or rational egoism. 
Advocating selrishness as a virtue does not imply 
violation or the rights or others, but allows one to help 
another only in an emergency situation, the aid terminating 
when the emergency does. Problems relating to this will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
Thus rar, this study has largely been uncritical in 
presenting Objectivism in order that the reader may study it 
as it actually is. The next chapter, however, will deal with 
"problems" Objectivism presents. These coul.d possibly stand 
in the way or Rand's educational views being implemented, and 
thus require consideration. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
PROBLEMS WITH OBJECTIVIS11 
As a philosophy of education, Objectivism presents 
parents, teachers and learners with several difficulties 
which might, if left unexamined, hinder acceptance. The 
following shortcomings will be discussed: (1) definitional 
thinking, (2) atheism, (3) religion and reason versus faith, 
(4) religion and capitalism, (5) the ethics of emergencies, 
(6) internal contradictions (The Fountainhead), theory of 
compromise, and (7) intolerance. 
Definitional Thinking 
Objectivism stands or falls on its use of definitions, 
objections to which have been raised by Albert Ellis: 
Objectivist philosophy bases most of its basic premises 
on highly tautological thinldng ••• it is ••• ulti-
mately i~ai th in the pm-ter of analytic def'ini tional prop-
ositions that nullifies practically all the good things 
that are included in Objectivism.l 
He argues that Objectivism uses analytic statements which 
although logically true, may not necessarily be true in 
reality. The distinction made concerns the so-called 
analytic/synthetic dichotomy. According to Robert Ennis in 
1A1ber·t Ellis, Is Objectivism a Religion? (New York: 
Lyle Stuart, 1968), pp-:--2"17 :ff. 
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_&ogic in Teaching, analytic statements " • • • are those which 
are in a given context correctly taken as true simply as a 
result of the meanings of the words appearing in the state1nent • 
• • • no conceivable test could exist for them. • • • " 2 Syn-
thetic statements, on the other hand, constitute any non-
analytic ones, ones for which a counter-example could be con-
ceived. The distinction is made since synthetic statements 
must be validated. For example to say "A bachelor is an un-
married man" is to speak analytically; to deny it would be a 
contradiction, but to say "Bachelors are happier than married 
men" may of course be contradicted. Thus it must be vali-
dated in the context in which it appears. 
Ellis accuses Rand of making statements which appear 
to be ~~alytic but fail to meet the criteria for such and 
therefore are invalidly used. For example, he cites the 
following from Atlas Shrugged, 
There is a morality of reason, a morality proper to man, 
and Nan's li.fe is its standard o.f value. All that which 
is proper to the life of a rational man is good; all that 
which destroys it is the evil,j 
and comments: 
••• life is defined as being good; and it is assum.ed 
that reason necessarTly sustains lii'e and that therefore 
a mor•s.lity based on r•oason must be absolutely va.lift:· 
Actually, human life csn bedefined as bad. • • • ~ 
2Hobert Ennis, !Jogic in Te~ch:i.ne (Englmvood Cli:fi's, 
N. J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., l<;i69J, pp. 300-01. 
3Ayn Rand, Atlas Shrugged (Nov;r York: The Nm...- American 
Library, Signet PI•oss,-19.j(), p. 940. Italics in original. 
4Ellis, Is Ob jec ti vism a Reljeion_:?_, P. 219 e I taJ.ics 
in original. 
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Ellis suggests that merely because Objectivism defines reason 
as life sustaining (morally good), does not necessarily make 
it so. 
There are several ways to respond. Quoting a statement 
out of context and then charging insufficient data to justify 
conclusions reached does Objectivism an injustice. Ellis of 
course is free to critique Objectivist ethics, but must him-
self consider supporting data offered by Rand. The purpose 
of chapter three was to provide such data for the reader. 
Secondly, one may (as does Rand) deny the distinction 
between analytic and synthetic statements. In order to 
understand why she denies other distinctions we must briefly 
return to the Objectivist theory of concept formation as it 
relates to the present question. Rand defines a concept as 
••• a mental integration of two or more units possessing 
the ~ dlstlnguishing ~-acteristic (s), ~ their 
partlcular· measurements omltted,5 · 
and argues that concepts intrinsically relate to language, 
specifically definition. Definition is defined as " ••• a 
statement that identifies the nature of the units subsumed 
under a concept. The purpose of a definition is to distin-
guish a concept from all other concepts .• n6 Imp or-• • 
tantly, "the nature of the units subsumed" means all units, 
and not just the essential or distinguishing characteristic 
(s) which usually constitute reported de£initions. She writes: 
5Ayn 
(NoH York: 
original~ 
Rand, Intl~oduction to Obiectiv:bEt Epis__:!::~molog¥ 
The Objectivist Ine q 19 9}, p. 17. Italics ln 
6Jbid., p. llo. 
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••• the error lies in assuming that a concept consists 
of nothing but its distinguishing characteristic. But 
the fact is that in the process of abstracting from 
abstractions, one cannot lmm-r what is a distinguishing 
characteristic unless one has observed other character-
istics of the units involved.7 
In forming definitions one naturally selects a distinguishing 
characteristic (~., rationality), but this should not imply 
that other non-essential characteristics be ignored. One 
must be aware of all the characteristics in order to deter-
mine the essential ones. 
Rand argues that man needs logic as a tool for com-
prehending reality, so to weaken logic by means of a dichot-
omy denies man his means of survival. Rand suggests that 
the proposing of a counter-example in no way sanctions an 
artificial split. By way of proof, she offers the following 
examples: All swans are white--synthetic since one may 
imagine a black swan, and a being from Mars with rationality, 
but a spider's body--synthetic, since one may imagine a 
creature other than man which has reason, ru1d comments: 
What these ••• do demonstrate is the failure to grasp 
the cognitive role of' concepts-i.e., the fact that the 
requirements of cognition determine the objective cri-
teria of concept-formation. The conceptual classif'ica-
tion of' newly discovered existents depends on the nature 
and extent of' their dirf'erences f'rom and similarities to 
the previously kno\m existents. In the case of' black 
m.;~ms, it is objectively mandatory to classify them as 
11 swans, 11 because virtually all their characteristics are 
similar to the characteristics of' 1vhite swans, and the 
dif'f'ercnce in color is of no cognitive signif'icance. 
(Concepts are not to be multiplied beyond necessity). 
In the case of the rational spldei' from Hars (if' such a 
creature Here possible), the dif'.ferences betHeen him and 
man would be so great that the study of one would scarcely 
7 Ibi~., p. 29. Italics in or•iginal. 
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apply to the other and, therefore, the formation of a new 
concept to designate the Hartians would be objectively 
mandatory. (ConcepSs are not to be integrated in disre-
gard of necessity.) 
She reasons, therefore, that the discovery of additional 
knowledge does not sanction the analytic-synthetic dichotomy. 
If possible the new knowledge must either be integrated into 
an already existing concept, or a new concept must be formed. 
Man, in other words, holds ~he power to logically validate 
synthetic statements (thereby rendel~ing the distinction use-
less) by reference to objective reality, but tt ••• it is 
man who has to identify the facts; objectivity requires dis-
covery by man •••• Man cannot know more than he has dis-
covered.119 Thus Rand argues that merely because the proposi-
tion "All m1ans are white" admits to counter-examples -that 
such does not justify its being given a special category. 
Therefore, what man ought to do to determine if black swans 
exist, or if bachelors are happier than married men, is to 
examine the facts of reality to discover the truth. The 
propositions are (or are not) logically true according to 
what evidence is uncovered. 
In Objectivist epistemology, the facts of experience 
are involved in all propositions, and are governed by the 
(logical) laws of thought. Thus, 11 
• • • a word has no 
meaning other than that of the concept it symbolizes, and 
the meaning of a concept consists of its units. It is not 
BRand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemolog][, 
pp. 65-66. Parenfhosos in original. 
9rbid., PPo L!-4-45. Italics in original. 
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words, but concepts that man derines--by specirying their 
rererents.nlO The rererents, however, are what exist in 
reality and what man seeks to understand through the knowledge 
provided by his senses. To remove the "rererents 11 would make 
words themselves meaningless. 
We may conclude this section by noting that when Rand 
deals with the accuracy or propositions, she does so exclu-
sive or any dichotomy, the truth or ralsity or which can only 
be determined by rererence to reality. It has not been the 
purpose of the foregoing to refute the analytic-synthetic 
dichotomy, but to discuss Rand's objections to it. 
Regarding Objectivism and definitional thinking, then, 
He must be careful to note the context in which words are 
used. As mentioned in the last chapter, Objectivism regards 
all definitions as contextual; thus selfishness or Romanti-
cism cannot be understood unless studied in the context or 
Objectivism. Strictly speaking, many or Rand's definitions 
are stipulative and readers may properly demand she remain 
internally consistent Hhen using them. Importantly for the 
chapters on education which follow this one, all definitions 
should be understood in the context of Objectivist metaphy-
si.cs, epistemology and axiology. 
Atheism 
Rand's classification of religion is not flattering. 
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Regarding it as a primitive form or philosophy, she responds 
in the Playboy Interview to whether religion has ever "offered 
anything or constructive value to : ... uma.n life": 
Qua religion, no--in the sense or blind belief, belief 
unsupported by, or contrary to, the facts or reality and 
the conclusions or reason. Faith, as such, is extremely 
detrimental to human lire: it is the negation or reason. 
But you must remember that religion is an early form or 
philosophy, that the rirst attempts to explain the uni-
verse, to give a coherent frame or rererence to man's life 
and a code or moral values, 't-Tere made by religion, before 
men graduated or developed enough to have philosophy. 
And, as philosophies, some religions have very valuable 
moral poi~ts • • • but in a very contradictory context, 
and on a very--how should I say it?--dangerous or malev-
olent base: on the ground or raith.ll 
Hhether or not .faith is the negation of' reason will be dis-
cussed shortly. Presently, however, we should note that in 
the Randian scheme of' things, religion serves as a crutch to 
be discarded when an individual becomes sophisticated enough 
to embrace a philosophy of' lif'e. Her dislike of' Christianity 
is oven more blatantly expressed: 
• • • according to the Christian mythology he [Christ] 
died on the cross not f'or his own sins but f'or the sins 
of' nonideal people. In other words, a man of' perf'ect 
vil,tue Has sacri.ficod f'or men who are vicious and who 
are expected or supposed to accept that sacrif'ice. If' 
I were a Christian, nothing could make me more indignant 
than that: the notion of' sacriricing the ideal to the 
nonidea1, or virtue to vice. And it is in the name of' 
that symbol that men are asked to sacri.fice themselves 
f'or theil• inf'eriors. That :l.s precisely ho1.; the symbol-
ism is used. That is torture.12 
Ho:r>e, it l-Tould appear that she not only rejects Christian 
morality, but also the concept of' God, linking it to sacri-
with 
11AJ.v~n Tof.flcr, (Interviewer), "Playbo~ Interview 
Ayn Rana, 11 Playbo;l[ XI (1-farch, 1964)~0. 
12Ibid. My brackets. 
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fice and (as we saw earlier) the forcing of man to live up to 
an unattainable moral ideal. 
Rand's militant stand against God and all forms of 
faith is apparently not shared quite so strongly by all of 
her followers. When still associated with Objectivism, 
Nathaniel Branden, in The Objectivist Newsletter (December, 
1965) warns that a frank and open admission of atheism cer-
tainly might not serve the advancement of Objectivism in a 
Christian democratic society. In "A Report to Our Readers-
1965," in which he lauds the spread of Objectivism in America, 
Branden notes: 
As uncompromising advocates of reason, Objectivists are, 
of course, atheists. He are intransigent atheists, not 
militant ones. \..Je are for reason; therefore, as a cOil=" 
sequence, He are opposed to any form of mysticism; there-
fore, we do not grant any validity to the notion of a 
supernatural being. But atheism is scarcely the center 
of our philosophical position. To be known as crusaders 
for atheism would be acutely embarrassing to us; the 
adversary is too tmworthy. 5 
Although it is not the purpose of this chapter to offer a 
defense for God's existence (for this writer it needs none), 
it would be worthwhile to examine the error in Objectivist 
thinking. 
13Nathaniel Branden, "A Report to Our Readers-1965 11 
The Objectivist Newsletter, IV, No. 12 (December, 1965), 5~. 
Ita11cs in origlnal:--T3randen 's remarks surmest a serious 
viola.tion of Objectivist ethics, as defined by Hand. If one 
must never be afraid to proclaim rationally derived principles, 
(and if Objectivism holds atheism as such), then by virtue of 
f'idolity to integrity, Branden ought not to be afraid to 
11 crusaden for atheism, regardless of' tho consequences. His 
reason (the adversary is too unworthy) appears as a thinry-
veiled attempt to hide one of two truths: rejection by the 
American people, or lack of conviction regarding tho merit 
of atheism itself. 
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First or all, the relationship between religion and 
philosophy is somewhat confusing. Philosophy, for example, 
may serve as a testing ground for the religious experience 
by clarifying and/or refining its commandments, adding so to 
speak intellectual ballast. Perhaps one reason why the 
Christian raith has endured centuries of persecution is be-
cause its foundations were strengthened by the philosophical 
systems or both Plato and Aristotle. J. Donald Butler com-
ments on tha philosophical-religious experience in this con-
text: 
Many times ••• there are serious inconsistencies in 
religious thought. This is because the rational impli-
cations of beliers are not rollowed through logically. 
Accordingly, the culling or truth .from the religious 
heritage, and the resolving or inconsistencies in reli-
gious doctrine, are tvm o.f the important re.finements o.f 
religion to Hhich philosophy can contribute much. • • • 
Also religion may readily become the appropriate f'ield 
of practical endep.vor in which a given philosophy may 
find expression.l4 · 
Thus both philosophy and religion, far rrom being antagon-
is tic, tend to define the co:mmi tment a man n1akes to lead a 
good lire. Butler's final sentence suggests still another 
relationship between religion and philosophy. It will be 
recalled that Rand considers a philosopher 1-:ho refuses to 
practically augment his convictions as leading less than a 
full life. Might not religion be the ideal means through 
l-Ihich this might be accomplished? Although Rand would dis-
agree, religion ca..'1 serve as the vehicle tl-:rx•ough ivhich a man 
lq.J. Donald Butler, Four Philosophies and their Prac-
tice in Edu~a ti _on and Relit;IO'Ti\'11eH York: f~lrpei' and Rmv, 
.196uL PP· 9-lo. 
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actualizes his philosophical potential. 
Religion and Faith VPrsus Reason 
When Rand speaks or religion, she generally rerers to 
it as mystical jargon beyond rational comprehension and thus 
absolutely non-contingent on rational thought. For example, 
in an essay entitled Faith and Force: The Destroyers or the 
Modern \vorld, she writes: 
Mysticism is the acceptance or allegations without evi-
dence or proor, either apart from or against the evidence 
of one's senses and one's reason. Hyst~cJ.sm is the claim 
to some non-sensory, non-rational, non-derinable means or 
knowledge such as 11 instinct,n "intuition," "revelation," 
or any form of njust knowing. 11 ••• in the light of what 
followed [i.e., the Renaissance) ••• nobody can now 
take faith, or religion, or revelation or any form of 
mysticism as his basic and exclusive guide to5existence, not the way it was taken in the 1-'Tiddle Ages .1 
Here, Rand seems to be accepting the philosophical position 
that man's senses provide the data necessary to allow reason 
to for•m proper judgments. But since the time of Plato, 
philosophers have argued that sense data can be extremely 
inaccurate, often therefore misleading reason. So from the 
standpoint of accurate reporting, sense data has its share 
of risks too, just as rai th. Ironically, Rt=md places so 
much ufaith11 in reason that she regards it as man's exclusive 
guide to kno"trledge and refuses to recognize that it, too, may 
deceive man, especially if data fed to it by the senses are 
15Ayn Rand, Faith and_Force: The Dc~~rozers of the 
l·'fodel'n Horld, reprint of a lectura deliverod at Yale Uni-
versity (February 17, 1960), Brooklyn College (April!~, 1960), 
and ColunJbia University (i'.Iay 5, 1960). (Nmr York: The 
Objectivist Inc., 1960), 11. Hy brackets. 
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not accurate. 
Further, the use of' the word "exclusive" (basic and· 
exclusive guide to existence) is at best misleading. Today, 
f'ew Christians would advocate a return to the Middle Ages. 
Not many religions base the conduct of' their af'f'airs totally 
on revelation, suspending all rational operations in the 
process. As the author of' lif'e, God gave man a mind which 
He expects him to use in order to s1~vive. Love of' and 
dependence on God does not in any way imply the abandoning 
of rational thought to mystical whim. Indeed the New Testa-
ment tells us that Jesus Has quite severe with the man who 
had failed to use his "talent" productively (Matt. 15:14-30). 
The dichotomy made bet1·men reason and faith is not 
accurate. 1-lhen postulating such a dis tinction, Rand seems 
to be saying that those who have faith must, as a necessary 
condition, either abandon reason entirely, or regard it as 
inferior to f'aith. But, to have faith is not to do either. 
Faith may be vieHed on tHo levels: hrunan and divine. Faith 
in our felloH man is a matter of necessity, since human 
knowledge Hould stagnate without it. No one person could 
ever hope to personally verify the data he must use to live, 
even if he possessed the necessary skills to do so, which 
is unlikely. \vhen an executive of a large corporation 
issues an order, all he can logically expect is that his 
subordinates 't·Iill execute it. LikeN·ise, a man wishing to 
pu:r>chase a television set or visit a doctor must place his 
faith in the reputation of the manu.facturer 1 s or doctor's 
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ability, especially if he lacks the education necessary to 
unders·tand and evaluate the complex electronic systems built 
into a television or the medical knowledge of the doctor. 
Of course, reason plays a crucial role in helping one to do 
this, but the fact remains that 
[the] largest percentage of our knowledge comes to each 
of us through our habitual trust in the reports, research, 
and opinions of others whom we take (perhaps by an addi-
tional application of faith) to be in a position to know. 
And we do not require that in order to be in a position 
to knm..r one must in every case be able to find out for 
himself. It would be a rare person who could claim to 
have found out or to have checked (or even have partially 
verified) any significant proportion of the things he 
counts among his knmvledge .16 
Without "faith," then, there could be little human knowledge. 
Direct and personal validation occupies but a mnall place in 
man's means of acquiring knowledge. 
Religious faith or "faith in God" does not render a 
man irrational. What gives rise to religious faith is often 
contingent upon the experiential environment: 
Hhat you can see depends upon the kinds of experience 
you can have; that depends upon the significance you 
assign to the elements of your experience and that 
depends upon your perceptual sets; and that in turn 
depends very often upon whether you are lucky enough 
to have met the right disclosure ~ituations. This 
holds for life generally .••• l{ 
Put in these terms, then, what Rand chooses to do is assign 
little signii':i.ca.Dce to the type of human experience which 
16James Ross, Introduction to the Philosophy of 
Rol~on (London: Thel1acmillan · Company, 1969), p. 79. Ny 
brackets. Parentheses in original. 
17Ibid., p. 109. Italics in original. 
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gives rise to raith in God.l8 But, reason and raith may be 
looked upon as two related types or human lmowledge. To deny 
the rormer would destroy human knowledge by negating the 
role or the mind in acquiring and validating lmowledge. To 
deny the latter would, in errect, accomplish the same thing 
by rerusing to man an inrinite variety or experiences just 
as essential to his survival. Faith in God can be a beauti-
ful and personally fulrilling experience ror man. Objectiv-
ism's rejection or a creator leads to many dirriculties, 
not the least of which is the philosophy's rejection by 
American schoolmen. 
Religion and Capitalism 
Objectivists argue that it is irrational to speak or 
capitalism and religion in the same context; the case against 
religion as an inrluence on the growth or capitalism in 
18Perhaps Rand's background explains why. Barbara 
Branden, her biographer, tells us that her parents, u • • • 
who were J-evdsh, were not particularly religious, e-nd had 
given her no formal religious training." Additionally He 
must not forget that as a child, she experienced the horror 
o.f the Russian revolution experiencing many horrible inci-
dents including con£iscation of her father's store, lack of 
food, little money, and unemployment. Under such circtun-
stunces, Rand's lack of belief in God's existence may appear 
understandable. Living in a world which ignored religious 
training ar!d fostered brutality as a way of: life, she obvi-
ously lacked the experiential elements necessary to a devel-
opment of' strong religious faith. Further, her almost 
f'aith-·like allegiance to the power of re!lson as man t s only 
reliable guide to knmvledge could possibly stem f'rom the 
irrationalism of' the revolution which perpetrated so many 
degradations. For details see: Barbara Branden, nwho Is 
Ayn Rand?, 11 in Nathaniel Branden, v!ho _I~ A?J! Rand? (New 
York: Paperback Library, 1968), pp. u.S~ , and Ayn Rand, 
\ve the L1.vi)r~ (New York: ':Phe Nm-v American Library, Signet 
Press, 1959 , passim. 
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America is stated by Barbara Branden: 
To rest one's advocacy of capitalism on .faith, is·to con-
cede that reason is on the side of one's enemies. Such 
implies that a free society cannot be rationally justi-
fied •••• To claim that capitalism rests on religious 
faith is to contradict the fundamental principles of the 
United States; in America religion is a private matter 
which must not be brought into political issues.l9 
unfortunately, for her argument, the "fundamental principles 
of the United States" as they relate to economic issues are 
indeed inclusive of religious issues. Objectivists, when 
advocating the opposite, ignore the tremendous impetus given 
capitalism by the Puritan ethic. The latter, by stressing 
hard work, productiveness, and self-help as signs of the 
elect and by condemning non-productiveness and laziness as 
vices, provided an atmosphere conducive to economic competi-
tion. Writing in this connection, R. H. Tawney observes of 
the Puritan: 
• • • he sees in the poverty of those who fall by the 
way, not a misfortune to be pitied and relieved, but a 
moral railing to be condemned, and in riches, not an 
object of suspicion-though like other gifts they may be 
abused-but the blessing which rewards the triumph of 
energy and vlill. Tempered by self-examination, self-
discipline, self-control, he is the practical ascetic, 
whose Victories are won not in the cloister, but on the 
battle.f'ield, in the counting-house, and in the market.20 
The fail~e of Objectivists to note the relationship between 
capitalism and the Puritan ethic leads them to distort his-
tory. In attempting to select only the non-religious .facto1~s 
19Barbara Bran.den, 11 Intellec tual Ammunition Department, 11 
_!h~ . .s>.PJ_~vi1:t NeHs1etter, I, No. 3 (March, 1962), 11. 
Ital1cs 1n or1ginal. 
20R. H. Ta~mey, Religion and tho Rise of Capitalism 
(Nevl York: Hontor Books, 1954), pp. "191-92 .. 
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which gave rise to free enterprise in America, they arbi-
trarily censor an important element in political and eco-
nomic development of this country. Although it is quite 
true that religion in the United States is a private matter, 
all the privacy implies is that according to the First Amend-
ment of the Bill of Rights, the Federal government may not 
institute a state religion, or lend support to any individual 
religion. It says nothing about the influence of religion 
in shaping .tmerican values and institutions. Objectivists 
fail to realize that the economic and political freedoms 
enjoyed by Americans today might not have occurred were it 
not for the religious influence.21 
Further, the concept of individual rights as opposed 
to man in service to the state has its roots not just in 
the Renaissance (as Objectivism suggests), but also in the 
"theocratic" !,riddle Ages, the era Rand deplores. Writes 
one critic of her historiography: 
••• the idea of representative government we owe to 
the cru~istian notion of personality and the medieval 
conception of mutually binding covenants • • • the cor-
nerstone of English and by extension American constitu-
tionalism is the ~ost medieval and feudal of documents, 
the Hagna Carta.2 
Although it may be argued whether the Hagna Carta exercised 
as much influence as suggested, it remains defensible to 
suggest that Christianity helped to displace the notion, 
21
samuol Eliot r.Torison, The O.xf'ord History of' the 
American Poople (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), 
pp.· "69-7~--
2211. Stanton Evans, "The Gospel Accm:•ding to Ayn Rand," 
Na tiona]. Roviel.·l, XIX ( Oc tobor, 1967), 1063. 
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common to Plato and Aristotle, that man must exist for the 
state. Paramount to the Christian ethic is respect for the 
individual dignity of' all men. .Just as an undue emphasis ~n 
f'aith can warp one's judgment, the converse is likewise true. 
one who f'ails to grasp the role religion has played in the 
f'or.mation and growth of' America cormnits the cardinal sin 
against which Objectivists constantly warn: that of evading 
reality and substituting whims or desires f'or what actually 
is (or was). 
The Ethics of' Emergencies 
As we have noted above, Rand rejects the source of 
human rights as coming f'rom the Christian ethic. Rather, 
she suggests that " ••• the source of' man's rights is not 
divine law or congressional law, but the law of' identity.n23 
Such a belief' tends to depreciate the value of' an individ-
ual's dignity. In the last chapter, we discussed the Objec-
tivist belief' that it would be morally justif'iable to allow 
an Adolf' Hitler to die. If' one judged his actions as 
morally abominable but then saved his lif'e, he would in 
ef'f'ect be perpetuating a moral evil. Whether such a moral 
norm becomes operative depends on who authors human li~e. 
If' rights originate ~rom anyone or anything other than God, 
then one would indeed be justified in allowing Adolf' Hitler 
23Ayn Rand, "Han's Rights," in The Virtue of' Selfish-
ness (New York: The Ne1v American Library, "signet Press, 
Y9b1+), p. 94. 
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to die since his li~e per se is o~ no importance. Saving 
his li~e does not prevent us ~rom judging his actions as 
evil, even to the point o~ prescribing death had he surviv~d 
the war, but only through due process. There~ore, Rand's 
position that we must know the ~acts be~ore condemning is 
not consistent with her position on the Hitler issue. 
Nathaniel Branden identi~ies the issue involved when 
discussing why capital punishment constitutes a danger to 
human freedom. Noting that the mor~l issue involved does 
authorize the state to execute a convicted ~elon through 
due process, he goes on to attach the rollowing legal stip-
ulation: 
••• men are not inrallible; juries make mistakes; that 
is the problem. There have been instances recorded where 
all the available evidence pointed overwhelmingly to a 
man's guilt, and the man was convicted, and then subse-
quently discovered to be innocent. It is the possibility 
or executing an innocent man that raises ~pubts about the 
legal advisability of capital punishment. 4 
The issue, however, is precisely a moral one ror the very 
reason Branden suggests--inrallibility. Suppose we argue, 
as it has been, that Hitler was insane at the time he issued 
orders leading to the extermination o£ rive million Jews. 
If so, can he be held completely morally responsible for his 
actions and thererore be allowed to die at the discretion or 
a single individual? The point is that when God is divorced 
rrom human affairs, the moral commitment to preserve lire 
fades~ Probably the rirst restraint to disappear would be 
2~·Na thaniel Branden, 11 Intellectual Arn.muni tion Depart-
ment, 11 The Objectivist Ne't·Tsletter, II, No. 1 (January, 1963), 
3. Italics id~riginal. 
117 
due process, resulting in death sentences being pronounced 
on the whims or mistaken judgments of accusers. 
Rand is quite correct when demanding that men not 
evade the responsibility to denounce evil, but to do so in 
a context which also denies the source of all good allm-Ts 
for too many errors. If a jury which has listened to over-
whelming evidence of guilt for months can err, then the risk 
of one person doing the same is that much greater. Plato 
suggests that belief is not the same as knowing; if it were, 
Branden's argurnen t against capital punish.'1l.en t would not 
exist, but men are fallible. 
We C~L thus condemn the actions of a Hitler and urge 
that he be held accountable for his perversions of the moral 
law, but to judge, condemn, and then execute is not the 
prerogative of any one individual in a free society. 
Internal Contradictions 
Ob jec ti vism is not 1-1i thout internal contradictions. 
Inconsistencies, for example, are found in her novel, ~ 
Folmtainhead. In an earlier chapter, we referred to Rand's 
heroes and their intensive struggle against evil, noting 
that the war usually consists of intellectual refutations, 
coupled when nec:essary 1-1i th appropriate action. 25 The nature 
of "appropriate" concerns us now. The F1ountainhead's hero 
Hov1a.rd Roark, an arc hi teet, undertakes to design a low-rent 
housing project, free of charge, for an inefficient colleague 
--------·--
2') 5 
·See p. 1 above. 
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provided he, Roark, .retains sole autonomy regarding design. 
However, when completed, implemented structural changes-
made without Roark's authorization-results in a hybrid 
26 design. He responds by dynamiting the project, and orrers 
the ~ollowing derense at his trial: 
"I designed Cortlandt. I gave it to you. I destroyed 
it. I destroyed it because I did not choose to let it 
exist. It Has a double monster. In form and in implica-
tion. I had to blast both. The form was mutilated by 
two second-handers who assumed the right to improve upon 
that which they had not made and could not equal. They 
were permit ted to do it by the ge .. 'leral implication that 
the altruistic purpose of the building supers·eded all 
rights that I had no claim to stand against it. . 
"I agreed to design Cortlandt ror the purpose of 
seeing it erected as I designed it and ror no other 
reason. That lvas the price I set :for my work. I was 
not paid. • • • 
"It is said that I have destroyed the home o:f' the 
destitute. It is forgotten that but for me the destitute 
could not have had this particular home. Those vrho were 
concerned with the poor had to come to me, who has never 
been concerned, in order to h~lp the poor. It is believed 
that the poverty of the future tenants gave them a right 
to my work. That their need constituted a claim on my 
life. That it was my duty to contribute anything demanded 
of me. This is the second-hander 's credo now Slvallolving 
the world. n'c!.7 
It is difficult to reconcile Roark's actions with Objectiv-
ist ethics on several counts. First it would appear that 
although Roark considers his rights violated, the response 
26Interestingly enough, The New York Times reported 
that when 'I'he Fountainhead was be~ng made ~nto a movie (1949) 
the producer, Henry Blanke, recalled: "She [Rand] told me 
she Hould bloH up the Harner Brothers lot if vle changed one 
word of her beautiful dialogue .••• And we believed her. 
Even Jack Harner believed her. He gave her a cigar. 11 See: 
E. Ephron, "A Strange Kind o:f' Simplicity, 11 The NeVI York Times 
Book Revielv, (Hay 1, 1968), p. 43. 
27Ayn Rand, The Fountainhead (New York: The New 
American Library, S~gnet Press, 1958), p. 685. 
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constitutes the aggressive use of' force-that 1'11'hich Objec-
tivist ethics supposedly rejects. Further, Roark's actions 
certainly set a dangerous social precedent. Society would 
obviously collapse if' individuals were allo1'11'ed to express 
personal dissatisfaction by using bombs. Ironically, Rand 
speaks quite harshly of those who resort to such tactics in 
the colleges to foster social change. If Roark's defense 
speech suggests a possible justification, then we must ask 
Rand to provide specific moral criteria which permit one to 
toss a bomb into a building. In any event, his actions 
certainly are not consistent with Objectivist ethics. 
Secondly, Roark's acceptance of the contract itself 
to design the housing project for low-income families ought--
for an Objectivist--to constitute a moral evil, for such a 
project is certainly socialism in action. If Roark honestly 
believes in the moral evil of the welfare state, then he 
certainly has no business associating himself' with actions 
designed to perpetuate its very existence. The project is 
ostensibly paid for by looting the productive workers to 
provide homes for those who, on the basis of' their need, 
require them. 
Another significant contradiction found in Objec-
tivism concerns Rand r s view- of morality and he1~ theory of 
compromise. We have already touched on the issue when dis-
cussing Aristotle's doctrine of the golden moan. Objectiv-
ism operates in a black/white context, refusing to allow 
for any moral compromise. Permitting compromise regarding 
i 
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"concretes or particulars,""28 but not where moral principles 
are concerned, she notes: 
The next time you are tempted "!...:> ask: "Doesn't life 
require compromise?" translate that question into its 
actual meaning: "Doesn't life require the surrender of 
that which is true and good to that which is false and 
evil?" The answer is that that precisely is what life 
forbids-if' one wishes to ach~eve anything but a stretch 
of' tortured years spent in progressive self-destruction.29 
In another publication, The Ayn Rand Letter, we .find endorsed 
the fairness doctrine for education, i.e., allowing students 
exposure to ideas and concepts beyond those advocated by a 
particular (and by implication, as we shall see, non-rational) 
university department. For example, she notes that 
[if] student minorities have succeeded in demanding that 
they be given courses on such subjects as Zen Buddhism, 
guerrilla warfare . • • then an intellectual student 
minority can succeed in demanding courses on, .for 
instance, Aristotle in philosophy, von }lises in eco-
nomics, 11ontessori in education, Hugo in literature. At 
the very least, such courses would save the students30 mind; [sic] potentially they would save the culture. 
The educational significance or such a policy will be dis-
cussed later, but importantly for the present purpose is 
what Rand actually thinks of its application by government: 
The "Fairness Doct1•ine 11 is a messy little makeshift of' 
the mixed economy, and a poor substitute .for .freedom of' 
speech. It has, hoHever, served as a minimal retarder 
of the collectivist trend: it has prevented the Estab-
lish.t'nent t s total takeover of the airways. • . • The 
doctrine is a typical product of the socialist senti-
28Ayn Rand, "Doesn't Life Require Compromise?" in 
The Virtue o:f SeJ.fislmess, p. 68. 
29Ibid., p. 70. Italics in original. 
30 Ayn Rand, "Fairnes n Doctr:i.ne for Education, 11 The 
Ayn Rand Lettei•, II, No. 19 (June 19, 1972), I~. I1y bracl{ets. 
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mentality that dreams of combining government o'W!lership · 
with intellectual freedom .••• The trouble with the 
fairness doctrine is that it cannot be applied fairly. 
Like any ideological product of the mixed economy, it is 
a vague, indefinable approxima~ion and! therefore, an 
instrument of pressure-group warfare.J 
The fact that Rand can endorse the fairness doctrine, even 
as a temporary stop-gap measure, suggests she is willing to 
compromise a very significant moral issue: the refusal to 
deal with, or accept any doctrine which advances the welfare/ 
socialist state at the expense of moral integrity. We are 
not quarreling with the ends-as will be argued later, stu-
dents do indeed require exposure to Aristotle-but with the 
means to achieve it which, according to Objectivist ethics, 
should also be moral. 
Additionally, by Rand's own admission, the fairness 
doctrine cannot be applied fairly as presently used, so 
what guarantee is there that it will work for education? 
Other means need to be found to achieve the same (legitimate) 
goal--freedom of thought on the campus. Rand is quite correct 
when arguing that the principle must remain inviolate. 
Intolerance 
Finally, Ellis charges that Objectivism provides 
little tolerance for opposing philosophies. Parenthetically, 
one Honders if Rand vrould allow the fairness doctrine to be 
31Ayn Rand, "Fairness Doctrine i'or Education, 11 The 
~Rand Letter, I, No. I8 ·rJune 5, I972),-1. • 
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applied to Objectivism itsel£?32 Ellis notes: 
• • • objectivists £requently resort to accusing them 
[their intellectual opponents] of many views to which 
they c~early do not subscribe. Then the objectivist 
writers enthusiastically proceed to knock down the straw-
men which they have constructed--while deluding themselves 
t~at tb~y have actually demolished their opponents' 
vJ.ews.33 
Unfortunately, this is true. Perhaps the most glaring in-
stance would be Rand's treatment of philosophical history. 
Excepting Aristotle, her catalog o£ philosophers and their 
mis-contributions to man's intellectual development reads 
like a tour through Dante's Inferno. Everyone since 
Aristotle, according to Objectivist historiography, has 
consistently and deliberately set out to destroy what 
Aristotle had accomplished. For philosophical crimes, 
post-Aristotelian philosophers are placed in two categories: 
Attilas and Witch Doctors, imagery suggested by Branden. 
She comments: 
The essential characteristics of these two remain the 
same in all ages: Attila, the man who rules by brute 
force, acts on the range of the moment, is concerned 
vlith nothing but the physical reality immediately before 
him, respects nothing but man's muscles, and regards a 
fist, a club, or a gun as the only answer to any problem 
-and the 1Vitch Doctor, the man who dreads physical 
reality;-dreaas the necessity of practical action, and 
escapes into his emotions, into visions of some mystic 
32Apparently not, for Ellis reports: nThe objectiv-
ists themselves consistently attack writers, painters • • • 
and I have never noticed that they give the persons they 
attack equal space in their publications.rr See: Ellis, Is 
Objectivism a Religion?, p. 290. This is correct; onl'J"" those 
i·Tho acree with Objectivism may publish in any of Rand's 
journals. As mmel"' and publisher, she may, of course, refuse 
to grunt anyone space, but that does not change the fact that 
intolel'ance exists. 
33Ib·· ' 2 1• 1• 
- ---2:2:. • , p • '+'+ • 1-iy brackets. 
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realm where his wishes enjoy a s~pernatural power unlim-
ited by the absolute or nature.34 
An examination or the introductor; essay in For the New 
Intellectual reveals the rollowing classirication or ages 
and individuals: \vi tch Doctors_-Plato, the Middles Ages, 
Augustine, Descartes and Hegel; Attilas--Greco-Roman 
(political) civilization, Hume, and Harx, and both--Kant, 
Logical Positivists, Twentieth Century Philosophers.35 
One ,)xample will illustrate ho1-v the classirication 
operates. Writing that the Renaissance freed philosophy 
from theology, Rand continues to say that the ruture seemed 
bright until Descartes who 
••• began with the basic epistemological premise or 
every Witch Doctor ••• 11 the prior certainty of con-
sciousness,11 the belief that the existence of an external 
world is not self-evident but must be proved by deduc-
tion from the contents of one's consciousness--which 
means: the concept of consciousness as some faculty 
other than the faculty of perception--which means: the 
indiscriminate contents of onets consciousness as the 
irreducible primary and absolute, to which reality has 
to con.form. ltlha t followed was the grotesquely tragiC"" 
spectacle of philosophers struggling to prove the exist-
ence of an external reality by staring, 1iith the Witch 
Doctor's blind, inHard stare, at the random twists or 
their c9nceptions--then of perceptions--then of sensa-
tions.36 
This is what Ellis means by setting up a stra\vrnan for the 
purpose of destroying it. Rand ignores the f'act that 
Descartes does not attempt to destroy the certainty of 
34Ayn Rand, "Introduction" to For the NeH Intellec-
tual (NeH York: The New American Library, SJ..gnet Press, 
19'bT), p. 11~. Italics in original. 
35I?i~., pp. 1o-57. 
36Ibid., p. 28. Italics in original. 
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external reality, but temporarily doubted its existence in 
order to ~ind criteria ~or determining and establishing 
reliable guidelines ~or human knowledge.37 Descartes real-
ized what was concluded earlier, that sense data can be inac-
curate, providing there~ore incorrect lmowledge. 
Further, she ignores the reasons which prompted philo-
sophers and scientists such as Descartes and Bacon to demand 
new methods o~ investigation. Scholasticism had become so 
corrupted and decadent that human lm;:nv-ledge ~aced the pros-
pect o~ extinction i~ attention were not paid to the environ-
mental stimuli or the day. Ironically, a contributing ~ac-
tor to the decline o~ scholasticism was Aristotle's logic. 
The use o~ deductive science, it was reasoned, provided 
convenient means ~or classi~ying lmowledge, but not expand-
ing it. The insisting on new methods which supplemented 
Aristotle resulted in the Renaissance which Rand so highly 
values. 
Thus, Rand's iconoclastic classi~ications are at 
best most misleading and hardly re~lect a mature approach 
to the study o~ philosophy. or course, she is ~oe to dis-
agree with conclusions reached by philosophers and scien-
tists, but one 1muld expect that as a philosopher (lover o~ 
v.Tisdom), she -vmuld at least respect the cont;ributions made 
by Plato, Kant and others to Western thought. 
37Rene Descartes, "Neditation I," !>1editations on ~-t Philosophy, trans. by Norman Smith 1n f:lonroe c. -
Beardslt-;,y, ed., European Philosouhors f'rom Descartes to 
Nietzsche (Ne~v York:- Hodern Llb~ary, 1960), pp. 28-J-:!:-
----
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Critic James Collins suggests that Rand's tactics 
stem ~rom the di~~iculties she encounters when switching 
~rom nove:ist to philosopher: 
Metaphors are use~ul in philosophy, but only as direc-
tives o~ the mind toward the particular evidences by 
which to test and quali~y the hypotheses using the 
metaphors. ~fuat makes it di~ricult ~or Ayn Rand to 
make the transition ~rom novelist to philosopher is 
that her personifications tend to take possession o~ 
the discussion and to lead a li~e Q~ their mn1, beyond 
our possibility o~ checking them.3b 
collins goes on to suggest that using imagery has a certain 
shock value, which jars the reader's complacency, but ~ails 
to contribute anything of substance to philosophical thought. 
Nrune-calling belongs to propaganda; not philosophy. 
Rand's over-use o~ metaphor in philosophy o~ten 
results in a reader dismissing Objectivism as being o~ 
little worth. Her neglect by the academic community con-
stitutes an example. Objectivism can make a significant 
contribution to educational thought, as the following 
chapters will hope~ully make clear, but readers are cautioned 
to read beyond the shock tactics used. 
SUMMARY 
This chapter has attempted to balance the previous 
ones by providing the reader with evidence suggesting irreg-
ularities in Objectivism. These include misleading or 
inaccurate assumptions regarding religion, faith, laissez-
faire Capitalism, and non-Objectivist philosophies. 0~ 
38 James Collins, 11 Ayn Rand's 'l1alents f'or Getting 
Headlines," America, CV (July, 1961), 569. 
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special ~portance to education is the conduct or her char-
acter Howard Roark, whose actions seem to ~itate the very 
student radicals she repudiates. 
The rollowing chapters will consider Objectivism as 
it evaluates American education. In so doing, however, we 
must keep in mind that the above characteristics will have 
to be either dismissed outright or modiried ir the philo-
sophy is to make any contribution to American educational 
thought. 
' 
' 
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CHAPTER FIVE · 
THE OBJECTIVIST CRITI~UE OF 
AMERICAN FOill4AL EDUCATION 
Rand's educational position rerlects a code or 
values a man ought to accept ir he be really educated. 
Thus, her critique or contemporary American rormal educa-
tion isolates practices which deviate rrom Objectivist 
ethics. The rollowing summary indicates rive areas or·edu-
cational practice Rand rinds most objectionable. When 
practiced by schoolmen, these procedures prevent the child 
rrom acquiring the virtues listed in the·second column. 
Rationality is common to the rive categories, since Rand 
regards it as man's basic virtue--the roundation ror the 
remaining virtues. 
Educational procedure: Virtues: 
1. Inadequate development or 
sense or lire. 
l. Rationality, integrity. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
----
Inadequate development or 2. 
self-esteem and cognitive 
selr-reliance. 
Confusion or tho roles or 3. 
reason a.nd emotion in 
childhood growth. 
Student activism, especially L~. 
violence. 
The "welfare state 11 mental- 5. 
ity or formal education. 
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Rationality, self-
esteem, pride, produc-
tiveness. 
Rationality, honesty, justice. 
Rationality, justice. 
Rationality, honesty, 
integrity, justice, 
produetivenoss. 
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Rand condemns American educators for failing to prac-
tice virtues which are essential to the realization of her 
concept of the educated man. In essence they are the virt~es 
which she wishes the educated man to possess. Any system 
of education which negates one or all of them falls under 
her critical scan. Each of the five issues will in turn be 
considered. 
Inadequate Development of ~iense of Life 
In chapter three, the concept sense of life was 
examined in reference to its importance for education. Rand 
relates it to education when discussing the learning situ-
ation in the context of Objectivist epistemology: 
The integrated sum of a man's basic values is his sense 
of life. A sense of life represents a man's early 
value-integrations, which remain in a fluid, plastic, 
easily amendable state, while he gathers knowledge to 
reach full conceptual control and thus to drive his 
inner mechan1sm ..•• The transition from guidance by 
a sense of life to guidance by a conscious philosophy 
takes many forms. For the rare exception, the fully 
rational child, it is a natural, absorbin8, if difficult 
process--the process of validating and, if necessary, 
correcting in conceptual terms what he had merely sensed 
about the nature of man's existence .•.•• The result is 
a fully integrated personality, a man whose mind and 
emotions are in harmonl, whose sense of life matches his 
conscious convictions. 
The educative process, then, begins with values regarded by 
an individual as significant-significan-t in terms of a 
personal evaluation of his universe, be it the home, the 
1Any Rand,."Philosophy and Sense of Life, 11 in _The 
Romantic r1anifosto (New York: The Ne\-1 American Library I 
·~hgnet Press, 19{.[), p. 29. Italics in original. 
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school or the community in which he resides. The adult 
community, by the way it structures the child's enviromnent, 
can advance or retard a healthy and viable sense of life, 
for a sense of life " • • • is formed by every individual 
child's early impression of the world around him: of the 
ideas he is taught • • • and of the way of acting he observes 
and evaluates. n2 Education plays a significant role . . . 
in helping the child convert his sense of life to a rational 
philosophy of life. It is at this juncture in the child's 
life that Objectivism begins its critique of American edu-
cation. 
Rand advises that sense of ~ becomes operative 
when the child confronts his earliest and most fundamental 
choice: 
Does a child conclude that the world is intelligible, 
and proceed to expand his understanding by the effort 
2Ayn Rand, "Don't Let It Go," The Ayn Rand Letter, 
I, No. 4 (November 22, 197IT,~. In Atlas Shrugeed, Rand 
describes what a proper sense of life ought to be, when 
spea1dng of two children: "They seem to face life as she 
[Dagny Taggart, Rand's heroine in the novel] had faced it. 
They did not have the look • • • of fear, half-secretive, 
half-sneering, the look of a child's defense against an 
adult, the look of a being in the process of discovering 
thEi.t he is hearing lies and of learning to .feel hatred. 
The two boys had the open, joyous, friendly confidence of 
kittens who do not expect to get hurt, they had an inno-
cently natural, non-boastful sense of their mvn value snd 
as innocent a trust in any stranger's ability to recognize 
it, they had the eaeer curiosity that would. venture any-1.1here 
with the cer·(;ainty that life had nothing 1.l1'1.>vorthy of or 
closed to discovery, and they looked as if, should they en-
counter malevolence, they would reject it c-:mtemptuously, 
not as dangerous, but as stupid, they would not accept it 
in bruised renignation as the la11 of existence." See: 
Atlas Shrugged (New York: The New American Libra1•y, Signet 
Press, "T9:;7T;--p. 730. My brackets. 
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of conceptualizing on an ever-wider scale, with growing 
success and enjoyment? Or does he conclude that the 
world is a bewildering chaos, where the fact he grasped 
today is reversed tomorrow, where the more he sees the 
more t_,:dpless he becomes-and, consequently, does he 
retre~t into the cellar of his own mind, locking its 
door. 
Unfortunately for the child, todayrs schooling usually leads 
to the latter--chaos. Objectivism offers several examples 
of educational decay, but perhaps the most important one 
concerns the destruction of a child's sense of the heroic. 
Young children tend to project their own activities in 
terms of heroes: Superman, The Lone Ranger, Batman--all of 
whom emerge victorious over evil. Why? In pre-conceptual 
sense of life terms, the child does not recognize that such 
heroes represent concepts he values as vital to healthy 
self-esteem: courage, integrity, honor, etc. What parents 
ought to do, suggests Rand, is to cultivate this hero wor-
ship by aiding the child in his attempts to transform his 
sense of ~ estimate of them to proper conceptual (philo-
sophical) terms. However, she warns: 
It is easy to convince a child, and particularly an 
adolescent, that his desire to emulate Buck Rogers is 
ridiculous: he knows that it isn't exactly Buck Rogers 
he has in mind and yet, simultaneously, it is-he feels 
caught in an inner contradiction--and this confirms his 
dosolrtoly embarrassing feeling that he is being ridicu-
lous.+ 
Of course the Lone Ranger and Buck Rogers do not exist, but 
3Ayn Rand, "The Comprachicos," in Tho New Left: Tho 
Anti-Industrial Revolution (NeW" York: The Nelv AmerJ.can 
L1brary, Signet Press, 1971), p. 159. 
4Ayn Rand, "Art and Moral Treason," in The Romantic 
Manifesto, p. 114. 
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that is not the point. When parents and teachers ridicule 
the child for admiring them or casting himself in their 
roles, h~ will eventually not only reject them, but also the 
values they represent. The hero himself may soon fade in 
the older child's memory, but the values ought not to fade. 
The hero and his values are so closely linked in the child's 
mind that a rejection of the former usually implies rejec-
tion of the latter with tragic results .for his moral/intel-
lectual development. The inner contradiction, in other 
words, impedes the proper integration of data later needed 
for concept formation, and for the formation of morally 
proper principles. The damage inflicted upon self-esteem 
is enormous and often irrevocable as the next section of 
this chapter will indicate. 
The child's sense of life and its potential for 
transition to an integrated conceptual framework become 
further frustrated, suggests Rand, when formal education 
begins, especially if the child is subjected to the Pro-
gressive educational influence. Her critique of John 
Dewey's philosophy of education5 charges that it lacks 
proper cognitive and moral foundations. Rand critiques 
Dewey's evaluation of the learning process. Writing in 
5Rand erroneously equates Dewey with Progressive 
education; for her, criticism of one implies criticism of 
the other. In reality, Dewey himself was quite critical of 
the excesses in the Progressive educational movement. See: 
Experience and Education (New York: Collier Books, 1971), 
pass:Ui1. Por a scholarly treatment of the Progressive educa-
tl.on movement and Dewey's role in it, see: IJm-Trence Cremin, 
Tho rrransformation of the Schools (New York: Vintaee Press, 
I96Id, o~c3peciaiTy pages 237-:-.39".-
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Democracy and Education regarding alleged de.ficiencies in the 
Montessori method, Dewey observes: 
Even the kindergarten and I1ont .... ssori techniques are so 
anxious to get at intellectual distinctions, without 
"waste of' time," that they tend to ignore-or reduce-
the ~uediate crude handling of' the f'amiliar material 
of' experience, and to introduce pupils at once to material 
which expr~sses the intellectual distinctions which adults 
have made. 0 . 
Rand of' course takes exception to any philosophy of' education 
which suggests. that cognitive operations be f'orestalled f'or 
whatever re~son. This is especially true regarding intel-
lectual distinctions since the ability to recognize dis-
tinctions cognitively constitutes an essential part of' the 
process of' concept !'ormation. The child, she warns, can 
never become conceptually aware if' intellectual operations 
are not involved at the earliest possible moment. Objec-
tivism not only f'aults Dewey's attempt to postpone intel-
lectual development, but f'urther objects to the context in 
vThich this occurs: namely, the group. 
Dewey believes that the " • • • reconstruction or 
reorganization of' experience, ••• n7 his def'inition of' 
the learning process, may best occur if' the learner inter-
acts with the enviro1~ent in an active sense as part of' a 
group engaged in problem solving. 8 The group, 1vhen solving 
problems, is guided by its own interests and should, there-
fore, be self'-motivating. Education f'or Dewey stresses the 
Fl'ee 
6 ~fohn Dewey, Democracft and Education 
Pl'e s s, 1968), pp .- 15.3-5 ~. . 
The (New Yorl::: 
7Ibid., p. 76. 8Ibid., pp. 10-22. 
. I I, 
I I 
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need for social cooperation as a means for survival in a 
democracy. He writes: 
• • • the social environment forms the mental and emo-
tional disposition of behavior in individuals by engag-
ing them in activities that arouse and strengthen certain 
impulses, that have certain purposes and entail certain 
consequences.9 
Rand counters the learning by doing method in a group con-
text, noting its effect on young children: 
He (the child] has acquired no incentive, no motive to 
develop his intellect. Of what importance can reality 
be to hi1:.1 if his fate depends on the pack? • • • Reality, 
to him, is no longer an exciting challenge, but a dark 
unknowable threat, ~1hich evokes a feeling he did not 
have when he started: a feeling not of ignorance, but 
of failure, not of helplessness, but of impotence--a 
sense of' his own mal~unctioning mind. The pack is the 
only realm he knows where he feels at hame; he needs its 
protection and reassurance; the art of human manipulation 
is the only skill he had acquired.10 
Without incentive or motivation, then, the transition spoken 
of earlier can not occur. This is especially true, accord-
ing to Rand, since Dewey tt • • • opposed the teaching of 
theoretical (i.e. conceptual) knowledge, and demanded that 
it be replaced by concrete, "practical" action, in the form 
of "class projects" which would develop the students' social 
spirit. 11 As we shall have occasion to note later, Objec-
9rbid., p. 16. 
10Rand, "The Comprachicos," p. 167. Hy brackets. 
llibid., p. 172. Parentheses in original. An advo-
cate of Dewey 1 s philosophy might here argue that Rand sets 
up a 11 straw man. 11 Specifically, according to Dewey, moti-
vation emanates from the learning situation itself (i.e., 
the problem), and that his opposition to 11 theoreticarr-:knowl-
edge means opposing 11 verbalism 11 introduced too early in the 
child t s education. Dewey himself', fol' exa.111ple, 11 lectured11 
l..Jhon teaching at Chicago. 
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tivism accepts the Montessori method because it regards the 
child as individual as the primary unit (not the group) in 
the educative process. 
The moral effects of Progressive education are worse, 
according to Rand. Progressive techniques (it is not clear 
whether Rand means De-vrey or Progressive education, but in 
the context of her article, "The Comprachicos," probably 
both) systematically destroy the virtues of rationality and 
integrity. As man's basic virtue, rationality demands a 
full and continuous conh~itment to reason, for only in this 
way will man's life on earth be happy. Specifically, Objec-
tivism charges that the virtue of rationality is turned 
against the child by forcing him to conform to the will of 
the group. 
The child who regards Buck Rogers as a hero senses 
a moral vrorth in his hero 1 s behavior, the same moral worth 
Rand's characters exhibit--they exist as morally responsible 
individuals concerned Hith the continuous and sustained 
development of the mind through engaging in productive work. 
Likewise several chaPacters, Jim Taggart, Lillian 
Rearden, and especially Ellsworth Toohey represent the anti-
hero, the individuals wishing to destroy the moral code 
practiced by the John Galts and Dagny Taggarts. As such, 
they repr0sent the Randian concept of' mis-educated people. 
Characteristically, they practice a code of' values consist-
ent with graduates of PPogressive schools. For example, 
prizing like-mindedness and group directeru1ess, Toohey 
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comments (in a selection Rand entitles "The Soul o:f a Col-
lectivist"): 
Everything I said is contained in a single word--
collectivism. And isn't that the god o:f our century? 
To act together. To think--together. To :feel--
together. To ~ite, to agree, to obey •••• Kill the 
individual. Kill man's soul. The rest will :follow 
automatically.l2 
such is the philosophy or the man educated to serve the 
group. Existing only insorar as the group will permit, he 
rears indep.)ndent cognitive action, which begins, according 
to the Objectivists, when the child is simply told by a 
teacher that his personal a.Yilbi tions or. thoughts mean little 
if the group wishes to pursue a conrlicting problem. Notes 
Rand: 
~1e of the most evil aspects of modern schools is the 
spectacle of a thinking child trying to "adjust" to the 
pack, trying to hide his intelligence (and his scholastic 
grades) and to act like "one of the boys. 11 He never 
succeeds, and is left wondering helplessly: "What is 
wrong with me? What do I lack? \vhat do they want?"l3 
Related to the groping for a sense of self-worth and self-
identity is the virtue of integrity, defined as 11 ••• the 
recognition of the fact that you cannot fake your conscious-
ness • • • that man , , • may not sacririce his convictions 
to the wishes of' others. • • • nlL~ But tho Objectivists 
warn that Progressive education demands such sacrifice (by 
12Ayn Rand, 11 '11he Soul of a Collectivist," in For The 
Ne1;v Intellectual ( NeH York: The New .American Library, SJ.g-
net Press:-1961), p. 76. 
13Rand, t• rrhe Comprachicos, 11 p. 179. Italics and 
parentheses in original. 
11.1-Ra.nd, "This Is John Galt Speaking, n in For 'rho 
Ne\.<T Intellectual, pp. 128-29. 
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creating the anti-hero) and lauds it as proper classroom 
practice. 
Another l-tay of examining the so-called amorality of 
Progressive educational methodology is to think in terms of 
the means-ends relationship in the educative process. Rand 
defines man in terms of the end he ought to seek if he 
desires to live as a man. Her ethical system adheres to 
the principle that man ought to exist as a heroic being, 
responsible and happy--in Aristotelian terms. 
Dewey, hmvever, does not recognize ends in the Randian 
sense, but focuses attention on means, or methodological 
procedures (i.e. the scientific method}. In Experience and 
Education, he writes: 
The educational system must move one way or another, 
either baclnvard to the intellectual and moral standards 
of a pre-scientific age or forward to ever greater utili-
zation of scientific method in the development of the 
possibilities of gro1-dng, expanding experience .1.5 
In this context, ends achieved immediately become means 
utilized again to achieve other ends, and so on. Thus Dm-1ey 
rejects the means/ends dichotomy, really seeing the two as 
one. Such a process fulfills an important criteria for an 
educative experience, that it be continuous. Objectivism 
charGes, hm·JE:ver, that the concept growth implies direction-
growth to1-1ard what? Dewey rejects all objective absolutes 
as too confining and restrictive, thereby preventing man 
from seekinG (gro-vling to} the truth. It \<Jould appear, then, 
~------------------
15John DeHey, Experience and Education (New York: 
Collier Bookn, 1971), p. 89. 
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that a given problem becomes only a temporary end, provid-
ing experience needed for fUrther growth. By ignoring a 
final end toward which the educative process must lead, 
Rand argues that Dewey divorces morality from education. 
If values are determined by the use and the satisfaction 
gained from employment, then ethics simply becomes a matter 
of plugging in proper methods to solve problems uithout 
regard to their moral worth. 
Rand's charge is serious, and deserves examination 
in light of Dewey's mm thinking. In Democracy and Edu-
cation, he speaks of' moral worth as arising from an activity 
oriented social context: 
The something f'or which a man must be good is capacity 
to live as a social member so that 1-1hat he gets f'rom 
living Hi th others balances ui th what he con tributes . 
• • • All education which develops power to share 
eff'ectively in social lif'e is moral. It forms a char-
acter vlhich not only does the particular deed socially 
necessary bu·c one which is interested in that continu-
ous readjustment which is essential to gro"t-lth. Interest 
in learning f'rom all ghe contacts of' life is the essen-
tial moral interest.l 
Objectivism "t·wuld ask, continuous readjustment tm·mrd what? 
The group? The society? The nation? While it is essential 
to Dewey's philosophy that grovTth consists of' solving prob-
lems (thereby building the experiential fund) in the group 
context, such is not essential f'or Objectivism. When Dewey 
denies objective moral principles, Rand charges that he 
delivers ethics to the whims of' "t-lhat the gi von group deter-
minos as good. 
16Dmo1ey, .:Q •. emocracil and Education, pp. 359-60. 
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Growth for Objectivism constitutes growth tm-rard a 
specific moral end-the concept of the educated man. Once 
achieved, conscious and continuous action by the individua: 
is required to insure proper ethical conduct. The concept 
serves the moral purpose of reminding man of the values he 
must constantly practice if he desires to remain a man. 
While Dew·ey is correct when suggesting that mere verbal 
information alone and divorced from action \-Till not result 
in proper moral conduct, he errs (according to Rand) when 
rei'using to assign to gro1vth a specific direction leading 
to a specific (moral) end.l7 For these reasons, Objectivism 
maintains the position that the scientific method of inquiry 
alone (i.e., without a final moral end) is not sufficient 
to bind ethics to educational pursuits. 
Objectivism's critique of Dewey's philosophy of edu-
cation is to a large degree contingent upon Rand's inter-
pretation of it. Dewey himself', as we have noted, criti-
cized Progressive educational excesses, including its fail-
ure to come to grips vTi th sub j oct matter. Indeed, he 
warned that method can never be divorced i'rom substantive 
content. Ii' Rand wishes to critique the excesses oi' Pro-
gressive education, she oi' course may do so, keeping in 
mind, hotvever, that Dewey himself is not synonymous with 
the movement, especially in its later stages. 
17This position, oi' course, rei'lects Objectivism's 
Aristotelian base. The latter argues that it is illogical 
to speak in terms oi' an ini'inity of means/ends. There must, 
he maintains, be a i'inal end or cause. 
t 
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Objectivism warns, however, that Dewey's philosophy 
frustrates the child's sense of life, resulting in fear, a 
blinding fear that the universe is malevolent, unintellig-
ible, and without direction. One reason Rand endorses 
Montessori is because that method presents reality as 
ordered fuid structured, therefore capable of being under-
stood by the child. 
Fear does constitute a clear and present danger. 
John Holt, who studies the concept in How Children Fail, 
outlines his belief that fear is the principal cause for 
academic failure: 
It is not just a matter of not knowing this fact or that 
fact; it is a matter of living in a universe like the 
one lived in by very young children, a universe which is 
utterly whimsical and unpredictable, wher~8nothing has anything to do vti. th anything else. • . • 
The demand for "the right answern and "memorization versus 
understanding" (which De1.-1ey deplores also) as learning 
techniques contribute to the child's sense of fear and 
ultimately darr1age self-estee1n. Objectivism posits that if 
education is to succeed then it must seek to dissipate fear 
and present a view of the 1tniverse as a place the child can, 
to the limits of his ability, understand. Holt in fact 
calls attention to the reality that intelligent children 
seldom regard the universe as hostile: 
They chock their nnswor·s and their thow:;:hts against 
common sense. • • • It seems as if Hha t 1-1e call intel-
ligent children feel that the universe can be trusted 
18John Holt, How Children Fail (New York: Delta 
Books, 1964), p. 93. 
even when it does not seem to make any sense, that even 
when you don't understand it you can be fairly sure that 
it is not going to play dirty tricks on you.l9 
But how can a child come to recognize his own intelligence 
when the school so o~ten shatters sel~-esteem and self-
con~idence? Objectivisn 1 s critique of Progressive educa-
tion essentially denounces its placing children in group 
situations, arguing that such practices cripple self-
confidence. The next section o~ this chapter considers the 
concept sel~-esteem in more detail. 
Inadequate Development of Sel~-Esteem 
and Cognitive Sel~-Reliance 
Very few adults seem capable o~ realizing that many 
children are terrified of school. The fear mentioned above 
grows and grows until the adolescent begs to be set free. 
Anyone who has observed the speed and joy of most children 
leaving school at the day's end knows, or should knovr, that 
what goes on inside cannot but damage young minds. In this 
section we are concerned with Rand's position that such 
damage results from the school's destruction of cognitive 
sel~-reliance and self-esteem. 
Educators including John Holt and Charles Silberman 
have recognized the ~act that a healthy selr-esteem is 
necessary for success~ul learning. It is significant that 
Silberman, for example, in a chapter entitled "Education 
f'or Docility, 11 argues that 
19Ibid., p. 46. 
~ar ~rom helping students to develop into mature, sel~­
reliant, self-motivated individuals, schools seem to do 
everything they can to keep youngsters in a state of 
chronic, almost infantile, dependency. The pervasive 
atmosphere of distrust, togethrr with rules covering 
the most minute aspects of existence, teach students 
every day that they are not people of worth, and cer-
tainly not individuals capable of regulating their own 
behavior.20 
Objectivist educational philosophy stresses that the 
destruction of the self-esteem concept utterly thwarts the 
learning process. To determine why, we must first define 
self-esteem. Arguing that it is a basic need of man, 
Nathaniel Branden comments: 
From the time that a child acquires the capacity for 
conceptual functioning, he becomes increasingly aware--
implicitly and sub-verbally--of his responsibility for 
regulating his mind's activity. To maintain the con-
ceptual level of avrareness, he must generate directed 
mental effort.21 
i<vhen the mind empl-oys proper mental efforts to sustain 
awareness, it is said to be 11 self-confident.n22 Self-
confidence implies the fact that a man knows he is capable 
of dealing rationally with the facts of reality. Related 
to self-confidence is "self-respect"-the knowledge " ••• 
that he is right as a person, right in his characteristic 
manner of acting-that he is good. n23 These two conditions 
constitute a healthy self-esteem, which " ••• entails and 
requires cognitive self-assertiveness, which is expressed 
20charles Silberman, Crisis in the Classroom (New 
York: Random House, 1970), p. 134. 
21Nathaniel Branden, "Self-Esteem,n Part I, The Objec-
tivist, VI, No. 3 (March, 1967), 2. Italics in original. 
22Ibid. 23Ibid., p. ~-· Italics in original. 
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through the policy of thinking, of judging, and of governing 
action accordingly.n24 If the above conditions are opera-
tive, the~l the young child will experience a healthy and 
viable self-esteem. It must be emphasized, however, that a 
child's self-esteem remains, while he is young, delicate and 
fragile; therefore capable of either grm-lth or suffocation 
contingent upon what the child estimates the state of real-
ity to be. At a young age, this estimate is largely deter-
mined by what the child observes in his limited environment: 
the home and the school. If a child, for example, discovers 
the world to be hostile, contradictory and oppressive, 
Branden warns that, n ••• after a number of unsuccess.ful 
attempts to understand their [irrational adults] policies 
and behavior, the child gives up-and takes the blame. n25 
The result is .fear, a fear often reinforced by both home 
and school. Branden continues, 
In the life of a young child, a certain amount o.f .fear 
is to be expected, since the child knows so little and 
the world around him is unfamiliar and strange. Nor-
mally and healthily, with the growth of his knowledge 
and abilities, these fears are overcome and left behind, 
so that, with the transition to adulthood, fewer and 
fewer things have the power to invoke fear in him. The 
extent to which a child follows this course to .full 
maturity, depen~g on the policy he adopts for dealing 
with his fears. 
In this connection, Objectivism argues that modern schooling, 
24Nathaniel Branden, "Self-Esteem," Part II, The 
Objectivist, IV, No. 4 (April, 1967), 6. Italics in-original. 
25Ibid., Part I, p. 5. 11y brackets. Italics in 
original.--
26~., Part II, p. 8. 
instead or showing the child how to deal with his rears, 
reinrorces them through irrational behavior. For example, 
when youn~ children (individual children) are £creed to 
conrorm to group standards, live in constant rear or supply-
ing the wrong answer, and are never quite sure v.rha t the 
teacher "wants," then selr-esteem becomes impaired and 
learning ceases. Children so victimized o.f'ten become sullen 
or hostile, attempting to strike out at a world they never 
made and cannot control. As we shall have occasion to note 
later, they grow into the "hippies" who drop out in a bewil-
dering stupor or drug addiction. Their pathetic state 
represents to a large degree the railure or education to 
help them develop selr-esteem. Signiricantly, they-j.n 
both dress and action--seem to derive perverse pleasure in 
self-degradation. 
Sadly, in the school establishment today, the teacher 
orten acts as the agent for destruction of sel.f'-esteem, and 
cognitive assertiveness. For example both Holt and Silber-
man27 report instances in which teacher action generated a 
lack of self-esteem in students. The follm.ring, .f'rom Crisis 
in the Classroom, is typical: 
ITEM: A fourth-grade math teacher vlri tes a hali'-dozen 
problems on the board for the class to do. "I think I 
can pick at least rour children Hho cantt do them," she 
tells the class, and proceeds to call .f'our youngsters 
to tho board to demonstrate, .f'or all to see, how correct 
the teacher's judgment is. Needless to say, the children 
27For adc1i tional examples, see: Silberman, Crisis in 
_the Classroom, Chapter IV, and Holt, HovT Children Pail, 
Part II. 
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fulfill the prophecy.28 
such activity negates the virtues needed for a healthy self-
esteem: rationality, independenc~, pride, and productive-
ness. 
Independence means that one is solely responsible for 
his own thinking, and cannot allow anyone to assume that 
task. But, when one is forced to abrogate this responsi-
bility, self-esteem suffers. Teachers such as the one 
Silberman d·7Scribes above seem to take a strange pride in 
destroying self-esteem. Holt notes how they destroy self-
esteem and independence by using the learner's self'-image 
destructively: 
Note the danger of using a child's concept of himself' 
to get him to do good work. We say "You are the kind 
of sensible, smart, good, etc., etc. boy or girl who 
can easily do this problem if you try." But if the 
work fails, so does the concept. If he can't do the 
problem, no matter how hard he tries, then, clearly, 
he is not sensible, smart or good.29 
The learner soon equates the fear of failure with his own 
self-concept, and tragically grows to hate learning itself. 
Forming the mental equation, learning = failure = lack of 
self-esteem, the learner, to preserve self-esteem as best 
he can and wishing not to be called "stupid" rejects learn-
ing. Branden identifies the nature of the error when he 
notes: 
If, in spite of his best efforts, a man f'ails in a par-
ticular undertaking, he does not experience the same 
--
28silberman, Crisis in the Classroom, p. 139. 
29nol t, How Children Fail, pp. 4-3-ltlt• 
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emotion oE pride that he would Eeel iE he had succeeded; 
but, if he is rational, his self-esteem is unaffected 
and unimpaired. His selr-6steem J.S not..::Or should not 
be--dependent on particular successes or failures, since 
these are not necessarJ.ly J.n a man's direct, 30olitional control and/or not in his exclusive control. 
The concept of control is essential. At a young age, when 
the learner is struggling to master a given problem and 
fails to do so, his lack of intellectual maturity causes 
him to equate failure in one specific area {i.e. not know-
ing that 8 + 2 = 10) with lack of self-esteem. At such 
times, the teacher must assume the responsibility of con-
vincing him that failure in one area ought not to diminish 
his self-worth. But, as Holt observes, teachers not only 
fail to provide such assurances, but rather reinforce the 
child's sense of his own self-degradation. 
Such is the result of a scho-ol system which rewards 
the ability to memorize often unrelated data. In The 
~nny of Testing Banesh Hofrman observes that the common 
multiple choice {guess) test reinforces the need to memor-
ize answers, 1-rhile penalizing brighter students: 
It is obvious from the nature of the tests [multiple 
choice] that they do not give the candidate a signifi-
cant opportlmity to express himself. I£ he is subtle 
in his choice of answers it will go against him; and 
yet there is no other '\-vay for him to shovr any individ-
uality. If he is strong-minded, non-conformist, unu-
sual, original, or creative ••• he must stifle his 
impulses and conform. • • • The more profoundly gifted 
the candidate is, the more his resentment v-rill rise 
against the mental st:rrit jacket into which the testers 
would force his mind.J 
3°Nathaniel Branden, 11 Self-Esteem, 11 Part III, The 
Objectivist, VI, No. 5 (May, 1967), 10. Italics in original. 
. 31Banesh Hoffman, The Tyranny o_f_ _rpes.!_;ing (Nou York: 
CollJ.or Books, 1962), pp. 91-92. Hy br·acl~ets. 
146 
Again we may observe the common theme-s-lack of respect for 
the individual's ability, conformity--which Rand decries in 
contemporary education. Such tes~in8 practices do little 
to allow brighter, more sophisticated students to function 
at maximum efficiency. Rather, they cater to those who 
equate memorization with understanding and guessing with 
sustained understanding of concepts. Self-esteem and its 
corollaries pride and productiveness suffer. 
The ·1irtue of pride bears an important relationship 
to self-esteem as Nathaniel Branden observes: 
Self-esteem pertains to a man's convictions of his 
fundamental efficacy and worth. Pride pertains to the 
pleasure a man takes in himself on the basis of and in 
response to specific achievements or actions •••• 
Self-esteem ls 0 I can, 11 .Pride is 11 I have. 11 3~ 
Productiveness is likewise essential: 
The scope of a person's productive ambition reflects, 
not only the range of his intelligence, but, most 
crucially, the degree of his self-esteem. The higher 
the level of a man's self-esteem, the higher the goals 
he sets for himself and the more demanding the challenge 
he tends to seek.33 
Educators have noted the profound sense of pleasure experi-
enced by a student 1.vho, on his own, has accomplished a dif-
ficult task or solved a significant (to him) problem. But 
pride and productiveness are destroyed lvhen the child is 
denied the atmosphere conducive to the development of self-
esteem upon which pride and productiveness are contingent. 
32Branden, 11 Self-Esteem, 11 Part III, p. 9. Italics 
in original. 
33Nathaniel Branden, "Self-Esteem," Part IV, The 
.Qbjectivist. VI, No.6 (,June, 1967), 3. 
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As mentioned above, many children dislike school, and perhaps 
one reason why they do rests with the inability of adults 
to recognize that all children crave an ordered environmen~ 
in which they, as individuals, can develop their own cogni-
tive powers. As we shall see, Rand admires Hontessori for 
the latter's scaling the environment to children's capabil-
ities, and for allowing them to pursue problem-solving on 
their m-1n. 
Educators have long argued that the school ought not 
to exist apart from life, but integral to it. College stu-
dents or adults who drop out of society have never learned 
to cope vrith life's challenges as individuals. Thus, in 
recent years, communes have become popular. The schools 
must assume the responsibility for failing to prepare chil-
dren to function in life as independent agents. More will 
be said concerning Randts position regarding what the school 
can do to foster self-esteem in the next chapter. 
The Roles of Reason and Emotion 
in Childhood Growth 
To insure healthy self-esteem, educators must not 
only break free :from the inimical effects of' ine.ffective 
teaching but (on the positive side) must cultivate rational 
development of the child so that he will be competent to 
survive as a man. Rand sees schooling engul.fed in a quag-
mire of emotionalism which retards rational development. 
The decline o.f the intellect as a signii'icant factor 
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in education may be traced to the inrluence or Rousseau. 
Decrying the corruptive influence or man-made society, 
Rousseau suggests that the child be raised apart from it, 
according to the dictates of nature. Bluntly advocating 
that education ignore cognitive growth, Rousseau--through 
the persona or the tutor to Emile--never really teaches 
Emile to read, suggesting he will learn when interested. 
Rousseau argues ror the primacy of instincts and emotions 
as the only significant vehicles capable of producing an 
educated (natural) man. Condemning this influence as hav-
ing infectious consequences ror education, William J. 
McGucken, S.J. argues: 
Back of every change will be found a man and a theory. 
Many of the significant innovations in American schools 
are derived from Jean Jacques Rousseau •••• The cult 
of sentimentalism and utilitarianism in American edu-
cation is due in large part to Rousseau's Emile ••• 
which has become the Koran of the American school with 
its cry of "back to nature. 11 The child is to be allowed 
to develop according to nature. Common sense indicates 
that the logical following of this maxim would lead to 
savagery ••• John Dewey, with his theory of freedom 
and his abhorrence of discipline, is a direct inheritor 
of the Rousseau tradition.3~ 
Rand too terms such educational philosophy "savage." As 
we have noted, she believes that reason is man's only means 
for survival; so to attempt to deliver the concept to 
instinct and emotions courts disaster. Harning that emotions 
are not cognitive operators, Branden comments: 
Hhat one feels in regard to any fact or issue is irrele-
vant to the question of whether one's judgment of it is 
34Hilliam HcGucken, S.J., The Catholic Hay in Educa-
tion (Chicago: Loyola University"'P'ress, 1962), pp. 6-7. 
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true or ralse, right or wrong. It is not b~ means of 
one's reelings that one perceives reality.3~ 
Rand notes that the educat5ve process raises a false 
dichotomy between reason and emotion very early in the 
child's lire. She observes or the young learner: 
His rationality is turned against him by means or a 
.•• dichotomy: reason versus emotion. His Romantic 
sense or lire is only a sense, an incoherent emotion • 
• • • It is an intense, yet fragile emotion, painfully 
vulnerable to any sarcastic allegation .••• vlhile the 
child is thus driven to rear, mistrust and repress his 
own emotions, he cannot avoid observing the hysterical 
violence of the adults' emotions unleashed against him • 
• • • He concludes, subconsciously, that all emotions as 
such are dangerous, that they are the irrat~onal, un-
predictably destructive element in peopGe' which can 
descend upon him at any moment •••• j 
The moral damage is great. At a young age a child does not 
yet understand that value judgments are contingent upon 
rational processes. Rather he s.ees hi.s likes and dislikes 
solely in terms of emotional stimuli. When, thererore, a 
child represses emotions, he soon concludes that making 
value judgments is likewise inimical to survival and con-
sequently, he never implements an important principle of 
Objectivist ethics: pronouncing moral judgments. As we 
have noted earlier, such pronouncements serve as the founda-
tion of the virtue of justice. 
When tho proper relationship between emotions and 
35nathaniel Branden, "Intellectual Ammunition 
Department," 'rho ObJectivist Newsletter, I, No. 1 (January, 
1962), 3. Italics ln original. 
36nand, "Art and Horal 'Ereason, 11 pp. 113-15. Italics 
in original. Por additional comments regarding the need 
for a remolding of formal education along rational lines 
see: Robert Hutchins, The Higher Learninc in America (NeH 
Haven: Yale University"Press, r)68), p. 65. 
I' 
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reason is not taught, educational standards decline since 
educators are either a.fraid or incapable o.f judging.37 I.f 
quality education cannot exist without standards, then 
standards themselves cannot exist unless someone capable o.f 
judging judges. Yet, warns Rand, by either ignoring the 
distinction between reason and emotion or construing reason 
inferior to emotion, educators destroy the child's potential 
to develop as a moral being and sacri.fice standards .for 
whims. 
The standards Objectivism seeks, of course, are 
those intellectual virtues outlined in chapter three. 
Another way of describing the importance o.f reason as the 
means o.f .fostering and maintaining educational standards 
is to speak in terms of the need .for objective .first prin-
ciples which, as we have noted, Rand requires in any moral 
operation. 
We shall conclude this section with additional com-
ments regarding the e.f.fects o.f .fear on young learners. The 
psychological and philosophical consequences are enormous, 
in producing what Objectivists call social metaph¥sical 
~' meaning that what a given group, society or mob demas 
37\,Jri ting in this connection Harry s. Broudy observes: 
"Quality education ·Hithout standards is a meaningless and 
mischievous notion. SomeHhere the standards o.f truth, good-
ness, and beauty must be made explicit .••• Such norms 
are available in the living tradition or each or the great 
domains or 1mowledge and the arts, and the school can be 
judged in terms or quality i.f these standards are accepted 
and used." Soe: The Real Horld o.f the Public Schools (NeH 
York: Harcourt Brace, and Jovanovich, -Inc., 197"Z),Pp. BL~-8;>. 
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true be true, regardless of' the i'acts of' reality. 
Termed by Branden as "a parasitism of' consciousness," 
social metaphysical i'ear " • • • consists of' rebelling 
against the responsibility of' rational judgment, of' resent-
ing the 'burden' of' cognitive seli'-reliance of' seeking to 
exist as a parasite on the consciousness of' others.n38 
Refusing to think and always living in :rear of' what someone 
will say or how they will react to independent thought 
i'irst develops in an educational con~ext. Rand describes 
the epistemological consequences: 
They tgraduates of' Progressive schools] are expected to 
acquire some sort of' i'ormal knowledge, to pass exams, to 
achieve acceptable grades, i.e., to comply with some 
minimal i'actual norms--but, to them, it is a metaphysi-
cal betrayal. Facts are what they have been trained to 
ignore; i'acts cannot be learned by the kind of' mental 
processes they have automatized: by an animal-like 
method of' catching the emotional cues emitted by the 
pack. The pack is still there, but it cannot help them 
at examination time--which they have to i'ace in a state 
they have been taught to regard as evil: alone.39 
Thus the epistemological contradiction in Progressive edu-
cation is that although it demands i'idelity to group norms 
(and thus presents a metaphysically i'alse reality), the 
child--as an individual--will eventually have to i'unction 
on his oHn: alone. iihen that time arrives, however, he 
Hill be incapable of' any independent cognitive operations. 
Rather, the student will begin a desperate search i'or some-
one to tell him what to do; how to think. This is the real 
38Na thaniel Branden, 11 Social Jv1ctaphysical Fear, 11 The 
Objectivist Newsletter, III, No. 7 (July, 1964), 27. 
39nand, "The Comprachicos, 11 p. 177. My brackets. 
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evil of Progressive education as Rand sees it. If the child 
is prevented from thinking, then the man is left incapable 
of independent rational judgment not only of his own worth, 
but also of the world about hL~. One cannot function 
rationally while chronically fearful. 
Fear of course has many manifestations, not the least 
of which is hate and a desire to destroy. Rand argues 
therefore that the graduate of' a Progressive elementary 
school is the college student anarchist of tomorrow. It is 
to the problem of student violence that we now turn. 
Student Violence 
Perhaps the most horrifying and dangerous spectacle 
American education has had to endure in the last decade 
concerns attempts by so-called "protestors" or "idealistic" 
students to subvert the f'or.mal educative process by engag-
ing in violence and brutality. To Rand the causes of such 
activity emerge f'rom philosophical nihilism. To determine 
why, we shall discuss the student 11 protestn movement as 
viewed by Objectivism. 
Prior to 1964, Alllerican university lif'e bad been 
quiet, almost apathetic, but events were soon to change. 
In that year, students at Berkeley formed what they called 
the Free Speech l-1ovement and proceeded to present the uni-
versity Hith a list of "demands" regarding academic free-
dom. Specifically they objected to a university regulation 
forbidding the use of school property for of'f~can1pus polit-
153 
ical activity. Comments one observer: 
The Free Speech movement showed how the campus itsel~ 
might become a front line. Students nm-1 saw that what 
happens on campus could really matter politically, and 
that a local campus uprisfrBg could have national and 
international importance. ~ 
And that is the important lesson. The issues, as will be 
shown later, are not important. What does matter, however, 
is that students found a vehicle they could readily utilize 
to forward any given "demands. n Rand comments on the 
Berkeley rebellion, deploring how quickly and easily the 
administration surrendered to the students: 
To the astonishment of the naive • • • the more demands 
were granted, the more were made. As the administration 
intensified its efforts to appease the F.S.M., the F.S.M. 
intensified its provocations. The unrestricted freedom 
of speech took the form of' a "Filthy Language Hovement" 
which consisted of' students carrying placards with ~our­
letter words, and broadcjlsting obscenities over the 
University loudspeakers.41 
And \<Tilliam Peterson, Professor of' sociology at Berkeley, 
sunrmarizes what he considers the students' real purpose to 
be. He is quoted by Rand: 
The first fact one must know about the Free Speech 
Movement is that it has little or nothing to do vii th 
free speech. • • • If' not free speech, what then is 
the issue? In fact, preposterous as this JllAY seem, the 
real issue is the seizure of power. . • • ~ 
But perhaps the issue of' p01-1er may not be so preposterous 
if' the facts are examined. Tracing the evolution of the 
40.rerome H. Skolnick, The Politics of Protest (New 
York: Ballantine Books, 1969), p. 93. 
!~lAyn Rand, lt'I'he cashing-In: The Student I Rebellion I '" 
in The NeH Le.ft: The Anti -Industrial Revoluti_££, p. 1.5. 
~2willirun Peterson as quoted in "The Cashing-In: The 
Student 1RcbeJ.lion 1 , 11 Ibid., p. 17. 
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student activist movement reveals several phases. Follow-
ing the Berkeley incident and to about 1964, Civil Rights 
occupied student attention. As the war in Asia gathered 
impetus, anti-war protests grew, as well as "police/ 
university" brutality charges. Anti-war protests and 
demonstrations lasted until the 1970's, l-Then the ecology 
issue attracted attention. 
Such cause-jumping (from Civil Rights, to the war, 
to university affairs, to ecology) might be interpreted in 
terms of a means-ends continuum. It becomes very difficult 
to speak of these phases in terms of ends ror if the phases 
were ends, then the rapidity with which students switched 
allegiances should not have occurred. For example, many 
argue that the black man in America has yet to fully win 
the civil rights struggle, but today student involvement 
on a scale comparable to the 1960's is lacking. Why? 
Might the ans1-rer not rest with the fact that Negro leaders 
began taking their case to the courts rather than to the 
streets? It seems apparent that the various causes are 
only means, only devices which can be used to further the 
central aim which remains unchanged: the pursuit of power. 
The current lull in the student "protest" movement is 
really no lull at all. Since ecology is accepted by most 
citizens as a worthwhile goal, and since most states have 
taken legal measures via legislation to prevent corruption 
of the environment, students 1-1ere f'orced to look for another 
cause lvhich of' late escapes them. \·Then and if' it is f'otmd, 
r 
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however, we may well expect violence to reoccur. 
By way or example which will serve as a transition to 
an analysis or tactics, let us co11sider the case or a small 
university in the East attended by this writer in the mid-
1960's. In the month or November, 1968 the rollowing stu-
ent activity was witnessed: 
Nov. 5: Eight university students (including the student 
body president) were rom1d drinking in the offices of 
the school newspaper in direct violation of a school ban, 
ror which they were found guilty by the student court. 
Nov. 22: A "massive student demonstration" opposed the 
convictions. During the demonstration, various spokes-
men warned of "various methods of confrontation. 11 43 
Nov. 25: The President of the university reversed the 
student court, dismissing the charges in order " • • • 
to set an example of charity, hoping that others will 
imitate it."44 
Although the incident received little publicity except in 
the local press and police intervention on a massive scale 
was not needed, the events reveal the tactics of those 
seeking power. The following five steps may be discerned, 
characterizing this and most student protests: 
1. An incident (real or conjured) is student sparked; 
the university is accused or violating student 
rights. 
2. The University responds with appropriate action or 
does nothing. --
3. Regardless, outraged students scream "repression 11 
and "police bl~utalitytt (i.f the latter are involved); 
they demand that their rights be respected, or 
aggrAssivo means might be utilized. 
4. '1.1he university surrenders. 
5. Students thon press for greater freedom and rev-Ter 
43"u of S Violators Receive 'Break'," The Scranton 
Times, November 25, 1968, 3. 
411-Ibid. 
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university controls.45 
The toll such activities take on American formal education 
is tragic •. Between 1969 and 1970 alone, about 1000 demon-
strations involving over 200 colleges, with property damage 
' 
l. in the millions of dollars, were witnessed by the American 
r ! people.46 The time lost to serious students, those devoted 
' 
to acquiring an education, can never be redeemed. 
Ironically, many seem to be deceived or unable to 
recognize the true intent of violent students. Witness, 
for example, the testimony of an undercover agent who joined 
the SDS (Students for a Democratic Society) and won the 
confidence of the Black Panthers: 
I stayed in a mountain cabin with Hark Rudd and other 
SDS leaders. The emphasis was on fiery revolution, on 
the necessity of ambushing "pigs," \_policemen] of bomb-
ing government building·s, of violence for its own sake. 
45students of Hitler's rise to power will recognize 
how successfully the Fuhrer used these same tactics to get 
pm·Jer. In the definitive biography of' Hitler, autho1 .. Alan 
Bullock comments: "One of Hitler's most habitual devices 
was to place himself' on the def'ensive, to accuse those who 
opposed or obstructed him of' aggression and malice, and to 
pass rapidly f'rom a tone of outraged innocence to the f'ull 
thunders of' moral indignation. It was always the other sido 
who v-rere to blame. • • • " See: Hitler, A ~~tud~- in Tyranny 
(New York: Har>per Torchbooks, 1964), p. 376, A olf Hitler>, 
Me in Kampf (Boston: Houghton-1'-Iiff'lin Co., 19It.3), passim., 
and Norman Hill, (ed.), The Black Panther 1-1enace: America's 
Neo-l'raz.is (NeH York: Popular Library, 19{T), pa~~aim. 'l'he -
essence of' the comparison is also stated by Jerry Dolln 
Femina: "There's very little dif'f'erence botHcen tho SDS 
punks Hho foment revolution in college and the Hitler Youth. 
Both Here f'ighting f'or poHer f'rom the establishment .••• 
You have the power they Hant. You are the establinhmont 
they want to overthrow." See: "The Lost Generation," 
Hal~koting/Corrrrnunications, CCXCVII (June, 1969), 32. 
46 11 \-,'ha t' s Going On Inside America, 11 U.s. Nmvn nnd 
\vorld Repor·t, LXVIII (Nay, 1970), 18. 
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Hard drugs and wild sexual orgies were stressed as impor~ 
tant because they
4
.serve to break down any links with the 
"straight" world. 7 
Apparently, the radical lert does not hesitate to employ 
whatever means they deem appropriate to achieve power. Since 
any government in its right mind has a legal and moral man-
date to curb violence threatening the prevailing social 
order and usually does so via the police, the latter have 
become the targets or unbelievable vilirication and hate. 
Between 1962 and 1972 the number of police orricers killed 
in the line or duty rose from 48 to 126. In December, 1962 
alone, thirteen policemen were murdered while attempting to 
perform their duty.48 
Attacks on policemen rorm a significant part or the 
tactics used by student revolutionaries ror they know that 
one way to destroy a rree society is to render lavT enrorce-
ment ineffective. Rev. Theodore Hesburgh, one of the few 
university Presidents courageous enough to confront stu-
dent violence, defines the tactic. After describing how 
students first find a cause and then use it to provoke a 
crisis, he continues: 
Once this has occurred--justified or not, orderly or 
not-yell, 11 Police brutality! 11 If' it does not happen, 
provoke it by foul language, physical abuse, whatever, 
and then count on a larger measure of' synpathy .from the 
up-to-noH apathetic or passive members oi"' the community • 
• • • Hust universities be subjected, willy-nilly, to 
47T. Ed1-1ard Hosher, "Inside the Revolutionary Le.ft, 11 
~~~.!''s Digest, IC (September, 1971), 53-5'7. My brackets. 
48 nA Ne1·J Drive Against Killers o.f Police," u.s. NeHs 
and 'tofor1d Repo1~t, LXXIV (January, 1973), 26-27. 
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such intimidation and victimization? ••• 49 
Often the naive are fooled and indeed extend sympathy, the 
classic case perhaps being those who accused the Chicago 
Police of rrbrutality" at the 1968 Democratic Convention. 
Neglecting the fact that officers 1.vere assaulted with rocks, 
bricks, bottles, chunks of asphalt, lye, balls studded with 
spikes and even human excrement, members of the community 
and the press played into the hands of the "demonstratorsu 
by blaming the police.5° 
The students who demand no police intervention in 
university affairs fail to comprehend a serious flaw ~ 
their reasoning. Usually the radicals attempt to justify 
violence by pointing out that the university must be jolted 
out of its apathy and assume responsibility for correcting 
social and political abuses in the community. This of 
course implies a bond between the two, but when they reject 
community intervention on campus (even to abort a serious 
threat to life and property), they sever the bond, implying 
that the university ought to exist as an isolated unit, 
apart from the community. Either the university is an 
integral part of the community or not. When students sup-
port the former position, then logically they ought to 
h9 11Dealing with Campus Chaos,u U.S. N'ews and Horld 
Report, LXVI (Harch, 1969), 34. -
50F01"' accounts of' Chicago, 1968 which report injuries 
sui'fered by police and identify radical ta'C:tics see: Alan 
Stang, 11 Democrats, 11 American Opinion, XI {October, 1968), 
1-0, and P. J. Emerson, (ed.), Crisis in ~licago: 1968 
(New York: Bee Line Books, 1968), passha. 
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recognize that su.ch a bond implies community involvement. 
Rand maintains, o~ course, that civil authority be 
allowed to intervene regardless o~ the university's rela-
tionship to the cornnunity as de~ined by students, i~ its 
existence poses a threat to public order. The ethical issue 
involved is that no organization be allowed to employ the 
aggressive use o~ ~orce to solve any social problem-espe-
cially in a rree society. 
A ~ew educators have recognized that moral principle 
and enrorced it. Among them, s. I. Hayakawa and Father 
Herburgh have exhibited exceptional courage. The latter, 
President o~ Notre Dame University, had taken one or the 
strongest stands against campus violence. His directive 
to raculty and students is there~ore worthy or extended 
citation: 
Anyone or any group that substitutes rorce ~or rational 
persuasion--be it violent or nonviolent--will be given 
15 minutes of meditation to cease and desist. 
They will be told that they are, by their actions, 
going cotmter to the overHhelming conviction of this 
community as to what is proper here. If they do not 
within that time period cease and desist, they will be 
asked for their identity cards. 
Those who produce these will be suspended rrom this 
CO!lh'nuni ty as not nnderstanding what this comrrnmi ty is. 
Those who db not have or will not produce identity cards 
Hill be assumed not to be members or this community and 
will be charged v-Jith trespassing and disturbing the 
peace on private property and treated according to the 
lalv. • • • 
A~tor notification of suspension or trespass in the 
case o.f noncommunity members, if there is not then within 
five minutes a movement to cease and desist, students 
will be notified of expulsion from this community, and 
the lal-v will deal with them as nonstudents. • • • 
Thoro seems to be a current myth that tmiversity 
members a1~e not responsible to the lau, and that some-
how the law is the enem.y-pai>ticularly those l-vhom society 
has constituted to uphold and enforce tho law. I would 
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like to insist here that all o:r us are responsible to 
the duly constituted laws of' this university community 
and to all the laws o:r the land. There is no other 
guarantee of' civilization versus the jungle or mob rule, 
here or elsewhere. 
r:r someone invades your home, do you dialogue with 
him or call the law? 
Without the law, the university is a sitting duck 
:Cor any small group f'rom outside or inside that wishes 
to de§troy it, to incapacitate it, to terrorize it at 
whim.;,l 
Several important themes emerge :rrom this statement, with 
which Rand would agree: (1) the aggressive use of' :Coree is 
morally wrong, (2) man is man because he has law, without 
which he becomes an animal, (3) one cannot appease brute 
:Coree, and (4) the imposing by :Coree of' a minority's view-
point on the majority constitutes tyranny. The signif'icant 
point of' agreement, however is that both recognize that a 
rational man does not need f'orce to live as a man. Thus 
the issue is ultimately philosophical, speci:Cically epis-
temological in that the mind is man's only tool f'or sur-
vival; ethical in that the aggressive use o£ f'orce is wrong, 
and metaphysical in that whims and desires f'or p01.vor cannot 
reshape reality. Rand connnents on Father Hosburgh 1 s deci-
sion: 
This, of' course, is the stand-and tho !?nly morally per-
missible stand-that a civilized person ::.-mst take in the 
present college crisis. (And more: this is tho stand 
to take in any issue and against sny group that initiates 
the use of' force. One does not "negotiate" with brutal-
ity, nor give it the benefit o:r the doubt •••• ) 
Father' Hesburgh's was the f'il"st voice ot: reason, dignity, 
and moral courage. • • • Observe that contompol'El.I'Y 
events are slowly bringing men·' s minds to tho nccoptance 
of an abstract principle which Objectivism haa beon 
~1 . 
:.J 11 DoalJ.ng with Campus Chaos," u.s. Hows nnd Horld 
Beport, p. 3L+·• 
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advocating ror many ~~ars: the moral supremacy or reason 
over physical force.~ 
cries of alleged repression and violation of rights do not 
justify the aggressive use of force by any member of the 
university community. Only in a rationally moral atmosphere 
can the university function as an institution dedicated to 
the pursuit of truth and knowledge. 
A justification often cited by students ror their 
conduct centers on the charge that they are rarely given 
the opportunity to articulate their own views. If we pay 
tuition, then we have the right to be heard, they argue. 
Several errors, however, exist in their thinking. First 
of all, students tend to conruse articulation with compli-
ance. There can be little doubt but that students are 
heard. 'trJhat they really seek, however, is instant imple-
mentation or stated demands. To equate the articulation 
of a position with its implementation is absurd and illogi-
cal. Indeed, such rerlects serious doubts as to the admin-
istrative ability of those students claiming the right to 
rormulate policy. Secondly, when demanding the right to 
formulate policy, students rest their case on the erroneous 
assumption that the university is a political institution.53 
52Ayn Rand, 11Brief Cormnents," The Objectivist, VIII, 
No. 3 (11arch, 1969), 1-2. Italics in orJ.gJ.nal. 
53In this connection Robert Hutchins connnents: 
11 
••• one shudders to note that every citizen entertains 
the conviction that he is an educational export of the most 
nigni.ficant variety." See: The Higher Lear;ninc in America 
(Ne\<-1 Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p:;--2o. 
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students who seek a four year college education at least 
tacitly admit that they lack the necessary intellectual 
sophistication for survival in society. If this be the 
case, then by what rule of reason or logic can they possibly 
equate their competence with that of experienced faculty or 
administrators? 
As long as students act as civilized human beings 
who are willing to learn and abide by university regulations, 
then they have the right to pursue the degree, but that 
right can and should be revoked if reasoned debate gives 
place to unreasonable demands and violent activity. Free-
dom to govern one's life and especially the lives or others 
cannot be granted by any administration unless the individ-
uals involved first prove they are mature and responsible 
enough to do so. One way to do this might be to devote 
serious attention to their course work. 
Ayn Rand observes that the SDS radicals of today 
were the graduates or Progressive schools when children. 
lVhile there, they learned that values are subjective and 
contingent only on immediate circlrrastances surrounding a 
given problem, that one should never judge, and that all 
one need do to solve a problem is implement whatever meru1s 
deemed appropriate. She notes: 
••• they went obediently along every step or the way, 
never challenging the basic premises inculcated in the 
Progl~ossive nursery schools. Thoy act in paclw, -vrl. th 
tho will or the pack as their only guide. The scramble 
for power amone the pack leaders and among difforont 
packs doos not make them question their premises: they 
are incapable or questioning anything. So they cling to 
tho belief that mankind can be united into one happily, 
163 
harmoniously unanimous pack--by rorce. Brute, physical 
rorce is, to them, a natural rorm or action. Philosophi-
cally, it is clear that when men abandon reason, physical 
rorce becomes their only means or dealing with one 
another and or settling disagreements. The activists 
are the living demonstration or this principle. 
The activists' claim that they have no way or "attract-
ing attention 11 to their demands and or getting what they 
want except by rorce--violent demonstrations, obstruction 
and destruction-is a pure throwback to the Progressive 
nursery school, where a tantrum was the only thing 
required to achieve their wishes. Their hysterical 
screaming stilJ,. cai•ries a touch or pouting astonishment 
at a world that does not respond to an absolute such as: 
"I want it!" The three-y~flr-old whim-worshiper becomes 
the""Twenty-year old thug.:::>L+ 
This is 1-rhy Rand entitles her article on student violence 
"The Cashing-In. . . . " Educators, she reels, are reaping 
the whirlwind or their own doctrines, with students merely 
"cashing-in" what they were taught as children. From the 
very second an objective code or ethics is denied, then 
literally anything goes. 
Violent student conduct and crime in America in 
general proves Rand's mfu~date that a rational code or moral-
ity is urgently needed ir America wishes to survive. Writes 
Rand: "Ir the universities-the supposed citadels or rea-
son, knowledge, scholarship, civilization-can be made to 
surrender to the rule or brute rorce, the rest or the coun-
try is cooked."55 
According to Objectivist ethics, one must "never rail 
54Rand, "The Comprachicos," pp. 199-200. Italics in 
original. 
55Rand, "The Cashing-In: The Student Rebellion, 11 
p. 39. 
I 
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.:!!.£ pronounce moral judgments."56 University administrators 
who fail to punish students who violently disrupt academic 
life are themselves guilty of moral cowardice. 
In concluding this section, it might be wise to pon-
der the words of realist philosopher, Harry s. Broudy: 
All are against cruelty, pain and domination by others, 
but some of them [students] do not mind, on occasion, 
lacerating the hearts of their parents, the scalps of 
the cops, and t9e feelings of those not yet on the road 
to liberation • .? 
The students, and fortunately they are a minority, who con-
sider violent tactics as moral means to achieve their goals 
should remember that they must afford the same respect .for 
the rights and opinions of others that they wish for them-
selves. 
The final section of this chapter will consider the 
eff'ects of' the "welf'are state" influence on American school-
ing. 
The 1velf'are State Hentali ty of' Formal Education 
Earlier chapters have suggested that as an advocate 
of' laissez-f'aire Capitalism, Rand rejects the concept of 
positive government, specif'ically socialism. Morally, she 
argues that the welf'are state negates the Objectivist prin-
ciple that the aggressive use of force is always Hrong, 
f'or once postulated a producer must provide money and/or 
services for the unearned benefit of others~ Rand relates 
57 Broudy" The Real vJorld of the Public Schools, 
p. 7L~. r~ry bracke s. 
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the issue to Objectivist ethics in Atlas Shrugged: 
There it was: the punishment that required the victim's 
own vi~tue as the ruel to make it work •••• Such was 
the code that the world had accepted and such was the 
key to the code: that it hooked man's love or existence 
to a circuit of torture ••• so that the virtues which 
made life possible and the values which gave it meaning 
became the agents or its destruction, so that one's best 
became the tool of one's agony .••• The need of some 
men is the knife or a guillotine hanging over others--
that all of us must live 1-Ji th our work ••• at the 
mercy of the moment Hhen that lmi.fe will descend upon 
us • • • that need, not achievement, is the source or 
rights, that we don't have to produce, only to want, 
that ~he earned does not belong to us, but the unearned 
does./tl 
Hence, the more one values the virtue or productivity, the 
more he will incur punishment insorar as those in needwill 
have more to claim. Rand does not regard need as the basis 
for rights, but insists rather that achievement be the 
standard; that one be allowed to keep what he rationally 
and honestly earns. 
The concept "right" is important here, and must be 
defined. According to Objectivist ethics a right is 
••• a moral principle derining and sanctioning a mants 
freedom o:f action in a social context. There is only 
one fundM1ental right ••• a man's right to his own 
life • • • for every individual, a right is the moral 
sanction of a positive--of his rreedom to act on his own 
judgment, for his ovm goals, by his own voluntar~, 
uncoerced choice. As to his neighbors, his rignts 
l.!llpose no obligation on them except of a negative kind: 
to abstain from violating his rights .. ::8 
For Objectivists, the concept or a welfare state directly 
58Rand, Atlas Shrugged, pp. 526, 540. 
59Ayn Rand, "Nan's Rights, 11 in The Virtue o:f Selrish-
ness (Nm·T York: The Ne't-I American Library, S~gnet Presc, 
~), pp. 93-9!~. Italics in original. 
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violates the rights of producers since choice becomes invol-
untary and coerced. The implications ror education are 
significant and will now be discussed. 
In its economic manirestation, the welfare state is 
familiar to most Americans, but its errects on other areas 
(including education) have not been rully recognized. 
Jacques Barzun comments: 
••• the university is the last outpost or help, like 
the government or a wel.fare statE:.·. Hhatever the indi-
vidual and the society cannot do .for themselves is 
intrusted to the likeliest existing agency. Faith in 
education and faith in the integrity and good vlill o.f 
those called educators have accordingly wished upon the 
mid-century univer•si ty a varig5Y or tasks .formerly done 
by others or not done at all. 
Recent developments suggest that the university in its role 
o.f "welfare state" may be sur.fering under the weight o:f 
increasing demands such as having to provide hotel, restau-
rant, employment services, and psychological rehabilitation 
etc. There are two vJays in which this influence has af:fected 
American education: governmental intervention and student 
attitudes. 
Three .forms of governmental intervention which Objec-
tivists dislike as violating someone's rights are: the 
maintenance of tax supported schools, busing, and the 
alleged quota system regarding faculty hiring and admission 
policies. 
In American educational history, the belief that all 
citizens have a right to a :formal education supported by 
60J h . . . t ( y 1 acque s Barzun, T e Amerlcan Unl versl Y. New orr: 
Harper and RoH, 1968), p. 10. 
the state may be traced to the proponents or the common 
school: Horace Mann and Henry Barnard. 6l Arguing ror the 
essentia:ity or informed moral citizens as necessary condi-
tiona £or the survival or democracy, Mann called £or the 
establishing or common {elementary) schools. In so doing 
he appealed to various vested interests: organized religion, 
business and industry, workers etc., promising each their 
own utopia ir they would only support public education. 
Mann's errorts created a panacea-like atmosphere in 
i'ormal education l-Thich has prevailed to the present. Be it 
problems of' race, drugs, crime or health, Americans look to 
their schools as the agencies responsible for and capable 
oi' correcting them. In the present century, as noted above, 
the university has inherited this tradition and is therei'ore 
expected to solve the problems of' community and government. 
Rand believes that the trend toward weli'are statism 
in education poses a serious threat to quality. Arguing 
that the state has no legal right (or moral commandment) 
to set up and maintain, through public i'unds, a school 
system, her (then) associate Nathaniel Branden asks: 
Should the government be permitted to remove children 
i'orcibly i'rom their homes, with or without the parents' 
consent, a~d subject the children to educational train-
ing and procedures of' which the parents may or may not 
a.pprove? Should citizens have their wealth expropriated 
to support an educational system which they may or may 
not sanction, and to pay f'or the education of' children 
61Gorald Gutek, An Historical Introduction to 
American Education (Nelv York: Thomas Y. Crmvell Co., 
1970), pp. 49-53. 
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who are not their m·m?62 
such a policy he maintains is consistent only with Nazi or 
communist states in which education was and is regulated by 
the authorities .for the purpose o.f promulgating political 
doctrine. Why state control invites danger is explained in 
three reasons: 
(a) most parents are e.f.fectively compelled to send their 
children to State schools and cannot a.f.ford to pay the 
additional .fees required to send their children to pri-
vate schools; (b) the standard.s oi' education, controlling 
all schools are prescribed by the state; (c) the growing 
trend in /unerican education is .for the government to 
exert w~der and wider control over every aspect o.f edu-
cation. 3 
As will be argued in the next chapter, one reason Objectiv-
ists i'avor tax credits is that they allow parents to send 
children to schools oi' their own choosing. Regarding con-
trol, the danger seen by Rand is that in the past, when a 
government assumed control o.f the educational establish-
ment, it sooner or ·later began to prescribe curricula. 
For example, the law denying the teaching o.f evolution in 
Tennessee was not declared unconstitutional until 1968. 
-
The i'amous Scopes ·trial, however, had occurred in 1925. 
Point (c) .above has come true today, believes Rand, 
in the form o.f compulsory busing to achieve racial inte-
gration. Objectivists reject Duch o.fficial encroachment 
as being unethical and inimical to educational quality. 
62Nathaniel Branden, "Intellectual Ammunition Depart-
ment," .The Objectivist HeviSlettor, II, No. 6 (June, 1963), 
22. 
63Ibid. Italicis in original. 
-
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To determine why, we must brie~ly examine the government's 
role in American education in recent years, with regard to 
equal opportunity. 
In 1954, the United States Supreme Court, in "Brovm 
v. the Board of' Education o~ Topeka," struck down the doc-
trine of' 'separate but equal.' Ten years later the Civil 
Rights Act authorized the Commissioner o~ Education 
••• upon the application o~ any school board, State, 
municipality, school district, or other governmental 
unit legally responsible for operating a public school 
or schools, to render technical assistance to such 
applicant in the preparation, adoption, and implementa64. tion of plans f'or the desegregation of' public schools. 
Initiative here obviously rests with the schools; Title VII 
of' the Act, banning discrimination on the basis o~ race, 
color, creed, and national origin, did not apply to educa-
tional institutions. In 1972, the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunities Enrorcement Act amended Title VII to include 
schools (1dth the exception or religious corporations, 
i.e., seminaries etc.) and directed that 
[ir] the court finds that the respondent has engaged in 
or is engaging in an unlawf'ul employment practice char•ged 
in the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent 
f'rom engaging in such unlawrul employment practice, ~~d 
order g~ch af'f'irmative action as may be appropriate. 
. . . 
As ue shall see, the phrase "order such ~f'irmative action" 
64civil Rights Act or 196L1:, (2000 C-2), United States 
Code, Title 1.1.2-'I'he Pub lie Ileal th and 1velrare, 1X (Hashing-
ton, D.C.: The United States Government Printing orf'ice, 
1971), p. 10289. 
65r-rouse Resolution 17lL6. E 
ities l!.nf'orcement Act of 1972 (2) 
States Government Pr1nt1ng Office, 
ual ~nplo~ent Opportun-
\vashington: 'rhe United 
1972), p. 19, Hy brackets. 
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:::..s l;he key to subsequent legislation. Meanwhile, the Su-
-~ :-~''lito Court speeded the process of' school integration. On 
~-~t·t I. 20, 1971 in a nine to nothing decision, in "Swann v. 
:-:.:
1111
''-otte-Mecklenburg Board of' Education, N.C.," the high 
- :""1\ 
- -
11
' l; directed that "Local school authorities may properly 
-- "" 
- - ''nquired by a Federal District Court to employ bus trans-
tool of' school desegregation.u66 Other -= <'1\• t • - •1\t~on as a 
::"-'~''''nunended means of' enf'orcing desegregation included 
::"·:2'\l\\ lring school districts to prove their own innocence and 
!:: - t 0 \'ing school attendance zones. 
Since 1971, busing has become the principal means 
-=~:l -, lzed by the courts to enf'orce school desegregation. 
r ... ___ t 
-- ''-',~tivists argue that the busing problem results in a 
::::.=__ -:"1.. ~ ' 
- -···tre of' politics and government with serious eff'ects 
--, 
.:... -:- ~- ,~ducational quality. Ethically, Rand rejects the con-
C = .. , .. 
-_ ~ ·~ .. 
' 
of' busing on the grounds that it leads to quota sys-
(which will be discussed below) and promotes govern-
enf'orced racism: 
_,·~'Z: is true that the Federal government has used the 
·':-.:\cial issue to enlarge its own power and to set a prec-
'',~ent of encroachment upon the legitimate rights of' 
~:~ates,67 in an urillecessary and unconstitutional manner. 
---..,.,.-:.......... 
-----------------
c- -- 66uni ted States Suureme Court Reports, 11 Swann v. -:-.:~-- :'" ':otte'-Hocklenburt; Board of Educatron, 11 Lmry-er 's edition, 
;-::_-- ~~I (New York: The Lmry-ers Co-operative Publishing Co., 
- - ' ' , p. 560 • 
z-:: :::-_ ~- 67The Tenth Amendment to the F'ederal Constitution 
t.:-- -~ s that, 11 The po-vwrs not delegated to the United States 
""""'" -.,._ -:.e Constitution nor prohibited to it by the states, are ~ :- -~- -' '::-oved to the states respectively, or to the people. 11 
~;.:;-~- ,' > the Constitution does not mention education, this 
e;:;~ - --::: --:":::>ved po-vrers" clause has been interpreted to mean that 
- ___ ... ~tion is essentially a local matter. 
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••• Instead or righting ror equal rights, they8 (Negro leaders] are demanding special race privileges. 0 · 
As mentioned above, the concept of' "rights" pertains to the 
individual citizen, and not to the race. Consequently, Ob-
jectivists charge that such practices as busing cannot be 
morally sanctioned. The black man in America, Rand argues, 
must base his case on his right as an individual citizen to 
equal protection under the law, ror any other solution 
implies the violation or someone else's rights.69 
Pedagogically, busing conrronts educators with a 
serious problem. We have noted that a child needs a secure 
environment ir his view or the universe is to be ordered 
and coherent. But, stability may be jeopardized when 
~riendships are broken, roots dislodged, and students rorced 
to travel several miles per day to school.7° A student, 
especially a young one, ~inds it di~i'icult to learn if' his 
emotional stability is threatened. Under such conditions, 
he may mature thinking that existence is, of' necessity, 
unpredictable and intrinsically harmi'ul. Although presUin-
ably well-intentioned, lmvmakers and judges may lack the 
educational competence to realize that their decisions pro-
duce unwelcome consequences in terms of child growth and 
No. 9 
68Ayn Rand, "Racism," The Objectivis~ Newsletter, II, 
(September, 1963), 35. 
69rbid., pp. 35-36. My brackets. 
7°rn "Swann v. Chai•lotte -r,recklenburg Board or Educa-
tion," the Supreme Court stipulated that the distance trav-
elled should not exceed seven miles or take longe1 ... than 
thirty-five minutes. 
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development. 71 
The "quota" issue must now be considered. Between 
1964 and 1972, the President's office issued a series of 
Executive Orders to be enforced by the Department of Labor 
and HEW. Designed to further prevent racial segregation, 
Order 11246 required "all government contracting agencies" 
to include in every government contract the following: 
"The contractor will take affirmati,.re action to ensure that 
applicants are employed ••• without regard to their race, 
creed, color or national origin. 11 72 Because affirmative 
action remained vague, the Labor Department, in Revised 
Order No. 4, specified that "non-construction contractors" 
must develop a "1-1ri tten affirmative action," defined as, 
II 
• a set of sp.ecifi.c and result-oriented procedures to • • 
which a contractor co~~its himself to apply every good faith 
ef.fort.n73 Throughout the Order, ngood .faith11 is the estab-
lished norm for compliance. But it may be asked what con-
stitutes good faith? Hm·T can the concept be def'ined in 
relation to plans proposed by schools? 
71For evidence suggesting that busing produces harm-
ful educational consequences, see: 11i'lhat Happened to One 
'Hodel School', 11 u.s. Nevrs and vlorld Heport, LXVIII (April, 
1970), 37. 
72Executive Order 112!1;6, Equal Employment Opportunity 
(Washington, D.C.: 'l'he United States Government Printing 
Office, Office of Federal Contract Compliance, 1965), p. 2. 
73Public Contracts and Property Hanagement-Title 41, 
u .. s. Department of Labor (\"Iashin-gton, D.C.: The United 
States Government Printing Office, Office of Federal Con-
tract Compliance, 1971), p. 2. 
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When discussing the nature or law, Rand specifies 
an important and necessary condition ror a valid one: 
The retaliatory use or force requires objective 
evidence that a crime has been co~~itted and to 
who committed it, as well as objective rules to 
punishment and enforcement procedures • • • men 
institution charged with the task or prQ~ecting 
rights under an objective code or laws.f~ 
rules or 
~rove 
ei"ine 
need an 
their 
How then may we objectively derine good raith? Ir a school's 
derinition conrlicts with HEW's, whose judgment prevails? 
J. Stanley Pottinger, director of the Ofrice or Civil Rights 
in HEW comments: "We have a whale or a lot or power, and 
we're prepared to use it if necessary.n75 It would appear, 
then, that !1r. Pottinger's definition of good raith will 
prevail. vlhen objective law gives place to subjective eval-
uation, then law becomes a matter or the enforcer's personal 
desire. The point is that non-objective law places citizens 
at the mercy of "a whale of a lot or power" against which 
they have no recourse. 
The implications of these laws for education are 
serious. Dr. George C. Roche III, Pre·sident or Hillsdale 
College in Hichigan, when delive:r•ing an address before the 
American Association of Presidents of Independent Colleges 
and Universities on December 4, 1972, spoke of the effects 
7hAyn Rand, "The Nature of Govel""mnent, 11 in Capital-
ism: The Unlmown Ideal (New York: The UEH·l American 
Library, Slgnet Press, 1967), p. 331. Italics in original. 
75J. Stanley Pottinger quoted in George Roche III, 
"Government Intervention in Private Education, 11 in "on 
Campus: 'An Iceburg of Government Inte:t.'vontion 1 ?, 11 u.s. 
News and 1-!orld Report, LUIV (January, 1973), 50. 
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of "good faith" on educational quality: 
Today, admission procedures in many schools are governed 
by a quota system which sets its own special double 
standard, unwritten but exercising great f'orce in the 
lives of' individual students. Such admissions policies 
also have their ef'rect on campus standards, compelling 
steadily lower requirements as the original applicants, 
of'ten unqualif'ied f'or admissions, are retained on campus 
despite their poor perf'or.mance.7o 
Although Revised Order No. 4 specif'ically denies that 
quotas be established, the result o:f "good faith" seems to 
suggest they are the logical result. If' quali.fied minority 
group students are lacking and the university must demon-
strate "good faith," then quotas would have to be estab-
lished. 
One might inquire o:f Errmi as to the criteria which 
constitute a minority, discrimination, or lack o:f good 
:faith. For example, i:f a student receives a D grade in a 
course, may he claim discrimination on the grounds that the 
instructor lacked good :faith? Should an administrator 
reserve the right to change the grade to demonstrate good 
:faith? 
'\llhen the basis of' human rights becomes "need" or 
"color" or any .form of' the unearned, then the virtues of' 
integrity and especially productiveness as de:fined by Objec-
tivist ethics are compromised. Laws must be based on objec-
tive criteria if' those obeying them are to know when and 
how to obey. 
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The wel£are state concept also e££ects the per-
£ormance o£ students, who observe that "need" and not 
achievem€.. ... lt is rewarded. In a special section o£ The 
Objectivist called "The Horror File," Rand has compiled 
in£ormation re£lecting speci£ic violations o£ Objectivist 
ethics. The following represent incidents related to the 
present context: 
A recent survey taken to ascertain "lvhat• s In Among 
College Students" has divulged a surprising £act: the 
most popular new activity among the hope of the £uture 
is ••• academic goldbricking .••• According to the 
poll, on hundreds of campuses arotmd the country, there 
is actually hot competition to see who can get away 
with doing the least by using the most credible excuses.77 
and, 
Student power demands appear to have reached the ridic-
ulous extreme in India. The London Observer reports 
that students there have demanded that they be allmved 
to cheat on tests. It says some Indian students have 
refused to £inish a 7~est unless they are permitted to use 'unfair means.' 
The second example, regarding the right to cheat, is espe~ 
cially revealing in terms of what Rand argues in Atlas 
Shrugged regarding the amorality of those advocating the 
welfare state: nAs they feed on stolen wealth in body, so 
they feed on stolen concepts in mind, and proclaim that 
honesty consists of refusing to knoH that one is stealing."79 
Cheating of course counters the Objectivist virtues 
77uFrom the Horror File," The Objectivist, VI, No. 1 
(January, 1967), 15. 
78"From the Horror File,n The Objectivis~, VIII, 
No. 7 (July, 1969), 16. 
79nand, Atlas Shrugged, p. 964. 
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of honesty, rationality, justice, and productiveness. In a 
study published in 1960, Jerome Ellison isolates the moral 
issue in"olved: "The principle involved is that someone 
• • • possesses valid inrormation and transmits it--because 
of fraternal bonds or just to be obliging-to the needy.n80 
Again, we are confronted l-Ti th "need" as moral justification 
for immoral acts. 
The study includes several "justifications" offered 
by students for cheating, including pressure rrom family to 
do well, the willingness to help someone less academically 
fortunate, and the fact that everyone cheats.8l 
If the justifications are considered, however, the 
following moral errors (in terms or Objectivist ethics) 
become apparent: The end does not justify the means. 
Rationality requires integrity--namely, ridelity to moral 
means, regardless of' social or family pressure. Likewise, 
independence requires that there be no substitute for 
one's own thinking. Finally, morality is not contingent 
on numbers involved. Justice demands that ir it is immoral 
for a single individual to cheat, then even an infinite 
number of' cheaters cannot abort the principle involved. 
Rights are conditions which must be earned; they 
cannot be predicated on any other condition. An individual 
in society has a moral right to follow his own designs, but 
80Jerome Ellison, "A..'tJlerican Disgrace: College Cheat-
ing," .The Saturday Evening Post, CCXXXII { J·anunry, 1960), 58. 
Blrbid. 
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not at the expense of others. No one citizen is under 
moral sanction to make another happy if he does not choose 
to do so, and most certainly not if his rights are violated 
in the process. An educational institution which sanctions 
quota systems or cheating violates the rights of I'ational 
men and women dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge and 
truth. 
SUMMARY 
The intent of this chapter has been to examine five 
important flaws Objectivism sees in American formal educa-
tion and to specify how they negate the Randian concept of 
the educated man. The five issues discussed all represent 
interdictions of Objectivist ethics. 
By depriving the learner of a proper sense of life, 
of self-esteem, by tolerating student violence, by miscon-
struing the roles of emotions and reason, and by permitting 
the "welfm~e state" concept to dominate the educative 
process, schoolmen have gravely damaged the learner's 
chances to develop into a rational and well adjusted indi-
vidual. The negation of rationality, independence, hon-
esty, justice, integrity, productiveness, and pride retards 
the learning process, replacing healthy growth with fear 
and hostility to moral worth. 
The following chapter will consider what alterna-
tives Rand postulates, and how they could roverne the 
trends of current school practice. Accordingly, the imple-
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mentation of her views on education ought to culminate in 
the Objectivist concept of the educated man. 
CHAPTER SIX 
OBJECTIVISM: AN ALTERNATIVE 
Rand regards modern educators as "Gomprachicos 111 of' 
the mind. 'ihen summing up the ef'f'ects of' contemporary edu-
cation on a child's intellectual development, she notes: 
The Progressive nurseries pleaded f'or a delay of' the 
process of education, asserting that cognitive train-
ing is premature for a young child--and conditioned his 
mind to an anti-cognitive method of' f'unctioning. The 
grade and high schools reinf'orced the conditioning: 
struggling helplessly with the random snatches of' knowl-
edge, the student learned to associate a sense of' dread, 
resentment, and self-doubt ~-rith the process of learning. 
College completes the job, declaring explicitly--to a 
receptive audience-that there is nothing to learn, that 
reality is unknowable, certainty is unattainable, the 
mind is an instrument of self'-deception, and the sole 
function of' re~son is to f'ind conclusive proof of' its 
own impotence. 
Obviously, Objectivism warns that American rormal education 
needs serious and sustained restructuring if' the "Com-
prachico" syndrome is to be negated. The pm:>pose of' this 
chapter will be to examine suggestions for improvement, 
with special emphasis on elementary and higher education--
1Tho 11 Comprachicos" were Seventeenth Century nomads 
who bought, sold, traded, and tortured children for• the 
amusement of the population. Rand notes: 11 :l'hey uere edu-
cators. They took a man and turned him into a miscarriage. 
• • • They stun ted gr•Nrth; they mangled features. • • • 11 
Soc: "The Compx•achicos, 11 in The NeH Left: 1'he Anti-
Industrial Revolution (New York: The NeH Amor~can Library, 
Signet Press, 19)I~pp. 152 f'f. 
2Ibid., pp. 188-89. 
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the two areas most rrequently subjected to criticism. 
Generally speaking, any educational rerorm must begin 
with a philosophical revolution. The entire thrust or Rand's 
criticism or American lire, including the educational estab-
lishment, points £undamentally to an abandonment by society 
of philosophical principles. Countering the anti-
philosophical trend, she comments: 
In order to live, man must act; in order to act, he must 
make choices; in order to make choices, he must de£ine 
a code or values; in order to define a code of values, 
he must lmoVT what he is and where he is-i.e., he must 
know his oHn nature (including his means or lmovdedge) 
and the nature o£ the universe in which he acts--i.e., 
he needs metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, which means: 
philosophy.3 
or course, philosophy in this context means Objectivism. 
Without philosophy, man cannot survive on earth, much less 
achieve the happiness seen as his end. To be a use£ul 
instrtunent for human growth and development, education 
must provide £or the child's philosophical maturation, 
meaning (in terms of epistemology) the process of concept 
formation. 
The young child needs to grasp the means men employ 
to acquire and extend knowledge. As discussed earlie~, the 
process of conc.ept formation is, for Objectivists, the 
only means one can use to sustain consciousness. As a 
child matures, he notes differences in objects, actions 
~· at £irst in his limnediate environment, and later in 
3Ayn Rand, "Philosophy and Sense o£ Li£e, 11 in The 
~ntic Manifesto (Nmv York: The New Arnerican Library, 
S~gnet Press, T97I), p. 30. Italics and parentheses in 
original. 
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the world at large. The ability (which must be learp,ed) to 
do such constitutes the first steps of classification which 
eventually will lead to concept rormation. Rand describes 
the significance or this ability in an educational context: 
Since concepts represent a system or cognitive clas~ifi­
cation, a given concept serves (speaking metaphorically) 
as a file rolder in which man's mind riles his knowledge 
or the existents it subsumes. The content or such 
folders varies rrom individual to individual, according 
to the degree or his knoVTledge-it ranges from the primi-
tive, generalized inrormation in the mind or a child or 
an illiterate to the enormously detailed sum in the mind 
or a scientist--but it pertains to the same referents, 
to the same kind or existents, and is subsumed under the 
same concept. This riling system makes possible s~ch 
activities as learning, education, research ••• ~ 
Elementary education's task, then, ought to consist primar-
ily in teaching the child how to form concepts. Specifi-
cally, Objectivism holds that two " ••• interrelated but 
dii'rerent chains or abstractions, two hierarchical struc-
tures or concepts must be considered: the cognitive and 
the normative.5 
Cognitive means a philosophical awareness or the 
nature or reality. Importantly, the child must be taught 
that he is capable or understanding (within the limits or 
his ability) the nature or the universe. On the elementary 
level, Rand has reconnnended the I'1ontessoPi I-1ethod as being 
conducive to proper cognitive development. 
l.~Ayn Rand, ~~eduction to Ob~ectivis~ Epistemolo~y 
(NeH York: The ObJectivist Inc., l'~h9), p. 60. Parentheses 
in original. 
5Rand, "Art and :Horal Treason," in The Romantic 
Manirest£, p. 110. Italics in original. 
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The Montessori Method first attracted attention in 
the United States in 1911 when McClures Magazine published 
an article by .Josephine Tozier entitled "An Educational 
~vonder-tiorker, The Net hods of Maria Montessori." Dealing 
with her method in general, the article lauds Montessori's 
use of didactic materials, her psychological insights, her 
use of sensory training materials, and her ability to spark 
explosions into reading and writing. Contrasting Montessori's 
beliefs with those of earlier educators, Tozier reports that, 
In Maria Montessori's view, all education worth having 
is auto-education. One or the dirriculties experienced 
in the training of teachers is that of preventing them 
from rushing to the aid of a child who appears to be 
• • • puzzled. • • • The policy of non-intervention 
applies, as a matter of course, no less to the moral 
than to the intellectual domain. Rewards and punish-
ments are rigorouslK banished. • •• The idea of "dis-
cipline for liberty 1 i·s aimed at and attained. • • • 
The child, in her conception, ought to be free, within 
the limits imposed, not by scholastic convention, but 
by social amenity; that is to say, h~ must not use his 
freedom to hurt or incommode others.6 
This brief passage contains several contributions of 
Montessori, notably teacher non-intervention, intellectual 
and moral self-discipline, and the moral/intellectual basis 
for rights (i.e., in negative terms). In contrast to the 
Progressives who ,.;rongly believe (according to Rand) that 
the child can best function in a group context, Montes-
sorians stress the role of the learner as individual. 
Indeed, the very foundation of her method is the liberty 
6.rosephine Tozier, "An Educational \ifonder-Horker, 
The Hethods of Maria l'fontessori, 11 HcClur·o's Mac;azine, 
XXt'\VII (Hay, 1911), 8-9. 
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of the individual child. On the nature of liberty in its 
pedagogical context, Montessori explains: 
The fundamental principle of scientific pedagogy must 
be, indeed~ the liberty of the.pupil;--such liberty as 
shall perm1t a development or-~nd~v~dual, spontaneous 
manifestations of the child's nature. If a new and 
scientific pedagogy is to arise from the study of the 
individual, such study must occupy itself with the-
observation of free children.? 
She reasons that educational reform must begin with child 
study. Consequently, Montessori stresses that the first 
duty of an educator must be to recognize the distinct per-
sonality of the young and to respect it.8 Education which 
forces the child to conform to adult standards gravely 
harms the young spirit. 
The Montessorian concept of freedom also wins Rand's 
sympathy. The form.er defines i'reedom in terms of the active 
child who disciplines himself, as opposed to being artifi-
cially restrained from without. In other words, discipline 
can only be viable when emanating i'rom child activity: 
And this freedom is not only an external sign of liberty, 
but a means of education. If by an awkward movement a 
child upsets a chair ••• he will have an evident proof 
of his own incapacity •••• Thus the child has some 
means by which he can correct himself •••• It is 
plainly seen that the child has learned to command his 
movements.9 
7Naria I'1ontessori, The Nontessori 11ethod Trans. 
Anne E. Geol"'ge (New York: Schocken Books, 197-r), p. 28. 
Italics in original. 
· 
8Haria Hontessori, The Child in the Fami11:, Trans. 
Nancy Ch•illo (Chicago: Henry Regne17 Co., 1970), p. 35. 
9Hontes sori, The 1'-fon tessori ~·fe thod, p. 8L~. Italics 
in original. 
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Thus discipline arises not rrom the teacher (or group), but 
.from the children themselves who, attempting to bring order 
to their own environment, will learn the value o.f discipline 
and order. Montessori describes a well-disciplined individ-
ual as one who leads his own li.fe as a .free man, limited 
only by the respect paid to the rights o.f others. In this 
way, individual di.f.ferences are allowed to emerge, and 
" ••• the child, conscious and .free, reveals himsel.r.nlO 
We may recall at this point how similar to the Montessorian 
concept o.f rights is the Randian concept. Both suggest 
that the rights of' an individual child must be respected, 
and are limited only inso.far as the rights o.f others are 
not violated. 
Montessori devised two sets o.f exercises to achieve 
the above goals: the exercises o.f practical li.fe and the 
didactic materials~both to be used in a structured environ-
ment, i.e. one scaled to the child's physical abilities 
(small chairs, coat hooks within reach etc.), thereby allow-
ing him to do .for himsel.f as much as possible. 
The practical li.fe exercises consist o.f various 
activities (v.rashing the hands, hanging up a coat, serving 
ltmch etc.), all designed to .foster independence and self-
reliance, but·above all intelligent growth. Rand comments: 
Intelligence is the ability to deal with a broad range 
o.f abstractions. \ifhatever a child's natural endo"Wlllent, 
the use o.f intelligence is an acquired skill. It has to 
lOibid., p. 95. Italics in original. 
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be acquired by a child's own e~~ort and automatized by 
his own mind, but adults can help or hinder him in this 
crucial process. They can place him in an environment 
that provides him,with evidence of a stable, consistent, 
intell~gible world which challenges and rewards his 
e~forts to understand • • • 11 
To Rand, the Montessori school provides that kind o~ environ-
ment: one ordered, structured, and secure, thereby permit-
ting the young child to master the skills necessary ~or 
proper concept ~ormation. 
The didactic materials consist ~or the most part o~ 
sel~-corrective and graded stimuli designed to facilitate 
sensory avrareness of reality and concept formation. The 
cylinders, ~or example, include sets o~ cylinders o~ vary-
ing diameters which must be placed in their proper cor-
responding containers. These materials help the child make 
comparisons betvreen objects, to :Corm judgments, to reason, 
~~d to reach decisions. 12 Such abilities Rand regards as 
essential to concept ~ormation. Writing in The Objectivist, 
Beatrice Hessen discusses the importance of the didactic 
materials to concept formation: 
The didactic materials aid the child in the process o~ 
concept-formation (of abstraction and integration) by 
means of eliminating nonessentials. The mat;erials are 
designed in such a way that all their characteristics 
are tho same except the one a ttl~ibute on 1.vhich the child 
is to concentrate. This allows him to focus on one dif-
~eronce at a time and to form a clear concept of a par-
ticular attribute, such as length, height, thickness, 
weight, sound 01~ color •••• The child is able to Hork 
by hi:raself with tho didactic materials, vli thout constant 
llnand, 111rhe Comprachicos, 11 p. 160. 
12r.1aria Uontessori, Dr. :f\1ontossori 1 s 0Hn Handbook 
Trans. Nancy Rambusch (Nevr York: Schocken Boo'Ks, 1965), 
p. 71. 
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directions rrom an adult ••• ir he places a cylinder 
in a hole too large ror it, he rinds at the end that he 
has at least one cylinder left which does not f'it in the 
remaining hole; he has to backtrack and discover his 
error and, in the process, he sharpens his capacity to 
observe and discriminate, which would not occur ir his 
mistake were merely pointed out to him by the teacher.l3 
The didactic materials become the basis ror the conceptual 
thinking or an adult. By aiding in the development or dis-
criminatoFJ judgment, they perform a significant philosophi-
cal function: they lay the foundat:ton f'or proper episte-
mological development. In other words, the child comes to 
learn that the universe is not beyond his cognitive grasp. 
Another reason Rand endorses Montessori concerns the 
latter's philosophical base: Aristotle. Montessori's biog-
rapher, E. M. Standing, relates the use of the didactic 
materials to Aristotelian philosophy when he observes: 
I 
What is most interesting, and most significant is that 
Aristotle described the whole process (the use of 
didactic materials in the process of abstraction and 
concept £'ormation] in terms of a gradual discarding of 
matter, until only the ab~tract ideal is left, which is 
purely immaterial ••• 14 
He continues, by Ttray of' example, noting that when a material 
object such as a cup is removed from sight, we retain a 
mental image of its physical properties. Finally, after 
observing a sufficient number of cups, ue arrive at the 
essence cupness, an intellectual concept, which is removed 
13Beatrice Hesson,· "The l\1ontessori Method," Part II, 
The Objectivist, IX, No. 6 (J'u!'1e, 1970), 10. Parentheses 
in origina1.--
1L~r.· M c< t d . M . 1\Jr t . H L. f d 
.:.:.. • u an lng, .arla 1·1on essorl: er J. e an 
Hork (NevJ York: 'l1he New Amorlca.n Llbrary, Slgnet Press, 
'!9b'2'), p. 163. Italics in original. I1y brackets. 
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from matter. Rand, of course, bases her epistemological 
position on this process. 
Unfortunately, Montessori's reception in America was 
short-lived. The primary agent of re.futation was a book by 
\villirun Kilpatrick, published in 1914, anti tled The r1ontes-
sori System Examined. Comparing Dewey to Montessori, he 
argues that 1-rhile both contributed to the nelv education, 
Montessori's plan was too narrow, less comprehensive than 
Dewey's, and based on inadequate assumptions. He argues: 
11 
••• she belongs essentially to the mid-nineteenth 
century, some .fi.fty years behind the present development 
o.f educational theory •••• We owe no large point o.f view 
to Hadron :r--rontessori.nl.5 Although the method remained, as 
a result of Kilpatrick's charges, dormant f:or some forty 
years, recent interest in Montessori has sparked a revival. 
Of course, Rand sees the Montessori revival as vital to 
American education. 
In her defense of Montessori, Rand responds to the 
Kilpatrick charge that the didactic materials are too rigid, 
thereby frustrating creativity. 16 She notes: 
Since the purpose o.f the Hontessori materials is to help 
the child in his cognitive development, i.e., to help 
him grasp the nature o.f reality and learn to deal with 
it, the 'rigidity' of the problems he has to solve pro-
15william Kilpatrick, The Montessori System Examined 
(Ne-tv York: Arno Press Reprint and the New York T1..mes, 
1971), pp. 63, 67. 
16Ibid., pp. 42-52. 
' • 
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vides him with the most important lesson he will ever 
learn: it teaches him the Law o~ Identity. It teaches 
him that reality is an absolute not to be altered by his 
whims, and i~ he wants to deal with it success~ully, he 
must ~ind the one right answer. He learns that a problem 
does have a solution and that he does have the ability to 
solve it, but he must look ~or the answer in the nature 
o~ things he deals with, ~ in his ~eelings.l7 
Rand's position is contingent upon tHo principles discussed 
earlier: (1) the success~ul dealing w.ith an ordered real-
ity ~esters a healthy sel~-esteem, and (2) that all issues 
a man con~ronts can be solved in te:':'Ills o~ one correct an-
swer. Although the latter was critiqued when discussing 
Objectivist ethics and Aristotle's golden mean, the ~or.mer 
does have signi~icant educational implications. Speci~i-
cally, the use o~ the didactic materials teaches the child 
that his whims or emotions cannot erase the fact that real-
ity will not magically alter itsel~ to suit those whims or 
desires. 
Creativity and cognitive efficacy cannot arise out 
or chaos and disorder. If students would learn this lesson 
while young, then Rand argues that college radicals--
demanding that reality conrorm to their whims, or else--
would not exist. When storming university buildings, they 
deny the epistemologica1 base needed ~or any learning situ-
ation: that emotions and whims are not tools o~ cognition. 
It should be mentioned that if Rand is to be con-
sistent with her own philosophical position, she cannot 
17Ayn Hand as cited in Beatrice Hessen, "The Montes-
sori Hethod, 11 Part III, The Objectivist, IX, No. 7 (July, 
1970), 7. Italics in original. 
' ~l 
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accept all of Montessori. The area of disagreement concerns 
Montessori's emphasis on religious education. Montessori 
speaks of the "spiritual embryo,nl8 implying that the child 
needs religious education to acquire Christian virtues. 
As we have noted, Rand rejects the Christian religions, and 
a Montessori school under her aegis would of necessity have 
to delete religious training, but in so doing, the potential 
exists that the method would sui'fer. Rand, therefore, may 
be vie-v1ed as accepting :Hontessori epistemologically, but 
not spil•i tually. 
Normatively, Objectivists note that current educa-
tion fails to teach the child the importance of ethics--
specifically, her sense of the heroic. Rand's educated 
man, as stressed bef'ore, is a moral being, cne practicing 
Objectivist virtues, and thus potentially capable of' the 
heroic. She comments in this connection: 
Apart from its many other evils, conventional morality 
is not concerned \vi th the f'orrna tion of' a child t s char-
acter. It does not teach or show him what kind of' a 
~ ~ ~uroht to be and Hhy; it is concerned onlrwith 
J.mposlng a set of' rules upon him-concrete, arbJ_trary, 
contradictol"y and, more often than not, incompreh~nsible 
rules, which are mainly prohibitions and duties.l'7 
"'Te have noted in the last chapter that such dictating causes 
grave damage to self'-esteem. Rand argues that education 
must assume the responsibility of' proper moral development, 
18Naria Mont(~ssori, The Absorbant 1·1ind Trans. Claude 
A. Claremont (New York: Delta' Books, 1967), pp. 60-82. 
19nand,. 11Art and Horal Treason," Po 110. Italics in 
original. 
I 
I 
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~hich can best be accomplished through the teaching of 
Romantic art. Chapter two, when discussing the anteced-
ents of Objectivism, argues that a clear relationship exists 
between art and ethics. Believing that art's function is 
to select the·essontials necessary for a given value change, 
Rand proceeds to create, in her novels, the concept of the 
educated man as one profoundly moral. Regarding Romantic 
art as the means necessary to instill proper values, she 
comments: 
The major source and demonstration of moral values avail-
able to a child is Romantic art (particularly Romantic 
literature). What Romantic art offers him is not moral 
rules, not an explicit didactic message, but tne-image 
of a moral person--i.e., the concretized abstraction of 
a moral ideal. It offers a concrete, d~rectly perceiv-
able answer to the very abstract question which a child 
senses, but cannot yet conceptualize: What kind of per-
son is moral and what kind of life does he lead?20 
In other words, a study of Romantic li teratu.re which por-
trays man as morally heroic, helps to develop in the child 
a sense of moral ambition, a desire to engage in productive 
work and to be proud of any rational achievement. 
Rand believes Romantic literature recognizes the 
principle that man has or possesses volitional conscious-
ness which must operate if he is to be moral. By studying 
Romantic literature, Rand suggests that the child will 
learn what is required for existence as a moral being 
because 
• • • Romantic art offers him a clear, luminous imper-
sonal abstraction-and thus a cleal', obj;·:1ctive test of 
20Ibid., p. 111. Italics and parentb.eses in original. 
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his inner state, a clue available to his conscious mind. 
• • • Romantic art is the i'uel and the spark plug of a 
man's soul; its task is to set a soul on fire and never 
let it go out. The task of providing that lii'e with a 
motor and a direction belongs to philosophy.21 
In the context of higher education, Objectivists regard 
philosophical training as the logical extension oi' Romantic 
art. For Rand, who terms herself a Romantic realist, 
Aristotle's philosophy provides the only meaningful philo-
sophical experience the college student should seek. 
A child's sense of life may tell him that Buck Rogers 
or The Lone Ranger are heroes worthy of admiration but as 
he matures, this Romantic sense must acquire philosophical 
1 i'oundations. A sense of life cannot provide the epistemo-
logical, metaphysical and axiological premises he needs to 
t 
' 
t 
survive. Conscious goal-direct·ed action· requires philosophy. 
Specif'ically, the Aristotelian goal of intellectually excel-
lent activity (the use of reason) ought to be the studentts 
goal for therein lies the only means to happiness. Believ-
ing the source of moral evil to be irrational man, Objec-
tivism suggests that if education were to postualte as its 
goal the happiness of man (i.e., rational activity in con-
foPmity to moral principles) then the moral chaos of higher 
education would be eliminated. 
Objectivists believe that the primary mission of edu-
cation is to aid in the development of man as a rationally 
thinking creature with reason as his only absolute. In the 
---------· 
21Ibid., p. 117. 
i 
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novels, Rand provides the reader with models o~ ideal 
social institutions. Educationally, the .ideal university 
{named in Atlas Shrugged Patrick Henry University) is one 
in which her concept o~ the educated roan might best be 
realized. The school's outstanding scholar a philosophy 
pro~essor named Hugh Askton serves as spokesman, and de-
scribes the university as " ••• a monument to unenslaved 
thought. 1122 His words are the key which unlocks the door 
to Randian educational philosophy. An educational institu-
tion ~or her must be totally and exclusively devoted to the 
pursuit o~ truth by means of rational inquiry, and the 
learners therein must likewise dedicate themselves. 
Dr. Askton summarizes the ideal learner when recal-
ling three o~ his ~orroer students: 
They never spoke o~ l-Ihat they wished they might do in 
the future, they never·wondered whether some mysterious 
omnipotence had ~avored them with some unknowable talent 
to achieve the things they '\-ranted-they spoke of what 
they would do •••• Every man builds his world in his 
own image. -.-•• He has the power to choose, but not the 
poHer to escape the necessity o~ choice. I~ he ~bdicates 
his povTer, he abdicates the status o~ man • • • J 
In essence, this de~ines the Objectivist concept of the edu-
cated man. He exists as a goal orientated moral being--
two characteristics vital to both Rand's and Aristotle's 
thinking. He must be willing to value productive work 
because he knows it is the only way in which human lif'e will 
22Ayn Rand, Atlas Shru~~Jd (Nevl York: The New Ameri-
can Library, Signet Press, 19 7 , p. 733. 
23rbid., pp. 732-35. Italics in original. 
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ever become something or value. He does not ask ror the 
unearned, but he does request as a man the right to use his 
mind to pursue the truth. Parenthetically, it is interest-
ing to note how Rand's concept of art prevails in Atlas 
Shrugged. Believing in the educative value or Romantic 
literature, she presents in that novel examples of the ideal 
learner or institution so that the reader may observe moral 
values operative in the concrete. 
The Objectivist model of a good teacher, of course, 
is personified by Dr. Askton, a man whose " 
• • • intransi-
gent devotion to the pursuit of truth ••• n24 separates 
him from the incompetency of his colleagues. To be a good 
teacher, in other words, one must be dedicated to respect 
for the truth and to the belief that students' minds, pro-
perly guided, are sufficient to locate and explore it. A 
teacher must impress upon his students that there are no 
other means, save the mind, to survive.25 
Examining the state of current educational practice, 
Rand decries the £light £rom the ideal which such an exam-
j ination reveals. She notes that teachers r~ve £ailed in 
-J 
24rbid., p. 728. 
25rt should be recalled here that Objectivists re-
ject faith aiJ a valid means to knowledge. This position 
might have serious consequences for education. Formal edu-
cation 1-JOUld be impossible if students had to personally 
verif'y every comment a professor made. 'l'his is not to deny 
the learner's right to rationally investigate and question 
his teacher's conclusions but unless proof to the contrary 
exists, the learner usually places his trust in the teacher's 
authority as an expert in his field. 
I 
' j 
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their duty, observing professors, 
who refuse to answer questions.;_the professors who answer 
by evE.3ion and ridicule-the professors who turn their 
classes into bull-sessions on the premise that "we 1re 
here to mull things over together11 -the professors who 
do lecture, but, in the name of "antidogmatism," take 
no stand, express no viewpoint, and leave the student in 
a maze of contradictions with no lead to a solution-the 
professors who do take a stand and invite students' com-
ments, and then:Penalize dissenters by means of lower 
d 26 gra es • • • 
Believing that many students desire more of a college edu-
cation than 'relevant discussions' and refusals to uphold 
moral principles in order to be flexible, Rand indicts the 
faculty for failing to correct such abuses. The lack of a 
sound educational philosophy usually results in such class-
room conduct. For example, Objectivism traces moral flexi-
bility to the Progressive schools in -vrhich future teachers 
learned that the moral rigidity of objective principles 
only stifles the search for truth.27 
Unfortunately for the young minds being so conditioned, 
26Ayn Rand, "The Cashing-In: The Student 'Rebellion'," 
in The Ne,.,-J" Left: The Anti-Industrial Revolution, p. 32. 
Ital~cs ~n or~g~nal. 
27nr. s. I. Hayakawa comments on one eff'ect of' this: 
"Now, professors tend ••• to give A's in their courses to 
students that [sic] are alienated. And as the students get 
A's they get appointed graduate assistants. Then they soon 
become proi'essors themselves. And then they p_ass on this 
alienation to another generation of' students, and college 
generations of students come i'ast, after all. And bei'ore 
you know it, you have whole departments lrrhich are basically 
sources of resistance to the culture as a whole." See: 
S. I. Hayakawa's testimony before the San Francisco State 
College Study Team in \rJilliam Orrick, Jr. (director), Shut 
it Dmm.l A College ?-n Crisis ( Snn Francisco State Col~, 
October~ l96b-·April, 1969) A Stai'.f Heport to the lJational 
Co:rnrniss~on on the Causes and I'frovontlon of Violence 0-Jash-
Ington, D.c.: 'l'he United States Government ?rintlng Office, 
June, 1969), p. 57. 
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the railure to respect morally binding absolutes leads to 
ethical nihilism in which anything goes ir it works. For 
this reason, students who riot or cheat when taking exam-
inations simply are practicing a moral code they learned as 
children. 28 
This chapter will conclude with two educational pro-
posals of a procedural nature which Rand advocates: the 
"rairness doctrine" for education and "tax credits." 
The fairness doctrine has already been considered 
and critiqued when discussing the Randian notion of com-
promise, but now its educational specifics must be considered. 
The doctrine, borrowed from the Federal Government's regu-
lation regarding broadcasting, might serve higher education 
by exposing students to ideas different from what a given 
department presents. Rand notes: 
There are philosophy majors who graduate without having 
taken a single course on Aristotle (except as part of a 
general survey). There are economics m.aj ors "tcTho have 
no idea of what capitalism is or was, theoretically or 
historically, and not the faintest notion of the mechan-
ism of a free market. There are li ter~~ure majors vTho 
have never heard of Victor Hugo • • • 
In order to avert domination of ideas which Objectivism 
considers inimical to student growth, the fairness doctrine 
28This writer once asked a college class hrn..r they 
complete term papers. Immediate answers included asking 
a friend for one he had dono in a previous semester, or 
copying from books. No consideration was paid to the moral 
issue involved. 
29Ayn Rand, "Fairness Doctrine for r:::du.cation, 11 The 
Ayn Rand Letter, I, No. 18 (June 5, 1972), 3. Parentheses 
in original. ·-
Iii 
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would permit student (intellectual) minorities to demand 
courses on Aristotle and capitalism. These subjects, Rand 
believes, are currently being neglected by universities, 
resulting in the various educational ills discussed in the 
previous chapters.30 Further, it would demand that raculty 
be hired on the basis or scholarly achievement; not because 
or ethnic origin. Rand notes: "rr the rights or various 
physiological minorities are so 1ouc.ly claimed, what about 
the right or intellectual minorities?n31 
Rand states that the implementation or the doctrine 
would be contingent upon " ••• subjective interpretation, 
which ·t-~ould orten be arbitrary and, at best, approximate.n32 
rr this appears vague, the reason probably is that ror the 
most part she has not bothered with speciric pedagogical 
techniques, choosing instead to emphasize educational reror.m 
in a philosophical context. But the problem or implementa-
3°Rand is not the only observer to express alarm. 
An article published in Nation's Business suggests that 
students lack correct knmvledge of capitalism. The author, 
Jerf'rey St. John, comments: "Does the rejection of business 
as a career by some students stem from the unbalanced, often 
biased, vieu they receive in the classroom on the moral 
meaning of capitalism?" St. John continues, praising Rand 
for providing a moral defense of capitalism: ttshe maintains 
that young people today have no idea of what capitalism is. 
• • • She charges that capitalism and businessmen have been 
the willing victims of smears and distortions that have 
part of their origins in the classrooms of the nation's 
colleges and universities." For Rand, the fairness doctrine 
might help to correct these abuses. See: Jeffrey St. John, 
"A:re America's Students Flunking Capitalism?," Nation's 
Business, LV (July, 1967), 90. 
31Ayn Hand, "Fairness Doctrine for Education," The 
Ay_n Rand Letter, I, No. f91June 19, 1972), 4. 
32Ibid., p. 1. 
I I~ I ' 
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tion remains. As Rand herself admits, arbitrary and sub-
jective criteria govern the fairness doctrine's operation. 
\Yho, then, for example, determines what is fair--students, 
faculty, department chairman, or perhaps a combination of 
these? What subjects fall under the fairness doctrine 
classification, and to what degree ought they to be inte-
grated with existing courses? The list of difficulties 
appears endless, and such a policy might result in a con-
tinuous proliferation of administrative directives, further 
complicating the already bureaucratically orientated struc-
ture of the university. 
While the philosophical construct implicit in the 
fairness doctrine (i.e., exposing students to Aristotle, 
Montessori, capitalism etc.) is valid, the very subjective-
ness of its nature would make enforcement impossible. 
Other, more suitable means, such as requiring philosophy 
majors to take courses on Aristotle, are needed. The 
fairness doctrine is consistent in principle with the Objec-
tivist belief that the university provide courses designed 
to reflect and develop man's rational nature. 
Tax credits are intended to remedy an educational 
problem discussed earlier: whether or not the state has 
the moral and legal right to require compulsory education 
at the taxpayer's expense. To break this goverrunent mono-
poly on schooling, Rand (among others) arg1Aes that quality 
education can only be achieved if private schools are 
allowed to flourish. 
~ 
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For example, economist Milton Friedman suggests a 
voucher system, designed to operate in much the same way as 
tax credits. Essentially, he posits (as do Objectivists) a 
derinite relationship between economics and individual rree-
dom, noting that capitalism ("rree private enterprise ~­
change economy ••• competitive capitalismn) is the only 
economic system conducive to rreedom and individual 
growth.33 
Educationally, he argues that the only justirication 
ror governmental control or schools (that or Americanizing 
diverse ethnic groups) has long since dissipated, and that 
the decentralization or the educational establishment might 
enhance quality and raise teachers' salaries. Specirically, 
his plan requires the issuance or vouchers by the government 
to individual citizens who could redeem them 
• • • ror a speciried maximum sum per child per year ir 
spent on "approved" educational services. Parents would 
then be rree to spend this sum a~d any additional sum 
they themselves provided on purchasing educational ser-
vices from an 11 approved 11 institution of their own choice • 
• • • The role of government would be limited to insuring 
that the schools met certain minimum standards, such as 
the inclusio~4or a minimum con~on content in their pro-grams • • • 
33r1il ton Friedman and Rose Friedman, Capitalism and 
Freedom (Chicago: The University or Chicago Press, 1962'), 
p:--1~· Italics in original. Friedman argt1es that while 
monopoly practices are generally exaggerated and arise be-
cause of governn1ent action, the governmentts intervention 
may be required to preserve free competition. Objectivists, 
or course, disagree vlith Friedman, opting instead for total 
separation between the government and the economy. 
3~-Ibid., p. 89. 
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Although Objectivists reject government interference o£ any 
type, they no doubt would agree with Friedman's contention 
that a voucher system, " • • • would meet the just complai~ts 
or parents that i£ they send their children to private, non-
subsidized schools they are required to pay twice ror educa-
tion ••• it would permit competition to develop •••• The 
development and improvement or all schools would thus be 
stimulated.n35 
Such a plan might have a desirable errect on higher 
education as well. In The Report or the President's Task 
Force on Higher Education, entitled "Priorities in Higher 
Education," John A. Houard, President or Rockford College, 
argues: 
Suppose legislation were enacted which permitted each 
taxpayer the option of paying the fir.st $100 of his 
£ederal taxes directly to the college of his choice, so 
that his payment to the Internal Revenue Service would 
be the amount of his tot~G tax bill less the $100 which 
he donated to a college.j 
Howard continues, suggesting that the advantages of the plan 
include allowing the universities to use the money as they 
see £it, and permitting smaller colleges to survive, thereby 
protecting " ••• the diversity and the autonomy or the 
educational institutions.n37 
35Ibid., p. 93. 
36 James H. Hester, (Chairman), The Report of the 
President's Task Force on Higher Ecluca~ion, ( 11 Priorities in 
iilgher Educa tion 11 ) (Hashington, D. c.: 'I'he United States 
Government Printing Ofi'ice, 1970), p. 21. 
37Ibid., pp. 21-22. Opposition to tax credits is 
voiced by-James c. Fletcher, President of the University of 
Utah, who critiqued the Ho1vard proposal: 11 This proposal, 
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In arguing ror the acceptance or tax credits, Rand 
calls attention to the plight or the poor but talented stu-
dent who tries to work his way through school: 
While millions of dollars are being spent by the govern-
ment on attempts to educate young people most or vrhom 
have no ability and/or no desire to get an education, 
what happens to the young man who has both? rr he is 
poor, he has to work his way through school. • •• Yet, 
out or his meagre income, he has to pay taxes--not only 
the hidden ones in the cost or everything he buys, but 
income taxes as well. Thus while he is allowed no 
deductions for the costs or his own education, he is 
paying for the .rree ~gucation or youths enrolled in 
government proJects.j . 
rr education were decentralized, then students or superior 
j ability would have the financial means to at tend private 
schools, which are presently beyond their reach. She rea-
sons that the brighter learners Hould avoid having to 
attend public schools, which have " •• ~ railed so dis-
astrously. • • • »39 
Rand cites three examples of the failure--drug 
addiction of youth, functional illiteracy and student 
violence4°--and goes on to suggest that the remedy for 
such abuses would consist in giving a citizen, 
••• tax credits for the money he spends on education, 
along with most tax credit proposals, has the very great 
difficulty that it represents the support of the middle and 
upper class groups of our society and therefore will tend 
to promote institutions Hhich are primarily associated Hith 
these t-vro groups of people, 11 p. 25. The Task Force did not 
endorse President Hovmrd' s tax credit proposal. 
3BAyn Tiand, "Tax-Credits for Education," The A~ 
Rand Letter, I, No. 12 (March 13, 1972), 4• Italics 1n 
original. 
39rbid., p. 2. 
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whether his own education, his children's. or any per-
son's ho wants to put through a bona-fide school of his 
own choice l.fncluding primary, secondary, and higher 
education).'+ 
If tax credits were implemented, Rand argues that those sin-
cerely interested in acquiring an education might be given 
the opportunity to attend quality schools. At least it 
would grant them the basic right of every citizen in a free 
society--freedom of choice. 
The Nixon administration has voiced support for tax 
credits. On April 30, 1973 President Nixon introduced tax 
credit legislation to Congress,42 but opposition to the 
plan has come from Federal Courts which regard the measure 
I as violating the First P~endment. At present, therefore, 
the future of tax credits remains in doubt. 
Before closing this chapter, an apparent contradic-
tion in Rand's thinking must be considered. Previous chap-
ters have suggested that she does not advocate religious 
training. If this be true, then it might be rightly asked 
how she can favor tax credits for private schools, many of 
which are religiously affiliated? Rand comments: 
• • • I am not an advocate of religion or of religious 
education; but the double burden of a forced necessity 
to pay for the support of secular schools is a violation 
of' the parents' right to religious freedom. The paro-
chial schools are collapsing financially ••• it is 
unjust that the children of' religious taxpayers are 
denied the special advantages granted to the children of 
41Ibid. Parentheses in original. 
42Edv-mrd Rohrbach, "End Tax Shelters, Nixon Bill 
Urges," The Chicago Tribune (Hay l, 1973), p. 1. 
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nonreligious ones.43 
Despite the :fact that Rand disf'avors religious education, 
she remains philosophically consistent. Her regard :for the 
rights or individual citizens includes granting them the 
choice to educate their children in religious schools if' 
they so desire. The point to remember is that Objectivism 
disclaims as immoral the 11 double burden" which parents must 
assume who wish to exercise their choice. 
SUMMARY 
The purpose or this chapter has been to develop the 
Objectivist view or what education ought to do if' its con-
cept or the educated man is to be realized. When discussing 
means, we have shown that Rand :fav.ors Aristotle and 11ontes-
sori as the only :figures devoted to preserving cognitive 
and ethical concepts needed by man to live as man. Roman-
tic literature :for moral guidance provides the necessary 
means to achieve her end. A study of' Aristotle's philos-
ophy as an extension, and philosophical :foundation of' 
Romantic literary concepts will lead--she believes--to 
happy men, men who pursue intellectually excellent activ-
ity, thereby alJ.owing :for the growth of' self'-esteem, pro-
ductive Hork and pride. 
If' students con:fronted 'tvi th the cognitive and moral 
anarchy of contemporary schooling -vrere only given the proper 
43rbid., p. 5. Italics in original. 
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guidance, notes Rand, then the new intellectual could become 
a reality. Practicing the virtues of rationality, independ-
ence, integrity, honesty, justice, productiveness, and 
pride, the new intellectual would achieve the happiness 
proper to a man living on earth. Contingent upon the real-
ization of happiness, of course, is the existence of' objec-
tive moral principles which man must recognize and use to 
guide his actions. It cannot be repeated often enough that 
Rand's educated man is above all a profoundly moral being, 
devoted to the preservation of his own happiness in a 
rational way. 
It would be well to conclude with the 'lrTords of John 
Galt, the central protagonist in Atlas Shrugged 1-1ho, in 
this context, speaks of the ideal man Rand hopes education 
will produce: 
My morality, the morality of reason, is contained in a 
single axiom: existence exists--and in a single choice: 
to live. The rest proceeds f'rom these. To live, man 
must hold three things as the supreme and ruling values 
of' his life: Reason-Purpose-Self'-esteem. Reason, as 
his only tool of' knowledge-Purpose, as his choice of' 
the happiness which that tool must proceed to achieve--
Self-esteem, as his inviolate certainty that his mind 
is competent to think and his person is vJorthy of' happi-
ness, which means: is worthy of living. These three 
values imply and require all of' man's virtues, and all 
his virtues pertain to the relation of' existence and 
consciousness: rationality, indopendencL~ integrity, 
honesty, justice, productiveness, pride.~ . ..:> 
43nand, Atlas Shrugged, p. 9114. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY 
What may be said of Objectivism and American formal 
education? At first, there appears to exist a number of 
obstacles s l.fficiently damaging as to prevent acceptance of 
the philosophy by American schoolmen. 
Objectivist ethics present a formidable instance. 
As often suggested throughout this study, few parents would 
be willing to commit their children to a school governed by 
a philosophical code advocating the nvirtue of self'isbness, 11 
much less "atheism.n1 By comparison, the former presents 
the lesser di.fi'icul ty. He have shown that within the con-
text of' Objectivist ethics, selfishness means not a ruthless 
or ai•rogant violation o.f someone t s rights, but rather a 
rational concern with one's self-interest. Such becomes a 
necessary condition for healthy self-esteem, which is so 
crucial to the learning process. This explains why Rand's 
definitional thinking must be understood if one wishes to 
accurately grasp her moral philosophy. Once understood, 
opposition might diminish. 
1Ttvo comments, both coming from Roman Catholics, 
crystallize the issue. On learning that Rand advocates 
atheism one co1-r.monted, 11 She cant t be intelligent if she's 
an atheist. 11 '!'he second responded, 11 HoH cotlld any educated 
person f'avor selfishness? 11 Significantly, both individuals 
never read any of Hand's materials. 
20~. 
205 
Atheism, however, is not so easily dismissed. Rand's 
antireligious stand could very well :forestall any national 
acceptance of' Objectivism. Traditionally, Americans have 
been religious people, incorporating religious sentiments 
and ref'erences to God in the basic documents of' the land: 
The Constitution and the Declaration of' Independence. 
Indeed, one of' the :first political documents in our nation's 
history, the :Hayf'lower Compact (1620), begins with the words, 
"In the name of' God, Amen. 112 
The question to be resolved then centers on the pos_-
sibility of' Objectivism without atheism and religious hos-
tility. Rfu~d's position, of' course, is quite clear. When 
asked if' Objectivism could possibly become dogma, she 
replied: 
No. A dogma is a set of' belief's accepted on :faith; that 
is, without rational justif'ication or against rational 
evidence. A dogma is a matter of' blind :faith. Objec-
tivism is the exact opposite. Objectivism tells you 
that you must not accept any idea or conviction unless 
~ou can demonstrate its truth by means of' rea~on •••• 
lDo you believe in God?] ••• Certainly not.j 
But, in the opinion of' this writer, if' Objectivism desires 
acceptance by Americans, its antireligious position will 
require modif'ication and/or dismissal. As argued earlier, 
2r·Tilton Viorst, (ed.), The Great Docu.ments of' \'lestern 
Civilization (NevT York: Bantam Books, l-'latrix edition, 
~), pp. 160-61. 
3Alvin Toff'ler, (Interviewer), "Playboy's Intervie1 .. 1 
with Ayn Rand," Playboy, XI (Harch, 1964), 39. Hy brackets. 
(Ironically, it rs-the-tb.esis of' Albert Ellis 1 Is Objectiv-
ism a Religion? that Objectivism is dogma in that it postu-
lates a set--of principles which must be accepted in toto, 
if' one is to be a f'aithf'ul practitioner.] -- ----
•------~ 
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there exists no epistemological hostility between reason and 
£aith. One needs both in order to survive as a man. Exclu-
sive reliance on £aith or reason would destroy human learning. 
Objectivism is internally consistent when, as advocat-
ing laissez-£aire Capitalism, it argues against the concept 
o£ state supported schools. Again, Rand's position is un-
equivocal: "My position is .fully consistent. Not only the 
post of£ice, but streets, roads, and above all, schools 
should all l>e privately owned and privately run. 11 4 Unt'or-
tunately, his tori cal evidence tveighs against the cone ept o£ 
non-public education. By the end or the Nineteenth Century, 
American schools were £airly well established at the primary 
and higher levels. Prior to about 1874 (the Kalamazoo 
Case), a ya1-n:1ing gap existed bet1-veen the two~ A laissez-
£aire system o.f private academies attempted to £ill the 
need for adequate secondary education, but their very diver-
sity produced graduates of such uneven academic quality 
that standards set by universities for admission were in 
g:r•ave danger. College administrators had no idea o.f a stu-
dent's background or his intellectual competency. Accord-
ing to one historian of American education, 
••• the academies' energies were di.f.fused ••• the 
lack of any common standards applied to education in-
evitably produced several patent weaknesses. There was 
chaotic prolii'eration Hithout organization in course 
orrerines, including numerous short courses in subjects 
sometimes taught f'or only a few weeks. There Has no 
established system of accreditation for either teachers 
4rbid., p. 12. 
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or schools.5 
Thus, the very laissez-£aire £abric or the academies ultim-
ately un~ermined their existence, being replaced by the High 
School. 
Even if the merits of a laissez-faire educational 
system were not in doubt, the chances of such a system being 
implemented today are at best slim. As with religion, 
Americans remain firmly committed to public schools, locally 
controlled and financed, as the means of introducing the 
young to the culture. Although often pitifully w·eak and 
ineffective, and plagued with the naive faith endowed them 
by the culture, few citizens would opt for the absolute 
dismantling of the system. At least for the foreseeable 
future, any reforms such as tax credits will probably have 
to occur within the framework of the public school system. 
Returning to the original questipn, then, "What may 
be said of Objectivism and American education?" Despite 
the foregoing limitations, it remains the author's firm 
conviction that Objectivism offers substantial and quali-
tative contributions to American formal education. 
Man is a rational being, but schools by their 
slaughtering of self-esteem, cognitive development, and 
individual effort seem to dishonor his rationality more 
than encourage its fruition. Here Objectivism's potential 
for good is enormous. By postulating a heroic and moral 
5Ger•ald Gutek, An Historical Introduction to American 
Education {NGiv York: Thomas Y. CroHell Company, 1970}, 
pp. 7h-75. 
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individual as its concept o~ the educated man, Objectivism 
offers much. Specifically, the following summary of educa-
tional aims, including the teacher, learner, and institution 
is offered as evidence: 
The teacher: 
1. A teacher must be dedicated to the pursuit of truth and 
lmowledge. 
2. Academic freedom (freedom ~rom violence, especially), is 
most essential if the learning process is to operate. 
3. Teachers must allow their students to develop self-
esteem, and cognitive self-reliance. They must aid in 
the process. 
4. The teacher must be a man of moral conviction, willing 
to state and de~end his convictions but not force them 
on others. 
5. The teacher must cultivate the mind by stressing the 
role of reason and concept formation in the educative 
process. 
The leal'ner: 
1. The learner has a right to an education, but not to a 
formal education unless that right is earned and sus-
tained by productive work. 
2. The learner must value cognitive excellence and pro-
ductive work. 
3. The learner must abhor the use o:r violence in the aca-
demic community, realizing that J.orce may be a threat 
to rational inquiry. 
r 
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The learner must rely on his own efrorts to acquire a 
formal education, seeking help only after sustained 
efrort on his own. 
5. The learner must be a moral being, dedicated to the 
concepts of reason, purpose and selr-esteem with their 
corresponding virtues of rationality, pride, honesty, 
integrity, justice, productiveness, and independence. 
The institution: 
1. It must roster rationality. 
2. It must devote itselr to the free pursuit of truth. 
3. It must not rall prey to violence and brute rorce as 
means or persuasion., 
4. It may allow the learner freedom of choice, provided 
he has proven himself r·esponsible to make decisions. 
5. It must not fall prey to government intervention, which 
tends to substitute race or "welfare socialism" as the 
basis for evaluation. 
It is the author's belief that unless formal educa-
tion in America first stipulates and then Dnplements these 
principles consistent \vi th Objectivism, little hope remains 
for any viable educational reform. If the above concepts 
could be summarized in one sentence, it might read--man has 
a mind; allow him the opportunity to cultivate and sustain 
it. It i.s a plea educators dare not ignore any longer. 
This study will conclude by offering suggestions ror 
further research. Since Objectivism is just gaining the 
recognition it deserves, many areas of investigation m.;ait 
r ~ 220 
the potential researcher. A ~ew of the more important ones 
include the following: a study of Objectivist epistemology, 
especially the process of concept formation. Rand has 
severely critiqued the behaviorism school, speci~ically 
B. F. Skinner.6 A comparison between the two approaches 
might prove ~rui t~ul. In this context, Nathaniel B1•anden' s 
writings, especially The Psychology of Sel~-Esteem, would 
be very use~ul as he has ~or.mulated a psychology based on 
Objectivist philosophy. 
Rand's approach to ~or.mal logic and the Laws o~ 
Thought could also be investigated. Her re~utation o~ the 
"analytic-synthetic" dichotomy plus deriving ethical postu-
lates ~rom the laws has, as we have seen, resulted in much 
criticism. The entire role of logic in Objectivist philos-
ophy deserves treatment. 
Of course, Objectivist ethics might also be examined 
in a separate study. Comparisons with Christian moral 
beliefs might help to lessen the attacks leveled against 
the ~ormer. Contingent upon such an investigation would 
be an examination of the definitional thinking implicit in 
so much of Objectivist moral philosophy. 
Objectivism can no longer be ignored by the academic 
cmr..muni ty. Students are discovering its championing of 
6see: Ayn Rand, "The Stimulus ••• ," The All Rand 
Letter, Parts I -II, Nos. (f-:"9" 1 J-anuary 17, 31, 1'91"2l, -4, 
I-6, and 11 ••• And the Response, 11 The Avn Rand Letter, 
Parts I-II, I, Nos:-H'f.:'Iltp7ebruary 14, 2~2), 1-4-, 1-L~. 
The attack centers on Skinne1 .. ' s Beyond Freedom and Digni tl 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 197 
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rational sel~-interest and individualism to be a re~reshing 
change from current intellectual practice which may be de-
scribed as an odd mixture of existentialism, Rousseau's 
naturalism and anarchy. For example, students at Rice Uni-
versity, in 1965, voted overv1helmingly to read The Virtue 
of Selfishness as their "Book of the Semester," despite 
opposition from the campus liberals.? It is hoped that this 
study will serve to introduce students and faculty to Objec-
tivism and thus serve as a springboard for further discus-
sion and investigation. 
?Nathaniel Brm1den, "A Report to Our Readers-1965," 
The Objectivist Newsletter, IV, No. 12 (December, 1965}, 57. 
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